



PREV

REVUE SYSTÉMATIQUE
DE L'EFFICACITÉ DES
PROGRAMMES DE PRÉVENTION
PRIMAIRE ET SECONDAIRE
DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA
RADICALISATION VIOLENTE

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Table des matières

Sommaire exécutif.....	1
Introduction.....	2
Objectifs.....	2
Résultats.....	2
Discussion.....	3
<i>Conclusions principales.....</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Limites des études.....</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Recommandations pour le design, l'implantation et l'exécution de programmes.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Recommandations pour l'évaluation de programmes.....</i>	<i>7</i>
Introduction.....	8
Qu'est-ce que le RPC-PREV?.....	9
L'importance des lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur les données probantes.....	9
Contexte théorique.....	11
L'importance de disposer de définitions claires.....	13
Les revues systématiques dans le domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation violente.....	13
Objectifs.....	14
Le modèle logique de la santé publique appliqué au domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation violente.....	15
Méthodologie.....	17
Étape 1 : Développer le modèle logique et formuler les questions principales.....	18
<i>1.1 : Développer le modèle logique.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>1.2 : Formuler les questions de recherche.....</i>	<i>20</i>
Étape 2 : Déterminer les études admissibles.....	20
<i>2.1 : Établir les définitions.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>2.2 : Établir les critères d'inclusion et d'exclusion.....</i>	<i>21</i>
Étape 3 : Effectuer la recension de littérature et la mettre à jour.....	22
Étape 4 : Sélectionner les études admissibles pour la revue systématique.....	22
Étape 5 : Évaluer la qualité des études.....	24
Étape 6 : Extraire les informations contenues dans les études.....	24
Étape 7 : Synthétiser les résultats des études et interpréter les données probantes.....	25
Étape 8 : Rédiger le rapport et formuler des recommandations préliminaires.....	25
Résultats.....	26
Discussion.....	31
Conclusions principales.....	32
<i>1) Les programmes visant des communautés précises sont contre-productifs.....</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>2) Les programmes de surveillance sont contre-productifs.....</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>3) Les programmes de police communautaire ont éprouvé des difficultés d'implantation et n'ont pas été adéquatement évalués quant à leur efficacité.....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>4) Les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire semblent être efficaces pour renforcer les facteurs de protection potentiels face à la radicalisation violente.....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>5) Les données disponibles sur les campagnes de contre-discours sont rares, mais encourageantes.....</i>	<i>36</i>

6) Les données concernant les retombées des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire de la radicalisation violente d'extrême droite, d'extrême gauche et à cause unique sont pratiquement inexistantes.....	36
7) Il n'y a pas suffisamment de données en ce qui concerne les aspects financiers et l'implantation des programmes de prévention.....	37
Limites des études.....	38
Limites de l'étude actuelle.....	40
Recommandations.....	41
<i>Recommandations pour le design, l'implantation et l'exécution de programmes</i>	42
<i>Recommandations pour l'évaluation de programmes</i>	42
Conclusion	44
Bibliographie	46
Études incluses dans la revue systématique des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire 52	
Annexes	56
1) Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études.....	57
2) Stratégie de recherche bibliographique.....	58
<i>Exemple de mots-clés utilisés dans les recherches bibliographiques</i>	58
3) Liste des études thématiquement éligibles, mais exclues en raison de leur qualité méthodologique insuffisante.....	59
Tableaux synthèses (en anglais)	61
Africa.....	62
<i>Positive Outcomes</i>	62
<i>Mixed Outcomes</i>	68
Asia.....	70
<i>Positive Outcomes</i>	70
<i>Mixed Outcomes</i>	71
Australia.....	74
<i>Mixed Outcomes</i>	74
Europe.....	76
<i>Positive Outcomes</i>	76
<i>Mixed Outcomes</i>	86
<i>Negative Outcomes</i>	93
North America.....	105
<i>Positive Outcomes</i>	105
<i>Mixed Outcomes</i>	108



Sommaire exécutif

Introduction

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les attaques planifiées et exécutées attribuables à des mouvements extrémistes ou à des « acteurs solitaires » se sont intensifiées et propagées dans plusieurs régions du monde. Cela a eu pour effet de renforcer le sentiment de peur au sein des populations locales ainsi que d'inciter plusieurs gouvernements à investir des sommes importantes dans la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent.

Malgré ces investissements, les connaissances actuelles sur les meilleures pratiques en matière de prévention restent disparates et l'efficacité des pratiques actuelles n'a pas encore été clairement démontrée. Ainsi, des milliards de dollars sont présentement consacrés au financement de programmes dont on ignore l'efficacité et les effets secondaires potentiels.

Objectifs

Compte tenu de ces éléments, le Réseau des praticiens canadiens pour la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent (RPC-PREV; <https://cpnprev.ca/fr>) a effectué une revue systématique de la littérature portant sur l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire dans le domaine de la radicalisation menant à la violence. Cette revue avait trois objectifs : **1)** déterminer si les programmes de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire sont en mesure de contrer la radicalisation violente; **2)** identifier les modalités spécifiques des programmes étant associées à une plus grande probabilité de succès ou d'échec auprès des populations ciblées; et **3)** évaluer la qualité des publications scientifiques afin d'identifier les données moins fiables, les principales lacunes de la littérature et les études auxquelles il convient d'accorder une plus grande importance dans l'interprétation des résultats.

La revue de littérature a intégré des données sur les éléments suivants : **a)** la radicalisation violente d'inspiration religieuse (p. ex., islamiste), d'extrême droite, d'extrême gauche

et « à cause unique » (*single-issue*; p. ex., misogynie); **b)** une classification des retombées en fonction du niveau de prévention; et **c)** les avantages et inconvénients, les coûts, la transférabilité et, lorsque mentionnés par les auteurs, les problèmes liés à l'implantation dans les milieux communautaires. Nous avons utilisé les méthodes de revue systématique développées par les collaborations Campbell et Cochrane. Le modèle logique qui sous-tend cette revue est fondé sur un modèle écosystémique de santé publique, qui divise les programmes en niveaux de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire.

Puisque les résultats des programmes de prévention primaire/secondaire et ceux des programmes de prévention tertiaire divergeaient considérablement, nous avons décidé de traiter les résultats des programmes de prévention primaire/secondaire séparément de ceux des programmes de prévention tertiaire. Toutefois, nous avons utilisé une méthodologie commune pour les deux revues systématiques.

Résultats

Les recherches documentaires ont permis d'identifier 11 836 documents (en juin 2019), mais seulement 56 d'entre elles répondaient à nos critères de sélection, c'est-à-dire qu'elles incluaient une évaluation empirique,

quantitative ou qualitative, d'un programme de prévention primaire ou secondaire basée sur des données primaires. Parmi celles-ci, 23 études ne présentaient pas une qualité méthodologique suffisante (une note de 3/10 ou

moins selon « l'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études ») et ont conséquemment été exclues.

La sélection finale regroupait donc 33 évaluations de programmes de prévention primaire ou secondaire, regroupant au total 6 520 personnes issues de 15 pays, avec des tailles d'échantillon allant de cinq à 1 446 participants ($M = 210,32$; $\bar{E} - T = 396,0$).

La plupart des études retenues évaluaient des programmes ciblant spécifiquement la radicalisation violente islamiste ($k = 24$). Neuf études ont évalué les résultats de programmes de prévention « générale », c'est-à-dire des programmes qui ne visent pas une forme de radicalisation violente particulière, cherchant plutôt à favoriser l'ouverture aux autres, le respect, l'éducation civique, etc., aussi bien chez les personnes « vulnérables » que dans la population générale. Seulement une des études retenues portait sur des programmes visant

exclusivement la radicalisation violente d'extrême droite, tandis qu'aucune ne visait l'extrême gauche ou la radicalisation violente à cause unique.

Au total, 18 des 33 études évaluatives de programmes ont fait état de résultats majoritairement positifs, sept de résultats mixtes (à la fois positifs et négatifs) et huit de résultats majoritairement négatifs. Il est pertinent de souligner que toutes les évaluations négatives étaient liées aux initiatives menées dans le cadre de « Prevent », la stratégie nationale du Royaume-Uni en matière de prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent. Dans l'ensemble, les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire semblaient plus efficaces que les programmes de prévention primaire ciblée. Toutefois, ce résultat est inévitablement lié aux nombreuses évaluations négatives de Prevent, une stratégie englobant plusieurs programmes de prévention primaire ciblée.

Discussion

Conclusions principales

1) Les programmes qui visent un groupe ethnique ou religieux en particulier, comme dans le cas des communautés musulmanes, produisent plus d'effets négatifs/iatrogènes que de bénéfiques. Bien que certains programmes aient mené à des résultats positifs, la plupart d'entre eux étaient perçus négativement, non seulement par les communautés ciblées, mais aussi par les intervenants concernés et par le personnel du programme. L'erreur fondamentale des programmes de prévention primaire ciblée est de considérer l'appartenance religieuse ou ethnique comme un facteur de risque de la radicalisation violente. À défaut de disposer d'autres indicateurs validés empiriquement, l'utilisation de ces derniers pourrait occasionner des sentiments de discrimination et de stigmatisation au sein des communautés ciblées;

2) Les programmes axés sur des méthodes de surveillance et de contrôle dans les secteurs de l'éducation, des soins de santé ou par le biais de lignes téléphoniques d'urgence produisent plus d'effets négatifs/iatrogènes que d'avantages. À l'instar des programmes de prévention primaire ciblée, les personnes ayant fait l'objet d'une surveillance (y compris le personnel) ont fait état de conséquences négatives telles que la peur d'être espionné, l'autocensure, la stigmatisation des communautés musulmanes et la détérioration de l'expérience universitaire pour les étudiants musulmans;

3) Les études ayant évalué les retombées des partenariats entre la police et la communauté sont parvenues à des conclusions mitigées, vraisemblablement en raison de problèmes liés aux designs de recherche, aux méthodologies employées et aux mesures utilisées. La plupart des études se sont concentrées sur les

perceptions subjectives des officiers de police, des parties prenantes (*stakeholders*) et des partenaires communautaires. Tel qu'attendu, ces programmes ont été perçus de manière plus positive par les policiers et les parties prenantes, qui ont déclaré avoir ressenti des sentiments d'autonomisation, de reconnaissance et de confiance mutuelle. Malheureusement, ces opinions contrastaient fortement avec celles des membres de la communauté ciblée, qui ont fait état de problèmes de confiance envers la police et de sentiments de discrimination, ce qui a entraîné des problèmes au niveau de l'implantation;

4) Les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire semblent être efficaces pour améliorer les caractéristiques personnelles, interpersonnelles ou psychosociales qui ont été établies comme des facteurs de protection potentiels contre la radicalisation violente (p. ex., l'empathie, l'ouverture aux autres, les compétences en matière de gestion des conflits). Toutefois, la littérature actuellement disponible ne permet pas d'assumer qu'une amélioration au niveau des facteurs de protection est suffisante pour réduire le risque de violence ou de s'engager sur une trajectoire de radicalisation violente. Ceci souligne l'importance de faire la distinction entre l'impact d'un programme en termes de retombées intermédiaires (*intermediate outcomes*, p. ex., l'estime de soi, la détresse psychologique) et son impact en termes de retombées ultimes (*final outcomes*, p. ex., le risque qu'une personne passe à l'acte, s'enlise dans un mouvement ou une idéologie radicale, fasse la promotion de la violence);

5) Seules trois évaluations de programmes basés sur les contre-discours (*counternarratives*) ont été retenues dans le cadre de la présente revue systématique. Bien que ces études aient fait état de résultats majoritairement positifs, aucune d'entre elles ne mesurait l'impact entre l'exposition aux campagnes de contre-discours et les attitudes et/ou comportements radicaux violents, limitant ainsi la portée des conclusions positives auxquelles les auteurs sont parvenus;

6) Parmi les 33 études examinées, aucune ne portait sur des programmes de prévention ciblant la radicalisation violente à cause unique ou d'extrême gauche, et une seule visait l'extrême droite. En revanche, 24 études concernaient des programmes visant la radicalisation violente islamiste et neuf autres la radicalisation violente en général. Ce résultat suggère que certains types de radicalisation pourtant largement répandus ne sont pas suffisamment considérés par les chercheurs, les bailleurs de fonds et les concepteurs de programmes, ou que les évaluations qui ont été effectuées n'ont pas encore été rendues publiques;

7) Les données relatives aux défis posés par l'implantation des programmes de prévention sont rares à l'heure actuelle. Cette situation rend difficile l'identification des moyens susceptibles d'améliorer la mise en œuvre de tels programmes à l'avenir. De plus, les études mentionnent très rarement les facilitateurs, les succès d'implantation, les problèmes de gestion budgétaire, ou la pérennité et le transfert des pratiques après l'achèvement du projet. Aucune des études examinées n'a fait état des coûts liés aux programmes ou à leurs évaluations, ce qui complique la tâche quant à l'allocation des ressources selon les résultats escomptés.

Limites des études

1) Il existe actuellement peu de données empiriques fiables sur les programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente de niveau primaire et secondaire. Sur les 56 études admissibles, 23 ont obtenu une note inférieure à 3/10 sur l'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études et ont été exclues. La plupart des études empiriques examinées comportaient des faiblesses au niveau des designs expérimentaux, des échantillons (trop petits ou biaisés) et de l'hétérogénéité des définitions, des types de mesures et des retombées. L'intégration des résultats fut donc très difficile, d'autant plus qu'il y avait plusieurs sections manquantes dans un bon nombre de manuscrits;

2) Les conflits d'intérêts sont aussi largement répandus dans les études d'évaluation de programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire. Dans sept des 33 études examinées, la majorité des données ont été recueillies auprès des fournisseurs de programmes (*program providers*), des décideurs, des intervenants, des partenaires communautaires ou du personnel pénitentiaire et policier, qui ont été sollicités afin d'évaluer l'efficacité des programmes dans lesquels ils étaient impliqués. Dans le cas de six études, les auteurs étaient également responsables de l'implantation du programme évalué. Dans six autres, c'est la perception des membres de la communauté à l'égard d'un programme qui a été utilisée et non celle des personnes qui ont réellement suivi le programme. Cela se traduit par des évaluations potentiellement biaisées, exagérément positives (ou négatives dans le cas des initiatives liées au programme Prevent) et, avant toute chose, peu sensibles aux impacts réels qu'ont ces programmes sur les populations ciblées;

3) Plutôt que d'opérationnaliser le succès comme une diminution des facteurs de risque empiriquement liés à la radicalisation violente, certains concepteurs de programmes ont opté pour une évaluation du degré de satisfaction des utilisateurs ou des fournisseurs de

programmes. Dans d'autres cas, certains ont décidé d'identifier ce qu'ils supposaient être des facteurs de risque pour ensuite mesurer la capacité du programme à y remédier. Tout cela restreint la portée des conclusions pouvant être tirées quant à l'efficacité réelle de ces programmes en matière de prévention et de lutte contre l'extrémisme violent;

4) Plusieurs études n'ont pas évalué ou mentionné les effets négatifs ou iatrogènes des programmes, introduisant ainsi un potentiel biais dans l'estimation de leur efficacité. Ceci complexifie par ailleurs la comparaison de ces programmes avec ceux ayant évalué les effets négatifs, pouvant potentiellement les faire mal paraître par rapport aux programmes ayant utilisé des designs méthodologiques moins exhaustifs;

5) Très peu d'études ont conceptualisé ou utilisé un modèle logique et une théorie du changement permettant de comprendre les processus qui sous-tendent les retombées positives et négatives d'un programme. Ces éléments auraient pourtant pu être utiles pour comprendre comment certaines activités de prévention sont parvenues à atteindre leurs objectifs et pour déterminer si ces résultats ont effectivement permis d'accroître la résilience à l'égard de la radicalisation menant à la violence;

6) En somme, au regard du manque d'évaluations théoriquement et méthodologiquement solides, la possibilité d'identifier les meilleures pratiques basées sur les données probantes en matière de prévention de la radicalisation violente est limitée. De plus, bien qu'il puisse y avoir des points communs dans les processus de radicalisation violente entre divers groupes ou individus extrémistes, la généralisation des résultats à différents contextes est présentement impossible dû à plusieurs facteurs : l'état des connaissances sur le terrain est limité, il existe une diversité de populations et de moteurs à l'extrémisme violent dans chaque état ou société, et les stratégies d'élaboration des programmes varient d'un endroit à l'autre. Compte tenu du

manque d'études évaluatives portant sur des programmes de prévention de la radicalisation d'extrême droite, d'extrême gauche ou à cause unique, les conclusions de ce rapport ne

peuvent donc s'appliquer qu'aux programmes de prévention généraux ou à ceux qui visent la radicalisation islamiste violente.

Bien que les données probantes concernant les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire demeurent limitées, les recommandations provisoires suivantes sont formulées à l'intention des professionnels œuvrant dans le milieu de la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent, à la lumière des conclusions tirées de cette étude.

Recommandations pour le design, l'implantation et l'exécution de programmes

1) Les programmes de prévention ne devraient pas cibler un groupe culturel, religieux ou ethnique en l'absence d'autres facteurs de risque (prévention primaire ciblée), puisque cela pourrait contribuer à la stigmatisation des communautés ciblées. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'ils ne devraient pas être adaptés à leurs destinataires. En fait, lorsqu'ils sont basés sur des données concrètes et que les communautés concernées y adhèrent, la personnalisation des programmes de prévention est recommandée;

2) Les liens de confiance avec les participants et de collaboration avec les communautés risquent d'être compromis si les programmes conçus pour la prévention primaire ou secondaire confondent la surveillance/la collecte d'informations avec des services de soutien psychosocial ou de santé mentale. Si votre programme comporte des éléments pouvant être utilisés à des fins de surveillance/de collecte d'informations, soyez transparent avec vos participants et expliquez clairement les limites de vos engagements de confidentialité, conformément à votre code de conduite professionnel;

3) Il ne faut pas s'attendre à ce que les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire préviennent une attaque, mais plutôt à ce qu'ils réduisent le risque – à moyen ou long terme – qu'une personne s'engage dans un processus de radicalisation violente. En

général, les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire bien conçus, ciblant des facteurs de risque et de protection appropriés, semblent être efficaces et devraient être encouragés;

4) Des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire spécifiques sont nécessaires afin de s'attaquer à la radicalisation violente d'extrême gauche, d'extrême droite et à cause unique. Les praticiens, les chercheurs et les décideurs devraient favoriser l'implantation et l'évaluation de programmes de prévention axés sur ces types d'extrémisme, en particulier dans les régions où ils sont les plus répandus;

5) Les résultats concernant l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire ne semblent pas encore généralisables. Ainsi, les praticiens devraient s'abstenir d'importer un programme tel quel d'un contexte à un autre. Ils ont la responsabilité d'adapter et de personnaliser les programmes en fonction des contextes locaux;

6) Dans la mesure où le financement le permet, il est recommandé qu'un modèle d'évaluation méthodologiquement robuste soit élaboré avant même l'implantation d'un programme. Il y a encore un besoin urgent de données plus complètes et robustes concernant les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire.

Recommandations pour l'évaluation de programmes

1) Dans le cadre d'une évaluation de programme de prévention, les conflits d'intérêts et les biais potentiels devraient être réduits au minimum ou être explicitement divulgués s'ils sont inévitables. Les évaluateurs devraient être autorisés à publier et diffuser leurs résultats de manière indépendante;

2) Les évaluateurs devraient tenter de constituer des échantillons représentatifs, en privilégiant la collecte de données auprès des participants du programme plutôt qu'auprès du personnel, des parties prenantes ou des membres de la communauté ne participant pas directement au programme. Toutefois, combiner les bénéficiaires du programme avec d'autres types de participants (par exemple, le personnel) peut mener à des évaluations plus exhaustives;

3) Les concepteurs et les évaluateurs de programmes ont intérêt à tenir compte des retombées intermédiaires (p. ex., une meilleure capacité à considérer plusieurs points de vue) et des retombées ultimes (p. ex., la réduction des attitudes ou des comportements radicaux violents) qui vont au-delà du simple degré de satisfaction des participants. Recueillir des données sur les retombées ultimes permet de s'assurer qu'un programme est réellement efficace et fournit des données sur le lien entre les facteurs de risque/protection et la radicalisation violente;

4) Les concepteurs et évaluateurs de programmes sont encouragés à mesurer la portée des effets négatifs/iatrogènes de leur programme. Les résultats obtenus dans le cadre de cette revue systématique semblent indiquer que les évaluations de programme plus rigoureuses rapportent souvent plus de résultats négatifs que les évaluations où ces effets n'ont pas été mesurés. Cela ne veut pas dire que ces programmes sont moins efficaces. Par conséquent, il est essentiel d'aider les

décideurs, les parties prenantes et les organismes de financement à bien comprendre les résultats des évaluations de programmes avant de porter un jugement de valeur sur leur efficacité;

5) Parallèlement aux effets positifs/négatifs et aux défis liés à l'implantation, les concepteurs et évaluateurs de programmes sont encouragés à recueillir des données sur la dimension financière des projets, les facteurs facilitant leur mise en œuvre et leur pérennité;

6) Les recherches quantitatives sur les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire ont intérêt à recourir à des modèles expérimentaux plus robustes. Pour cela, il est recommandé de colliger des données sur les variables contrôles, d'utiliser des mesures pré-/post-test, de recourir à des groupes témoins et/ou d'assigner aléatoirement les participants aux différents groupes si la procédure respecte les normes éthiques (si ce n'est pas possible, des modèles quasi expérimentaux devraient être envisagés);

7) Pour ce qui est des recherches qualitatives, la rigueur au niveau des analyses est essentielle afin de minimiser les biais de confirmation potentiels des chercheurs. Plutôt que de se contenter de citer des propos qui confirment la thèse de l'auteur, il est préférable de présenter clairement la méthode employée pour effectuer l'analyse de discours;

8) Peu importe le type de recherche, qualitative ou quantitative, réfléchissez et formulez une théorie du changement susceptible d'expliquer les effets escomptés de votre programme, puis élaborez et présentez un modèle logique en conséquence. Tel que mentionné précédemment, intégrez les retombées intermédiaires et ultimes dans le modèle. Au fil du temps, révissez et complexifiez votre modèle si nécessaire.

The background features a large, abstract geometric composition. A dark blue triangle on the left contains the word 'Introduction'. This triangle is bordered by a white line that separates it from a light blue triangle below. To the right, a yellow triangle points towards the center, meeting the white border. The overall design is clean and modern.

Introduction

Qu'est-ce que le RPC-PREV?

Le Réseau des praticiens canadiens pour la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent (RPC-PREV; <https://cpnprev.ca/fr/>) est un réseau fondé sur les données probantes et centré sur les praticiens, financé par le Fonds pour la résilience communautaire de Sécurité publique Canada et le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines (CRSH). L'objectif du RPC-PREV est de mettre de l'avant le leadership canadien et de développer l'excellence dans la lutte contre la radicalisation violente. Il soutient les meilleures pratiques et la collaboration entre les équipes d'intervention, grâce à une mobilisation soutenue des connaissances entre chercheurs, praticiens, décideurs et le milieu communautaire. Le RPC-PREV a quatre objectifs interdépendants en matière de prévention de la radicalisation violente :



- 1) Générer des lignes directrices sur les meilleures pratiques basées sur des données probantes en matière d'évaluation, de prévention et d'intervention;
- 2) Identifier les ressources existantes et examiner le niveau de collaboration par le biais d'une cartographie des initiatives existantes à l'échelle du Canada;

- 3) Renforcer le développement collaboratif des ressources par et pour les praticiens de multiples secteurs et disciplines, grâce au renforcement des compétences dans les domaines où les besoins sont importants;

- 4) Élargir et améliorer l'accès à l'ensemble des ressources existantes qui sont à la fois basées sur des données probantes et adaptées aux praticiens canadiens.

L'importance des lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur les données probantes

Le domaine de la radicalisation violente se trouve à l'intersection cruciale des éléments suivants: **a)** le besoin social reconnu de remédier à son augmentation parmi les populations vulnérables; **b)** des requêtes pour des lignes directrices de pratique basées sur les données probantes relatives aux efforts de prévention/intervention en ligne et hors ligne, notamment suite aux investissements importants faits par les acteurs nationaux, régionaux et intergouvernementaux; et **c)** la disponibilité des preuves empiriques, qui, cependant, n'ont pas encore été évaluées et intégrées dans des guides de pratique. De plus, comme la radicalisation violente est un phénomène à faible occurrence et dépendant du contexte (ses antécédents, son évolution et sa dynamique varient significativement d'un endroit à l'autre), il y a parfois trop d'hétérogénéité pour que les modèles de

prévention et d'intervention s'adaptent bien aux contextes locaux. Le domaine ne dispose pas non plus de lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur des données empiriques, si bien que les praticiens se fient actuellement à l'expertise locale et au cas par cas pour concevoir et implanter des programmes de prévention. Il est donc préférable de mettre l'accent sur des lignes directrices souples et adaptables au contexte plutôt que sur des modèles préétablis, permettant ainsi d'orienter le travail en fonction du secteur. De telles lignes directrices sont particulièrement pertinentes compte tenu du fait que la pratique en est encore à ses balbutiements dans la plupart des pays et des secteurs.

Une ligne directrice de bonne pratique basée sur les données probantes est une recommandation qui : **a)** vise à optimiser le bien-être et les soins

offerts à la clientèle en aidant les praticiens et leurs clients à prendre les décisions les plus adaptées à leurs situations particulières; **b)** s'appuie sur une revue systématique des données probantes; et **c)** comprend une évaluation des avantages et des inconvénients en comparaison avec d'autres options de soins (Graham et al., 2011; Pacini et al., 2016). En Amérique du Nord, les lignes directrices sont également employées dans l'évaluation des effets et de la qualité des interventions implantées, pour ensuite allouer les ressources en fonction des besoins. De plus, il a été démontré que les lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur les données probantes contribuent à améliorer la qualité des soins (Wallen et al., 2010).

L'élaboration de lignes directrices s'appuie fréquemment sur des revues systématiques en tant que point de départ. Une revue systématique recueille et analyse les études empiriques quantitatives et qualitatives portant sur une question de recherche particulière, par le biais d'une recherche exhaustive utilisant des méthodes explicites, vérifiables et très robustes (Cooper, 2017; Gough et al., 2012). L'objectif ultime d'une revue systématique est de fournir une synthèse fiable des données probantes pouvant servir à l'élaboration de lignes directrices pour la recherche, les politiques et la pratique (Pettigrew & Roberts, 2006). Les lignes directrices non fondées sur des revues systématiques sont susceptibles d'induire en erreur ou de causer des préjudices, car elles pourraient être basées sur des données biaisées ou douteuses (Lim et al., 2008).

C'est pourquoi le RPC-PREV s'est lancé, depuis 2017, dans la réalisation de revues systématiques afin de produire des lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur les données probantes au sujet des thèmes suivants :

1) L'exposition à des contenus extrémistes en ligne peut-elle conduire à la radicalisation violente? Et si oui, comment?

2) Comment évalue-t-on le succès relatif des programmes qui visent à **a)** prévenir la radicalisation violente au sein des populations vulnérables et **b)** désengager les personnes adhérant à des idées ou comportements radicaux violents? Existe-t-il des modalités d'intervention spécifiques qui sont associées à un plus haut taux de réussite ou d'échec?

En 2019, en collaboration avec la chaire UNESCO-PREV, le RPC-PREV a amorcé un processus

Delphi

(<https://www.rand.org/topics/delphi-method.html>) dans le but d'évaluer les lignes directrices tirées des recommandations faites dans ses revues systématiques. Des experts canadiens et internationaux en prévention (<https://cpnprev.ca/fr/comite-canadien/>) ont été invités à exprimer dans quelle mesure ils étaient en accord ou en désaccord avec chaque recommandation et à suggérer, si nécessaire, des modifications. Lorsqu'elles seront finalisées, ces lignes directrices améliorées et consensuelles seront ensuite adaptées aux contextes locaux et nationaux, puis transmises par le biais d'articles scientifiques, de notes de synthèse et de tout autre moyen de transfert des connaissances.

Le document actuel présente la revue systématique sur l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire (Sujet 2a). Les lecteurs souhaitant obtenir la revue systématique portant sur le lien entre l'exposition à des contenus extrémistes en ligne et la radicalisation violente (Sujet 1) peuvent consulter Hassan et al. (2018). Pour obtenir les résultats des programmes de prévention tertiaire (Sujet 2b), veuillez consulter le lien suivant : <https://cpnprev.ca/systematic-review-3/>. Notez que le rapport sur la prévention tertiaire sera publié quelques mois après la parution du présent rapport et pourrait donc ne pas être immédiatement disponible.



**Contexte
théorique**

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les attaques planifiées et exécutées attribuables à des mouvements extrémistes ou à des acteurs solitaires se sont intensifiées et propagées dans plusieurs régions du monde. Cela a eu pour effet de renforcer le sentiment de peur au sein des populations locales ainsi que d'inciter plusieurs gouvernements à investir des sommes importantes dans la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent.¹ Ces efforts représentent un développement significatif au sein des pays occidentaux et ont conduit à une plus grande implication d'institutions ne faisant pas partie de la sphère traditionnelle de la sécurité nationale, notamment les secteurs de la santé mentale, de l'éducation et des milieux communautaires, ainsi que les systèmes juridiques et carcéraux. Par exemple, on estime que les États-Unis ont alloué 16 % de l'ensemble de leur budget discrétionnaire (2 800 milliards de dollars) au financement de mesures antiterroristes entre 2002 et 2017 (Zucchi, 2018).

Malgré ces investissements, les connaissances actuelles sur les meilleures pratiques en matière de prévention restent disparates et l'efficacité des pratiques actuelles n'a pas encore été clairement démontrée (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Parmi les nombreuses études traitant de la radicalisation violente et du terrorisme – près de 20 000, selon Lum et al. (2006) – très peu sont des évaluations des retombées des programmes de prévention mis en place par des gouvernements, des institutions ou des organisations (Christmann, 2012; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013; Schuurman, 2020), et plusieurs d'entre elles ne sont pas accessibles au public (p. ex., des rapports

d'évaluation réalisés à l'interne, par et pour des agences gouvernementales sur des programmes qu'elles ont financés). Des milliards de dollars sont donc présentement consacrés au financement de programmes dont on ignore l'efficacité et les effets secondaires potentiels. Par ailleurs, la qualité et la fiabilité des quelques études disponibles sur le sujet ne sont toujours pas évaluées (Burke, 2013; Rabasa et al., 2010).

La mise en place trop rapide de mesures de prévention, souvent sous le coup de la panique et sans une compréhension approfondie du phénomène, soulève de sérieux problèmes sociaux, scientifiques et éthiques. En l'absence de connaissances adéquates sur leurs retombées et leurs impacts potentiels, l'implantation de programmes de prévention pourrait en fin de compte s'avérer contre-productive, stigmatisante et engendrer plus de préjudices que de bénéfices (Romaniuk, 2015). Actuellement, les informations disponibles concernant l'efficacité de la plupart des programmes reposent plus souvent sur des opinions que sur des preuves empiriques. De plus, de nombreuses études prétendent être des « évaluations », alors qu'elles ne répondent pas aux critères de base nécessaires à de telles évaluations.

Afin de remédier à cette situation, le RPC-PREV a réalisé une revue systématique portant sur l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire.² Des recommandations ont été formulées sur la base des résultats de cette revue systématique à l'intention des praticiens, des décideurs et des chercheurs actifs dans ce domaine.

¹ La distinction entre la prévention et la lutte contre la radicalisation violente n'est pas toujours évidente. Selon l'auteur et la situation, les initiatives liées à la lutte sont parfois considérées comme de la prévention, et vice-versa. Pour cette raison, la plupart des auteurs ont tendance à utiliser les deux termes de façon interchangeable ou à les combiner. Nous suggérons que la littérature serait mieux servie en classant les efforts de lutte contre la

radicalisation violente en termes de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire. Par conséquent, l'expression « prévention de la radicalisation violente » sera utilisée dans le présent rapport pour désigner à la fois la prévention et la lutte, ainsi que tous les niveaux de prévention (primaire, secondaire et tertiaire).

² Le rapport actuel traite uniquement des résultats des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire.

L'importance de disposer de définitions claires

L'absence de consensus sur les définitions des termes utilisés est l'une des plus importantes limites dans la littérature au sujet de la radicalisation violente. Ces problèmes terminologiques découlent pour la plupart du fait que les termes tels que radicalisation, terrorisme et extrémisme violent ont été employés de manière interchangeable. Le terrorisme et la radicalisation violente font référence à un résultat ou à un type de violence politique, tandis que la radicalisation désigne un processus ou un état (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). De plus, les définitions ont tendance à être fortement influencées par le domaine de pratique de l'auteur et par sa compréhension de problématiques sociales comparables. La plupart des définitions existantes mettent également l'accent sur la radicalisation violente à caractère religieux (p. ex., Korkhoskovar, 2014; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Les définitions récentes de la radicalisation violente (p. ex., Hafez & Mullins, 2015) mettent en évidence une vision plus holistique du phénomène en intégrant des dimensions systémiques, anthropologiques, psychosociales et sociopolitiques. Cette vision

fait écho aux travaux de Heitmeyer (2002) sur la désintégration sociale, où la radicalisation violente est considérée comme le fruit d'expériences individuelles et de conditions sociales donnant lieu à un sentiment d'injustice sociale (Alava et al., 2017). En opposition à la rhétorique du « nous contre eux », les définitions écosystémiques (p. ex., Schmid, 2013) dépeignent la radicalisation violente comme une escalade des tactiques de confrontation, où la violence apparaît comme l'unique – ou le plus efficace – moyen de défendre sa cause ou celle de son groupe. Dans le but d'intégrer ces différentes définitions, le RPC-PREV définit la radicalisation violente comme suit : un processus non linéaire au cours duquel un individu ou un groupe (y compris un État) subit des transformations systémiques (comportementales, socioéconomiques, psychologiques, identitaires, politiques et/ou idéologiques) qui le conduisent à soutenir ou à favoriser l'usage de la violence envers un individu ou un groupe, en vue de faire progresser sa cause et de susciter des changements sur le plan individuel ou sociétal.

Les revues systématiques dans le domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation violente

Plusieurs revues de littérature au sujet de la radicalisation violente ont été publiées au cours de la dernière décennie, mais peu d'entre elles portaient sur les programmes de prévention ou ont été systématiques dans leur démarche. La grande majorité de ces revues – dont certaines publiées par de grands consortiums internationaux – ont essentiellement un caractère théorique et dressent un portrait plus ou moins exhaustif des divers écrits conceptuels, théoriques et/ou empiriques quant aux causes possibles de la radicalisation violente (p. ex., Borum, 2012; Chistmann, 2012; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010 ; Doosje et al., 2016; King & Taylor, 2011; McGilloway et al., 2015; Rahimullah et al., 2013; Schmid, 2013).

Cependant, les connaissances que ces revues ont intégrées demeurent disparates et se concentrent sur des formes de radicalisation différentes au sein de populations différentes.

Les autres recensions existantes sont des revues de littérature traditionnelles ou des revues narratives de programmes de prévention (p. ex., Davies, 2018; Feddes & Galluci, 2015; Holmer et al., 2018; Kudlacek et al., 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN], 2019 ; Samuel, 2018; Stephens et al., 2019). Il s'agit donc de résumés de publications et/ou d'études sur un thème commun, ce qui tend à les rendre sélectifs et, par conséquent, plus subjectifs et biaisés (Jackson, 1980).

À notre connaissance, seulement cinq revues systématiques ont été consacrées aux programmes de prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent (Andersson Malmros, 2018; Bellasio et al., 2018; Christmann, 2012; Gielen, 2019; Madriaza & Ponsot, 2015). La première, publiée par le Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (Christmann, 2012), examine les résultats de programmes de prévention, mais ne porte que sur deux programmes de déradicalisation mis sur pied pour les jeunes ayant des démêlés avec le système judiciaire anglais, ce qui limite considérablement sa portée. La deuxième, publiée par le Centre international pour la prévention de la criminalité (Madriaza & Ponsot, 2015), est une revue typologique qui présente une catégorisation détaillée des différents programmes et stratégies de prévention, sans toutefois procéder à un examen systématique et critique de leurs résultats, ni à une évaluation de la qualité et de la fiabilité de leurs données empiriques. La troisième (Gielen, 2019) est une revue réaliste (*realist review*) portant sur les études évaluatives de programmes de prévention, dont la portée est impressionnante et dont les conclusions sont prudentes, puisqu'elle ne regroupe que les résultats d'études qui sont comparables. Cependant, une revue réaliste – contrairement à une revue systématique à part

entière – ne propose pas une évaluation des études en fonction de leur qualité méthodologique et n'est ni standardisée, ni reproductible. La quatrième, publiée par la RAND Corporation (Bellasio et al., 2018), est une revue systématique des stratégies, politiques et programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente mis en œuvre aux Pays-Bas et ailleurs. Toutefois, puisqu'elle est axée sur le design et les méthodes d'évaluation des programmes plutôt que sur leurs retombées, elle ne fournit pas de recommandations pour les cliniciens, mais uniquement pour les chercheurs et les évaluateurs de programmes. Qui plus est, sa portée géographique est limitée. La cinquième, réalisée par l'Institut Segerstedt (Andersson Malmros, 2018), est une revue systématique en bonne et due forme des programmes de prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent, mais n'a été présentée que lors d'une courte conférence, le rapport complet n'ayant pas encore été publié. En somme, les revues systématiques actuellement disponibles des études portant sur les programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente sont limitées sur le plan méthodologique ou ont une portée restreinte, ce qui diminue leur utilité dans l'élaboration de lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur les données probantes.

Objectifs

À notre connaissance, il n'y a pas eu suffisamment d'intégration des données disponibles concernant l'efficacité et les effets secondaires potentiels des programmes de prévention, et les revues systématiques réalisées jusqu'à présent ne permettent pas d'évaluer adéquatement la qualité de la littérature dans un cadre formel et structuré. Pour remédier à ces lacunes, le RPC-PREV a réalisé une revue systématique de la littérature portant sur l'efficacité des programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente. Après un survol rapide de la littérature, un constat s'est imposé : les résultats des programmes de prévention primaire/secondaire et ceux des

programmes de prévention tertiaire étaient très disparates, notamment en raison des définitions très variées des facteurs de risque et de protection, des causes du phénomène et du manque de bonnes pratiques largement reconnues. Cela nous a incités à traiter les résultats des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire séparément de ceux des programmes de prévention tertiaire, mais à utiliser une méthodologie commune pour les deux revues. Les objectifs de notre revue systématique étaient les suivants :

- 1) Décrire les retombées des programmes en termes de prévention et/ou de réduction du risque de radicalisation violente;
- 2) Identifier les modalités spécifiques des programmes étant associées à une plus grande probabilité de succès ou d'échec auprès des populations ciblées;
- 3) Évaluer la qualité des études afin d'identifier les principales lacunes dans la littérature et à quelles études il convient d'accorder plus (ou moins) d'importance dans l'interprétation des résultats;
- 4) Formuler des recommandations préliminaires à l'intention des praticiens, des décideurs et des chercheurs travaillant dans le domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation violente.

Cette revue fut exécutée afin de fournir une base de connaissances fiable et valide pour permettre l'élaboration des lignes directrices basées sur des données probantes à l'intention des praticiens, des chercheurs et des décideurs issus de multiples secteurs. Cet objectif a été atteint en intégrant des données probantes sur les points suivants :


- a) La radicalisation violente d'extrême droite, d'extrême gauche, à caractère religieux et à cause unique;
- b) Une intégration des résultats par niveau de prévention;
- c) Les bienfaits/préjudices, les coûts, la transférabilité et les enjeux d'implantation communautaire, lorsque mentionnés par les auteurs.

Le modèle logique de la santé publique appliqué au domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation violente

De nombreux auteurs ont souligné les avantages d'appliquer les modèles de santé publique aux évaluations de programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente (Bjørge, 2013; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Stares & Yacoubian, 2007; Weine et al., 2017). Premièrement, ces modèles permettent d'encadrer l'analyse des facteurs de poussée et d'attraction (*push and pull*) vers la radicalisation violente situés à tous les niveaux de l'écosystème d'un individu (Schmid, 2013). Ce cadre permet ensuite d'établir une base solide pour catégoriser les retombées individuelles et sociales des programmes – autant celles attendues que celles observées. Deuxièmement, ces modèles permettent de classifier les programmes en fonction de leur offre de services, ainsi, selon leurs activités de prévention primaire, secondaire ou tertiaire

(voir Figure 1) (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). Ils peuvent donc aider à organiser et à catégoriser des types de programmes très différents comportant des postulats, des volets et des objectifs qui leur sont propres. Troisièmement, ils apportent des renseignements essentiels sur les lacunes dans la coordination des équipes interinstitutionnelles et multidisciplinaires, ainsi que sur les obstacles et les facilitateurs de l'engagement communautaire – un élément clé pour la réussite en prévention de la radicalisation violente. Par ailleurs, les modèles de santé publique fournissent des méthodologies rigoureuses pour la conception de lignes directrices de bonne pratique basées sur des données probantes, comme celles générées par des collaborations telles que Campbell, Cochrane, NICE et PRISMA.

Figure 1
Les niveaux de prévention en santé publique



Un modèle logique est un schéma récapitulatif qui présente une population cible conjointement avec une intervention et toutes ses retombées attendues (Baxter et al., 2014). Plus précisément, ils permettent de comprendre comment et pourquoi une intervention réussit, échoue ou conduit à un résultat en particulier (Weiss, 1998). Ils documentent également les liens entre les retombées à court/moyen/long terme et les retombées ultimes, tant attendues qu'inattendues (Pottie et al., 2011; Rogers, 2008). Les modèles logiques sont de plus en plus présents dans la méthodologie de revues systématiques, particulièrement les revues portant sur des études évaluatives de programmes, comme on peut le voir dans les méthodes préconisées par la Campbell Collaboration. Les modèles logiques offrent ainsi de nombreux avantages :

- a)** Ils permettent d'identifier la population cible;
- b)** Ils aident à opérationnaliser les définitions clés;
- c)** Ils aident à établir des liens entre les concepts et les variables;

- d)** Ils facilitent la formulation des questions principales de l'étude;
- e)** Ils structurent la stratégie de recherche, la codification des études et l'analyse des données;
- f)** Ils encadrent l'interprétation des résultats obtenus;
- g)** Ils accompagnent l'élaboration de lignes directrices basées sur les pratiques soutenues par des données probantes;
- h)** Ils aident à repérer les lacunes dans la littérature et à établir des priorités de recherche future (Anderson et al., 2011; Pottie et al., 2011).

En résumé, les modèles logiques peuvent rendre les revues systématiques et les recommandations qui en découlent plus transparentes aux yeux des décideurs (Anderson et al., 2011; Wallace et al., 2012). Avec la précision des analyses qu'elles fournissent, les revues systématiques basées sur des modèles logiques permettent de déboucher sur des conclusions allant au-delà de la formule d'usure « plus d'études sont nécessaires » (Baxter et al., 2014).



Méthodologie

La stratégie de recherche a été basée sur la méthodologie préconisée par la Campbell Collaboration (<https://www.campbellcollaboration.org>) pour les revues systématiques. À l'heure actuelle, la Campbell Collaboration est reconnue comme la référence en ce qui concerne les revues systématiques, surtout dans le domaine des sciences humaines et sociales. Les étapes décrites ci-dessous ont été suivies en conformité avec leurs lignes directrices.

Étape 1 : Développer le modèle logique et formuler les questions de recherche

1.1 : Développer le modèle logique

1.2 : Formuler les questions de recherche

Étape 2 : Déterminer les études admissibles

2.1 : Établir les définitions

2.2 : Établir les critères d'inclusion et d'exclusion

Étape 3 : Effectuer la recension de littérature et la mettre à jour

Étape 4 : Sélectionner les études admissibles pour la revue systématique

Étape 5 : Évaluer la qualité des études

Étape 6 : Extraire les informations contenues dans les études

Étape 7 : Synthétiser les résultats des études et interpréter les données probantes

Étape 8 : Rédiger le rapport et formuler des recommandations préliminaires

Étape 1 : Développer le modèle logique et formuler les questions principales

1.1 : Développer le modèle logique

Notre modèle logique (voir la Figure 2) classe les programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente par niveaux de prévention en fonction du modèle de la santé publique. Les programmes de prévention primaire sont conçus pour la population générale, c'est-à-dire pour des personnes qui ne sont pas à risque ou qui ne sont pas identifiées comme étant à risque de radicalisation violente. L'objectif de ces programmes est de prévenir la radicalisation violente avant son apparition en s'adressant à une population entière (Brantingham & Faust, 1976). Ces programmes englobent un large éventail de projets, allant de programmes d'ouverture aux autres mis en place dans les écoles et les universités jusqu'à la diffusion de contre-discours à la radio ou à la télévision (p. ex., les émissions de radio parrainées par le United State Agency for International Development; Aldrich, 2014).


Notre revue de littérature a débouché sur plusieurs programmes de prévention ciblant des membres d'une population spécifique n'étant pas nécessairement à risque, la plupart du temps en fonction de leur appartenance religieuse ou ethnique. Ces programmes ont été désignés comme des « programmes de prévention primaire ciblée », puisqu'ils sont destinés à une population spécifique ne présentant pas clairement de risque de radicalisation violente (p. ex., le programme Diamond qui cible les musulmans; Feddes et al., 2015). Cette approche était plus fréquemment associée à des effets iatrogènes, notamment la stigmatisation.

Pour leur part, les programmes de prévention secondaire s'adressent à des populations identifiées comme vulnérables à la radicalisation violente. Cette supposition peut être fondée sur des procédures d'évaluation

fidèles et valides (bien que très peu soient validées empiriquement; Scarcella et al., 2016) ou sur des informations indiquant que ces individus sont à risque (p. ex., des individus que l'on sait exposés à des discours extrémistes; Liht & Savage, 2013). Ces programmes visent

essentiellement à prévenir les comportements violents et/ou l'enracinement dans des idéologies extrémistes chez des personnes jugées vulnérables, mais qui n'ont pas encore passé à l'acte.

Figure 2
Modèle logique de la prévention de la radicalisation violente



Enfin, les programmes de prévention tertiaire (c'est-à-dire les programmes d'intervention, de désengagement ou de déradicalisation) visent les individus qui se sont déjà engagés sur la voie de la radicalisation, qui ont déjà commis des actes de violence politique ou qui ont rejoint un groupe extrémiste violent. Ils privilégient la réinsertion sociale des individus et les incitent à renoncer à la violence. Ils peuvent également encourager des changements idéologiques.

Qu'ils soient de niveau primaire, secondaire ou tertiaire, tous les programmes de prévention peuvent avoir à la fois des retombées bénéfiques et néfastes, qu'elles soient voulues ou non par les prestataires de programmes. Ces effets peuvent mener à des changements (positifs et/ou négatifs) dans les attitudes et les comportements associés à la radicalisation violente (p.ex., l'ouverture aux autres). Ceux-ci ont à leur tour un effet sur les retombées ultimes souhaitées (p. ex., se désengager d'une trajectoire de radicalisation violente).

1.2 : Formuler les questions de recherche

En nous appuyant sur le modèle logique, nous avons formulé la question principale qui guidera notre stratégie de recherche documentaire : « Quelles sont les principales recommandations qui se dégagent de la littérature concernant la prévention dans le domaine de la radicalisation violente? » Cette question principale implique à son tour une multitude de questions spécifiques :

- 1) Quelles sont les populations visées par les programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente?
- 2) Quels sont les programmes de prévention primaire dont les retombées ont été évaluées?
- 3) Quels sont les programmes de prévention secondaire dont les retombées ont été évaluées?
- 4) Quels sont les programmes de prévention tertiaire dont les retombées ont été évaluées?

Pour chaque niveau de prévention, nous avons tenté de répondre aux sous-questions suivantes :

- a) Quel est le contenu de ces programmes?
- b) Comment les retombées de ces programmes ont-elles été définies et mesurées?
- c) Quelles sont les retombées intermédiaires et ultimes positives?
- d) Quelles sont les retombées intermédiaires et ultimes négatives?
- e) Par quels mécanismes les auteurs expliquent-ils ces résultats?
- f) Si les auteurs en font état, quels sont les problèmes liés à l'implantation et au financement?

Étape 2 : Déterminer les études admissibles

2.1 : Établir les définitions

Les niveaux de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire

Très peu d'études ont appliqué le modèle de la santé publique à l'évaluation de programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente (Bjørge, 2013; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Weine et al., 2017). En se basant sur le modèle de la santé publique, la distinction entre la prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire devient claire. Notre revue systématique adopte ce modèle, mais ajoute la distinction entre les programmes de prévention primaire et les programmes de

prévention primaire ciblée. Le lecteur peut se référer aux sections précédentes pour obtenir les définitions qui ont servi à classer les programmes en tant que prévention primaire, primaire ciblée, secondaire ou tertiaire.³ Bien que la stratégie de recherche inclût tous les niveaux de prévention, les résultats de chaque type de programme seront présentés séparément.

³ Dans notre revue systématique, le classement des programmes en tant que prévention primaire, primaire ciblée, secondaire ou tertiaire a été établi en fonction de l'échantillon de l'étude. Il est donc possible qu'il y ait des

divergences entre la manière dont les auteurs ont décrit le programme et la façon dont nous avons classé ces programmes.

Opérationnalisation de la radicalisation violente

Outre la définition conceptuelle de la radicalisation violente adoptée dans cette revue systématique, nous nous appuyons également sur l'opérationnalisation des manifestations de la radicalisation violente proposée par McCauley et Moskalenko (2009). Ces auteurs établissent une distinction entre l'activisme politique (la participation à des actions politiques légales et non violentes) et la radicalisation violente (des actions politiques expressément violentes et/ou illégales). Ainsi définie, la radicalisation violente peut se

manifeste par l'expression d'attitudes violentes, par la participation à des activités violentes ou par des actes de violence politique dans le but de défendre les intérêts de son groupe (ou de soi-même) en attaquant, en persécutant ou en éliminant les membres des exogroupes. Les conséquences de la radicalisation violente englobent donc les émotions, les attitudes et les discours fondés sur la haine (et leur propagation), de même que le recours à la violence physique.

Opérationnalisation des retombées des programmes

Dans cette revue systématique, les retombées des programmes ont été divisées en deux catégories : les retombées positives et les retombées négatives. Les retombées positives englobent les variables associées au bien-être individuel ou social et qui ont été confirmées dans la littérature comme étant des facteurs de protection contre la radicalisation violente. Ces retombées incluent notamment : une plus grande résilience face à la radicalisation, une amélioration de l'estime de soi, un engagement citoyen accru, l'acquisition de connaissances sur des sujets liés à la discrimination et le degré de satisfaction des participants à l'égard d'un programme. Les retombées positives incluent également la réduction des facteurs de risque liés à la radicalisation violente, comme une diminution du niveau de soutien accordé à des groupes extrémistes ou une réduction du

sentiment de détresse psychologique. Les retombées négatives, quant à elles, correspondent aux échecs anticipés ou non anticipés du programme, tels que l'insatisfaction des participants, les dysfonctions du programme (p. ex., une mauvaise utilisation des ressources financières), les problèmes liés à l'implantation, la stigmatisation de la communauté ciblée, l'augmentation de la détresse psychologique ou la polarisation vers des idées radicales. Les retombées négatives englobent également toute autre variable signalée dans la littérature comme étant un facteur de risque lié à la radicalisation violente. Dans le domaine médical, les effets secondaires négatifs inattendus sont souvent appelés « effets iatrogènes ».

2.2 : Établir les critères d'inclusion et d'exclusion

Puisque le domaine est caractérisé par une hétérogénéité au niveau des études, des designs méthodologiques et des retombées évaluées, nous avons opté pour des critères d'inclusion et d'exclusion qui maximisent l'inclusivité, ce qui a accru notre capacité à trouver des études qui utilisent des méthodologies et/ou des cadres conceptuels variés. En plus d'améliorer la généralisation et la cohérence, cette approche facilite la triangulation des données probantes.

La sélection des études que nous avons jugées recevables s'est faite en fonction des critères suivants :

- 1) Être rédigées en anglais ou en français (langues communes aux membres de l'équipe de recherche);
- 2) Devaient inclure une évaluation – à partir de données primaires – de n'importe quel type

d'initiative de prévention de la radicalisation violente;

3) Si cette condition était remplie, aucune restriction quant au design, au type, à la méthodologie ou à la date de publication de l'étude n'a été imposée (jusqu'en juin 2019);

4) Les études problématiques sur le plan éthique ont été exclues.

L'évaluation de la qualité de la littérature disponible est l'un des nombreux objectifs des revues systématiques. Nous avons donc été délibérément larges quant à ce que nous considérons comme admissible, puisque cela nous a permis de critiquer l'état actuel de la littérature. L'étape 5 fournit plus de détails sur la procédure que nous avons utilisée pour évaluer la qualité des études.

Étape 3 : Effectuer la recension de littérature et la mettre à jour

En collaboration avec un expert en bibliothéconomie, une stratégie de recherche capable de cibler un large éventail de bases de données bibliographiques et de littérature grise fut mise sur pied. Dans la mesure du possible, des termes standardisés tirés des thésaurus de bases de données ont été utilisés. La stratégie de recherche a été adaptée à chaque base de données afin de profiter pleinement de leurs fonctionnalités. Afin de minimiser les biais de publication (Bernard et al., 2014), une recherche approfondie de la littérature grise fut effectuée sur le Web à l'aide du moteur de recherche Google, afin de trouver des études, des rapports, des revues électroniques, des actes de colloques et autres documents pertinents. La recherche de programmes de prévention primaire, secondaire et tertiaire a été effectuée simultanément, car ils partagent plusieurs mots-clés.

En plus des documents recensés à l'aide de la stratégie de recherche décrite ci-dessus, nous avons comparé nos résultats avec ceux de sept revues de littérature/systématiques récemment

publiées sur les programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente : Andersson Malmros (2018), Bellasio et al. (2018), Davies (2018), Gielen (2019), Kudlacek et al. (2017), RAN (2019) et Samuel (2018). Tous les documents admissibles en anglais ou en français que nous n'avions pas repérés précédemment ont été ajoutés à notre base de données. Nous avons fait de même pour les études figurant dans la base de données du projet Impact Europe sur les programmes et interventions dans le domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent (<http://www.impact.itti.com.pl/index#/inspire/search>).

Lorsqu'une équipe de recherche avait publié plusieurs articles à partir du même échantillon, des mêmes analyses et suivant les mêmes objectifs (p. ex., un rapport gouvernemental subséquent publié dans une revue scientifique), seule la version la plus récente était retenue. La liste complète des bases de données bibliographiques consultées et des exemples de mots-clés utilisés peut être trouvée à l'Annexe 1.


Étape 4 : Sélectionner les études admissibles pour la revue systématique

Pour faire la sélection initiale des études admissibles, cinq assistants de recherche ont examiné minutieusement les titres et les résumés des publications identifiées lors de la recherche documentaire. L'accord interjuge du processus de sélection, tel qu'évalué par le kappa de Fleiss (1971), était de 0,64 pour les

évaluations de programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire, et de 0,65 pour les programmes de prévention tertiaire. Les membres de l'équipe ont ensuite passé en revue et contre-vérifié le texte intégral des documents afin de déterminer s'ils étaient ultimement admissibles. Nous avons utilisé le modèle

PRISMA (<http://www.prisma-statement.org>) pour consigner les résultats de nos recherches documentaires dans un organigramme (voir Figure 3).

Figure 3
Énoncé PRISMA



Étape 5 : Évaluer la qualité des études

Les chefs de file en matière de revues systématiques tels que la Campbell Collaboration et Cochrane ont mis en évidence à quel point l'évaluation de la qualité des études est difficile dans les domaines où les recherches varient énormément sur le plan de la méthodologie, des échantillons et outils utilisés et des résultats. Pour les besoins de cette revue, la qualité des études a été évaluée à l'aide d'une version modifiée de l'Appraisal of Guidelines for Research & Evaluation II (AGREE II; Brouwers et al., 2010), qui a été adaptée pour correspondre à l'état des connaissances en matière de prévention de la radicalisation violente. L'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études, qui se trouve à l'Annexe 2, est constitué de 10 items valant un point chacun. Ces items abordent les éléments suivants : **a)** la clarté des concepts, des variables et des questions/hypothèses de recherche; **b)** la quantité de détails méthodologiques (p. ex., la description de l'échantillon) et la validité de la stratégie analytique; **c)** la robustesse des données recueillies; **d)** la divulgation des limites et des conflits d'intérêts potentiels; et **e)** si les auteurs ont abordé les implications pour la pratique ou les recherches futures.

Chaque item de l'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études a été pondéré de manière équivalente (un point chacun). Cette décision

fait suite au constat de l'hétérogénéité des études dans le domaine, ainsi que de l'absence de lignes directrices claires concernant l'évaluation de la qualité méthodologique, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'études provenant aussi bien de la littérature officielle que de la littérature grise. Cette approche a permis d'accroître la flexibilité de l'outil ainsi que l'étendue des études pouvant être incluses. Nous avons par exemple trouvé des rapports issus de la littérature grise avec des designs méthodologiques très solides, qui ne contenaient toutefois que très peu de détails sur l'échantillon et les analyses statistiques étant donné la nature du rapport. Si nous avons accordé trop de poids à la description des échantillons et à la présentation de la méthodologie, de telles études auraient été exclues bien qu'elles contenaient des données solides. Cependant, les études qui satisfaisaient trop peu d'items (cote de qualité de 3/10 ou moins) ont été exclues de la revue systématique, car elles fournissaient des données trop peu fiables. Veuillez noter que la note « de qualité » attribuée à chaque étude ne doit pas être interprétée comme une mesure quantitative, mais plutôt comme une évaluation qualitative de la présence ou de l'absence de détails méthodologiques essentiels à toute bonne recherche scientifique.

Étape 6 : Extraire les informations contenues dans les études

Une grille de codification a été mise sur pied afin d'extraire les données et les informations pertinentes provenant de chaque étude retenue. Ces grilles contenaient les informations suivantes : **a)** les conflits d'intérêts; **b)** l'emplacement et les objectifs du programme; **c)** les caractéristiques de l'échantillon; **d)** le design méthodologique; **e)** les mesures concernant le programme (p. ex., le niveau de satisfaction des utilisateurs); **f)** les retombées potentiellement

attribuables au programme (p. ex., des changements au niveau des comportements/attitudes radicalisés, de l'estime de soi); **g)** les retombées positives et négatives; **h)** les limites de l'étude; et **i)** les recommandations en matière de politiques ou de recherches futures. Toutes les informations recueillies ont ensuite été regroupées dans un tableau synthèse (*summary of evidence table*).

Étape 7 : Synthétiser les résultats des études et interpréter les données probantes

Nous avons d'abord essayé d'agrèger les données par types de retombées (changements dans les attitudes, les comportements, la satisfaction à l'égard du programme, etc.), mais cette tâche s'est révélée impossible à compléter avec parcimonie au regard de l'hétérogénéité des études et des types de retombées. Nous avons donc effectué des agrégations de données parallèles selon **a)** l'emplacement du programme ou le pays; **b)** le nom du programme; et **c)** si les retombées étaient majoritairement positives, négatives ou mixtes. De cette façon, nous nous sommes assurés que chaque étude ne serait répertoriée qu'une seule fois.

Une fois les effets positifs et négatifs répertoriés, les membres de l'équipe ont analysé chaque étude afin de déterminer si les retombées du programme de prévention étaient majoritairement positives, négatives ou mixtes (selon les auteurs). Pour qu'une évaluation soit considérée comme « majoritairement positive », les auteurs devaient faire état d'effets exclusivement positifs, ou nettement plus positifs que négatifs (et inversement pour les résultats « majoritairement négatifs »). Lorsqu'un programme ne générait ni retombées positives ni retombées négatives, il a été qualifié de « majoritairement négatif », puisque dans l'ensemble, le programme ne justifiait pas les coûts/ressources y étant associés.

Étape 8 : Rédiger le rapport et formuler des recommandations préliminaires

Pour la rédaction du rapport, nous avons synthétisé les résultats des études de la manière suivante : **a)** les principales conclusions issues de la littérature; **b)** le niveau de confiance envers chaque résultat (c.-à-d. la robustesse des études, évaluée qualitativement et à l'aide de l'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études); **c)** la généralisabilité des résultats et

leurs applications potentielles pour la pratique; et **d)** les limites de la littérature disponible et les lacunes en matière de recherche. Finalement, nous avons employé un procédé de synthèse narrative pour intégrer les résultats et formuler des recommandations préliminaires (Moher et al., 2009).

Résultats

A large, stylized arrow pointing to the right, composed of several geometric shapes. The main body of the arrow is a solid dark yellow. The tail of the arrow is a lighter yellow with a gradient effect. The tip of the arrow is a solid blue triangle. The word "Résultats" is written in white, bold, sans-serif font on the dark yellow part of the arrow.

Le document actuel présente les résultats des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire. Pour obtenir les résultats des programmes de prévention tertiaire, veuillez consulter le lien suivant : <https://cpnprev.ca/systematic-review-3/>.

Veuillez noter que le rapport sur les programmes de prévention tertiaire pourrait être publié quelques mois après le rapport actuel et ne sera donc peut-être pas disponible immédiatement.

Parmi les 11 836 études identifiées par nos recherches, 56 étaient admissibles à cette revue, car elles comportaient une évaluation empirique d'une initiative de prévention primaire ou secondaire fondée sur des données primaires. Parmi celles-ci, 23 études ne présentaient pas une qualité méthodologique suffisante pour être incluses (une note de 3/10 ou moins selon l'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études). Ces chiffres sont révélateurs de nombreux problèmes en ce qui concerne l'état de la littérature, dont il sera question dans les sections suivantes. La liste des études admissibles, mais exclues peut être consultée à l'Annexe 3.

La sélection finale regroupait donc 33 études de prévention primaire et secondaire qui ont évalué les retombées de 31 programmes différents dans 15 pays (Royaume-Uni [$k = 16$], États-Unis [$k = 4$], Pays-Bas [$k = 3$], Afghanistan [$k = 1$], France [$k = 2$], Kenya [$k = 2$], Somalie [$k = 2$], Australie [$k = 1$], Belgique [$k = 1$], Irak [$k = 1$], Allemagne [$k = 1$], Mali [$k = 1$], Écosse [$k = 1$], Suède [$k = 1$], Tunisie [$k = 1$]).⁴ Aucun document retenu ne comportait d'évaluation d'un programme canadien. Le nombre total de participants s'élevait à 6 520, avec des tailles d'échantillon allant de cinq (Madriaza et al., 2018; Manby, 2010b) à 1 446 personnes (Swedberg & Reisman, 2013). La moyenne du

nombre de participants était de 210,32 ($\bar{E}-T = 396,0$).

Le tableau 1 présente chacune des 33 évaluations de programmes retenues, classées par **a)** emplacement géographique, **b)** types de retombées, et **c)** nom de programme. La plupart des études ($k = 24$) ont évalué des programmes ciblant spécifiquement la radicalisation violente islamiste. Neuf études ont évalué les résultats de programmes de prévention générale, c'est-à-dire des programmes qui ne visent pas une forme de radicalisation violente particulière, cherchant plutôt à favoriser l'ouverture aux autres, le respect, l'éducation civique, etc. Seulement une des études retenues portait sur des programmes visant exclusivement la radicalisation violente d'extrême droite, tandis qu'aucune ne visait l'extrême gauche ou la radicalisation violente à cause unique.

Sur ces 33 études, 18 ont fait état de retombées majoritairement positives, sept ont fait état de retombées mixtes (à la fois positives et négatives), et huit ont fait état de retombées majoritairement négatives. Il est pertinent de souligner que toutes les évaluations négatives étaient liées à des initiatives menées dans le cadre de Prevent, la stratégie nationale du Royaume-Uni en matière de prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent. Dans l'ensemble, les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire semblaient plus efficaces que les programmes de prévention primaire ciblés. Ces derniers semblent avoir généré plus d'effets négatifs que positifs et ont été globalement moins efficaces que les autres types de programmes de prévention. Toutefois, ce résultat est inévitablement lié aux nombreuses évaluations négatives de Prevent, une stratégie englobant plusieurs programmes de prévention primaire ciblés.

⁴ Deux études (Christiaens et al., 2018; Swedberg & Reisman, 2013) ont été réalisées dans plusieurs pays, ce qui

explique la disparité entre le nombre d'études (k) et le nombre de pays.

Tableau 1

Évaluations de programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire retenues, classées par a) emplacement géographique, b) types de résultats, c) nom du programme

Type de retombées	Nom du programme	n	Devis métho.	Type de radicalisation violente	Type de prévention
Afrique					
Majoritairement positives	Being Kenyan Being Muslim, Kenya (Savage et al., 2014)	24	Quanti.	Islamiste	Secondaire
	Programmes basés sur le Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, Mali (Aldrich, 2014)	200	Quanti.	Islamiste	Primaire
	Search for Common Ground: Bottom-Up Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Tunisie (Bala, 2017)	10	Quali.	Islamiste	Primaire
	Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program, Somalie; Garissa Youth Program, Kenya; et Kenya Transition Initiative Eastleigh Program, Kenya (Swedberg & Reisman, 2013)	1 446	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire
Mixtes	Somali Youth Leaders Initiative, Somalie (Mercy Corps, 2016)	812	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire
Majoritairement négatives	-	-	-	-	-
Asie					
Majoritairement positives	Break the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project, Irak (Speckhard et al., 2018)	N/A*	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire et secondaire
Mixtes	Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training, Afghanistan (Mercy Corps, 2015)	729	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire
Majoritairement négatives	-	-	-	-	-
Australie					
Majoritairement positives	More Than a Game, Australie (Johns et al., 2014)	39	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire ciblée
Mixtes	-	-	-	-	-
Majoritairement négatives	-	-	-	-	-
Europe					
Majoritairement positives	Being Muslim Being British, Royaume-Uni (Liht & Savage, 2013)	81	Quanti.	Islamiste	Secondaire
	Being Muslim Being Scottish, Écosse (Boyd-MacMillan, 2016)	21	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire ciblée
	BOUNCEUp, Belgique, France, Allemagne, Pays-Bas et Suède (Christiaens et al., 2018)	151	Métho. mixte	Générale	Secondaire
	Diamond, Pays-Bas (Feddes et al., 2015)	46	Quanti.	Islamiste	Primaire ciblée

	Diamond, Pays-Bas (Scientific Approach to Formulate Indicators & Responses to Radicalisation [SAFIRE], 2013)	46	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Primaire ciblée
	Prevent [Citizenship Programme], Royaume-Uni (Manby, 2010a)	9	Métho. mixte	Générale	Secondaire
	Prevent [Pathways into Adulthood], Royaume-Uni (Manby, 2010b)	5	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Secondaire
	Prevent [Pilot Parenting Project], Royaume-Uni (Manby, 2009a)	7	Métho. mixte	Générale	Primaire
	Prevent [Theatre Project], Royaume-Uni (Manby, 2009b)	6	Métho. mixte	Générale	Secondaire
Mixtes	Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women, and Imams' Active Development, Royaume-Uni (Sheikh et al., 2012)	82	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	48 programmes sous Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Hirschfield et al., 2012)	104	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent [Film Project], Royaume-Uni (Manby, 2009c)	9	Métho. mixte	Générale	Secondaire
	Vivre-Ensemble, France (Madriaza et al., 2018)	5	Quanti.	Générale	Secondaire
Majoritairement négatives	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Bowie & Revell, 2018)	8	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (HM Government, 2011a-d)	1 158	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Joyce, 2018)	38	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Kundnani, 2009)	32	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Kyriacou et al., 2017)	9	Métho. mixte	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Lakhani, 2012)	56	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent, Royaume-Uni (Younis & Jadhav, 2019)	16	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
	Prevent [Pathfinder], Royaume-Uni (McDonald & Mir, 2011)	1 149	Quali.	Islamiste	Prim. et sec. ciblée
Amérique du Nord					
Majoritairement positives	LAPD iWatch, États-Unis (Castillo, 2015)	18	Quali.	Générale	Primaire et secondaire
	Redirect Method, États-Unis (Helmus & Klein, 2019)	N/A*	Quanti.	Extrême droite, islamiste	Secondaire
	WORDE, États-Unis (Williams et al., 2016)	179	Quanti.	Générale	Primaire
Mixtes	See Something, Say Something, États-Unis (Campbell III, 2011)	25	Quali.	Générale	Primaire
Majoritairement négatives	-	-	-	-	-

* Speckhard et al. (2018) et Helmus et Klein (2019) ont évalué l'impact de campagnes de contre-discours en ligne. Comme le nombre de participants touchés par ces campagnes (p. ex., le nombre de clics, de mentions « j'aime », de commentaires) ne peut pas être comparé aux participants conventionnels d'une étude, ils ont été exclus du décompte des participants.

Les tableaux synthèses des études retenues se trouvent à la fin du présent document (p. 61; à savoir, ils n'ont pas été traduits de l'anglais). Ils résument l'état actuel des données probantes en ce qui concerne les avantages, les inconvénients et les coûts (lorsqu'ils sont documentés) des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire. Les tableaux 2.1 à 2.33 fournissent les informations suivantes pour chacun des programmes: **a)** le nom du programme et le pays où il a été implanté; **b)** les objectifs du programme; **c)** les caractéristiques de l'échantillon; **d)** les détails méthodologiques; **e)** les retombées positives; **f)** les retombées

g) le bilan des retombées (majoritairement positives, négatives ou mixtes); **h)** les limites identifiées par les auteurs; **i)** les limites non mentionnées par les auteurs, mais identifiées par notre équipe; et **j)** une note correspondant à la qualité de l'étude (/10). Chaque tableau est suivi d'un résumé du contenu de chaque étude sous forme de texte, puis d'une évaluation de la fiabilité de ses résultats. La synthèse de ces 33 études est présentée dans les sections suivantes portant sur les conclusions principales, les limites, les recommandations et les recherches futures.

The image features a large, abstract geometric composition. On the left, a large green triangle points towards the right. Overlapping its bottom edge is a lighter green triangle, also pointing right. To the right of the lighter green triangle is a small, light green triangle pointing right. Further right is a blue triangle pointing right. The word "Discussion" is written in white, bold, sans-serif font across the green triangle.

Discussion

Le présent document propose une revue systématique de la littérature portant sur l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire dans le domaine de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent. Comparativement aux revues de littérature et systématiques similaires, l'étude actuelle comporte des avantages notables. Premièrement, son contenu est d'actualité, puisque la revue inclut des articles publiés jusqu'en juin 2019. Deuxièmement, elle contient des études évaluatives de programmes provenant du monde entier plutôt que d'une région précise, et ce, malgré la surreprésentation d'études concernant les programmes sous la bannière Prevent au Royaume-Uni. Troisièmement, en plus de regrouper les données probantes, elle les évalue

de manière critique et pondère les principales conclusions et recommandations selon la fiabilité des données. Quatrièmement, puisque l'un de ses objectifs était de jeter les bases nécessaires à l'élaboration de lignes directrices de bonnes pratiques fondées sur des données probantes, elle fournit des recommandations pour la pratique clinique ainsi que pour les recherches et évaluations futures.

Dans les sections suivantes, nous aborderons les conclusions principales de notre revue systématique, les limites les plus importantes des études retenues, ainsi que celles de la présente revue. Finalement, nous élaborons des recommandations pour le design, l'implantation, l'exécution et l'évaluation de programmes futurs.

Conclusions principales

1) Les programmes visant des communautés précises sont contre-productifs

D'après les données disponibles, les programmes qui visent un groupe ethnique ou religieux en particulier – dans le cas présent, les communautés musulmanes – génèrent plus d'effets négatifs/iatrogènes que de bienfaits (Bowie & Revell, 2018; HM Government, 2011a-d ; Kundnani, 2009; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Lakhani, 2012; McDonald & Mir, 2011; Younis & Jadhav, 2019). Bien que certains programmes aient donné lieu à des retombées positives (More Than a Game [Johns et al., 2014], BMBS [Boyd-MacMillan, 2016] et Diamond [Feddes et al., 2015; SAFIRE, 2013]), ils ont pour la plupart été perçus négativement, tant par les communautés minoritaires ciblées que par les intervenants et les membres du personnel chargés des programmes. Ils ont été dépeints comme étant principalement contre-productifs, entraînant des conséquences négatives telles que la stigmatisation, la discrimination, la méfiance et la peur d'être surveillé. Ces conséquences sont particulièrement problématiques puisqu'elles ont été documentées dans la littérature comme des facteurs de risque de la radicalisation violente, surtout en relation à la capacité qu'ont

les mouvements extrémistes présents en Occident à mobiliser les griefs articulés autour de la discrimination et du racisme pour créer une mentalité « nous contre eux » afin de justifier leurs actions (Piazza, 2011). En outre, les impacts négatifs de ces programmes semblent persister dans le temps.

Les résultats négatifs proviennent pour la plupart d'évaluations liées à la stratégie Prevent du Royaume-Uni. Cependant, la stratégie Prevent a évolué au fil du temps et a été déclinée en plusieurs programmes locaux différents, dont quelques-uns sont inclus dans cette revue systématique. La première version de Prevent (2007-2011) était explicitement centrée sur les communautés musulmanes et a été considérée comme une cause majeure de stigmatisation pour cette communauté (Busher et al., 2019; Kundnani, 2009; Romaniuk, 2015). La majorité des études de notre revue rapportant des résultats négatifs ont en effet évalué des composantes de la stratégie initiale de Prevent. En 2011, la stratégie a été élargie à l'ensemble des formes d'extrémisme afin d'éviter de

stigmatiser la communauté musulmane (Busher et al., 2019). Consolidé en 2015 avec le Counter Terrorism and Security Act (Prevent Duty act), ce changement dans la stratégie a de plus légalement contraint les autorités locales de différents secteurs sociaux à s'impliquer dans la prévention du terrorisme; une démarche qui a été perçue comme une incitation et/ou une obligation à la délation (Busher et al., 2019; Elwick & Jerome, 2019). Malheureusement, les études incluses dans notre revue au sujet de la deuxième phase de Prevent ont constaté les mêmes effets iatrogènes que ceux mis en évidence lors de la première phase, malgré les efforts déployés pour renouveler la stratégie (Bowie & Revell, 2018; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Younis & Jadhav, 2019).

L'erreur fondamentale des programmes de prévention primaire ciblée est de confondre l'appartenance religieuse ou l'ethnicité avec le risque de radicalisation violente. Présumer l'existence d'un risque sans pouvoir s'appuyer sur des indicateurs empiriquement validés peut susciter des sentiments de discrimination et de stigmatisation au sein des communautés ciblées. À l'inverse, plusieurs programmes de prévention secondaire conçus spécifiquement pour remédier à la radicalisation islamiste n'ont pas été accueillis avec méfiance, puisqu'ils

étaient dirigés vers des individus réellement à risque (activement courtisés par des groupes extrémistes islamistes ou étant déjà engagés sur une trajectoire de radicalisation violente).

Fait à noter, les études qui ont souligné les aspects négatifs des programmes de prévention primaire ciblée ont souvent échoué à faire la distinction entre les opinions des personnes participant au programme et celles des membres de la communauté ou des intervenants. Par conséquent, il est difficile de déterminer si les retombées négatives représentent réellement l'expérience des participants ou si des observateurs externes ont émis des opinions négatives au sujet d'un programme qu'ils n'ont peut-être pas tout à fait compris ou dont ils n'ont pas fait l'expérience. Cependant, même en tenant compte de cette limite, il n'y a présentement pas assez de preuves permettant de conclure que les programmes de prévention qui ciblent un groupe ethnique/religieux précis, en l'absence de tout autre facteur de risque, devraient être encouragés davantage. Les intervenants qui souhaiteraient tout de même mettre en œuvre ce genre de programmes devraient se méfier des effets iatrogènes potentiels, en plus de prévoir une évaluation et un suivi continu de ces effets pendant toute la durée du programme.

2) Les programmes de surveillance sont contre-productifs

Selon les données disponibles, les programmes axés sur des méthodes de surveillance et de contrôle dans les secteurs de l'éducation, des soins de santé ou par le biais de lignes téléphoniques d'urgence produisent plus d'effets négatifs/iatrogènes que d'avantages. À l'instar des programmes de prévention primaire ciblée, les personnes ayant fait l'objet d'une surveillance ont fait état de conséquences négatives telles que la peur d'être espionné, l'autocensure, ainsi que la stigmatisation des

communautés musulmanes. De plus, ces programmes créent des climats de méfiance et de suspicion en encourageant des pratiques qui portent atteinte à la liberté de pensée et d'expression. En effet, ces programmes semblent avoir contribué à la détérioration de l'expérience universitaire pour les étudiants musulmans du Royaume-Uni, et même le personnel des programmes hésitait à les mettre en œuvre.

3) Les programmes de police communautaire ont éprouvé des difficultés d'implantation et n'ont pas été adéquatement évalués quant à leur efficacité

Les études évaluant les retombées des partenariats entre la police et les communautés sont parvenues à des conclusions mitigées, vraisemblablement en raison de problèmes liés aux designs de recherche, aux types de méthodologie et aux mesures utilisées (Castillo, 2015; McDonald & Mir, 2011; Sheikh et al., 2012). La majorité de ces études évaluatives n'ont recueilli que les taux de satisfaction des participants et les perceptions subjectives des policiers, des parties prenantes et des partenaires communautaires. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, ces programmes ont été perçus de manière plus positive par les policiers et par les parties prenantes, qui ont déclaré avoir ressenti des sentiments d'autonomisation, de reconnaissance et de confiance mutuelle. Ces résultats n'ont toutefois pas permis de se faire une idée sur la capacité réelle de ces programmes à prévenir la radicalisation violente, surtout si l'on tient compte que ces opinions contrastent fortement avec celles des membres des communautés ciblées, qui ont fait état de problèmes de confiance envers la police et de sentiments de discrimination.

Ces programmes ont également été entravés par de nombreux défis au niveau de l'implantation. Par exemple, ces programmes

visaient pour la plupart des populations musulmanes, ce qui peut accroître la méfiance générale à l'égard de ces communautés et contribuer à amplifier les stéréotypes et la stigmatisation. Par ailleurs, ce type de programmes était perçu comme une forme de profilage ethnique ou religieux par les membres des communautés musulmanes, notamment en raison de leurs relations tendues avec les agences de sécurité par le passé. Cette constatation revêt une importance particulière au regard de l'héritage des mesures de sécurité adoptées après le 11 septembre 2001, du manque de confiance entre les communautés racisées et les forces de l'ordre, de même que des perceptions négatives préexistantes que peuvent avoir certaines communautés de nouveaux arrivants à l'égard de la police.

Par conséquent, nous ne disposons pas pour l'instant de données suffisantes pour déterminer l'efficacité des programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente basés sur les services de police communautaire, surtout en raison du manque d'études évaluatives adéquates dont les mesures ne seraient pas douteuses ou biaisées (p. ex., le degré de satisfaction des concepteurs du programme).

4) Les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire semblent être efficaces pour renforcer les facteurs de protection potentiels face à la radicalisation violente

Les études d'évaluation indiquent que les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire sont efficaces pour améliorer les caractéristiques personnelles, interpersonnelles ou psychosociales qui ont été établies dans la littérature comme des facteurs de protection contre la radicalisation violente. Des effets positifs ont été documentés dans des programmes de prévention générale (Madriaza et al., 2018; Manby, 2009a-c, 2010a; Williams et al., 2016) ainsi que dans des programmes centrés sur la radicalisation islamiste (Boyd-

MacMillan, 2016; Feddes et al., 2015; Hirschfield et al., 2012; Johns et al., 2014; Liht & Savage, 2013; Manby, 2010b; Mercy Corps, 2015, 2016; SAFIRE, 2013; Savage et al., 2014; Swedberg & Reisman, 2013). Ces programmes favorisaient le développement de plusieurs éléments : l'engagement civique, l'employabilité, l'ouverture aux autres (ou la complexité intégrative), le travail d'équipe, la maîtrise de soi, la gestion des conflits et la communication, une sensibilisation aux dynamiques qui sous-tendent la radicalisation violente, l'empathie,

l'estime de soi, le sentiment d'identité, la pensée critique et les connaissances religieuses.

Toutefois, on ne peut pas présumer qu'une amélioration au niveau des facteurs de protection généraux est suffisante pour réduire le risque de violence ou de s'engager sur une trajectoire de radicalisation violente. Par exemple, bien que certains programmes aient réussi à améliorer l'employabilité et l'engagement civique, ces améliorations n'étaient pas corrélées à une diminution de la sympathie à l'égard des groupes extrémistes ou à une baisse du recours à la violence pour des motifs politiques (Mercy Corps, 2015; Swedberg & Reisman, 2013). Il en va de même pour deux études évaluatives qui ont fait état d'améliorations au niveau du sentiment d'identité, de l'ouverture aux autres, de l'empathie, de l'estime de soi et des compétences en matière de résolution des conflits, sans que cela s'accompagne d'une diminution des attitudes radicales violentes (Madriaza et al., 2018; SAFIRE, 2013).

Ceci illustre la nécessité de faire la distinction entre l'impact d'un programme sur les retombées intermédiaires (p. ex., l'estime de soi, la détresse psychologique) et son impact sur les retombées ultimes (p. ex., le risque qu'une personne passe à l'acte). Plusieurs études ayant fait état d'améliorations au niveau des retombées intermédiaires n'ont pas évalué les retombées ultimes. Ainsi, bien que ces programmes semblent atteindre les objectifs qu'ils se sont fixés, il n'est pas possible de déterminer s'ils ont véritablement réussi à réduire le risque de violence extrémiste. La prudence est donc de mise lors de l'interprétation d'études qui font état de retombées très positives, sans toutefois évaluer les retombées ultimes ou les effets iatrogènes potentiels. Des telles études brosseront un tableau plus favorable du programme qu'elles évaluent, non pas parce qu'il est réellement meilleur, mais plutôt dû à la présence de biais de confirmation, qui ne sont pas autant présents dans les évaluations plus rigoureuses au plan méthodologique. Par exemple, l'étude de Mercy Corps (2015) a employé un devis

méthodologique très robuste et a procédé à l'évaluation des retombées négatives et ultimes, pour aboutir à des résultats nuancés indiquant que les programmes d'employabilité améliorent l'employabilité, mais ne réduisent pas les attitudes radicales. Un tel constat ne signifie pas qu'INVEST est moins efficace que les programmes qui ont obtenu de « meilleurs » résultats. Les lecteurs devraient donc garder à l'esprit que les retombées globales d'un programme – tel que nous le présentons – n'est pas une mesure directe de son efficacité, mais plutôt un amalgame entre la rigueur méthodologique de l'évaluation, les biais de l'auteur/de l'échantillon et, bien sûr, l'efficacité réelle du programme. Qui plus est, la littérature n'a pas encore défini avec certitude tous les facteurs de risque et de protection en lien avec la violence radicalisée, même si des méta-analyses commencent à voir le jour (p. ex., Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Par conséquent, il est possible qu'une partie des programmes de prévention aient été fondés sur des hypothèses non vérifiées.

Cependant, il est important de souligner que certains programmes sont parvenus à améliorer aussi bien les retombées intermédiaires que les retombées ultimes. BMBB (Liht & Savage, 2013), Diamond (Feddes et al., 2015), certains programmes spécifiques sous la bannière de Prevent (Hirschfield et al., 2012) et dans une certaine mesure SYLI (Mercy Corps, 2015) ont tous conduit à des améliorations des facteurs de protection, tout en entraînant une baisse des attitudes radicales violentes, de la vulnérabilité à être recruté, ou du risque de passer à l'acte par la voie de la violence politique. De plus, ces études étaient généralement parmi celles qui employaient les meilleurs devis méthodologiques. Ces résultats sont encourageants et justifient largement le recours à des programmes ayant pour objectif d'améliorer la résilience à la radicalisation violente en ciblant des retombées intermédiaires tels que les facteurs de risque et de protection (Harris-Hogan, 2020). Du point de vue de la santé publique, l'utilisation de ce type de programmes va dans le sens des

recommandations de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé en matière de prévention de la violence, qui soulignent l'importance de cibler les déterminants sociaux de la violence dans leur ensemble. Sur le plan macrosocial, cette approche peut permettre de réduire le risque et d'améliorer la résilience auprès d'un grand nombre de personnes potentiellement à risque

de radicalisation violente, en fonction des changements dans leurs circonstances de vie. En améliorant les facteurs de protection généraux, il est possible d'obtenir des avantages à long terme contre la polarisation sociale et la délinquance, qui sont en soi des facteurs de risque potentiels pour la montée de la radicalisation violente à l'échelle de la société.

5) Les données disponibles sur les campagnes de contre-discours sont rares, mais encourageantes

La présente revue systématique n'a trouvé que trois évaluations de programmes de contre-discours admissibles (Aldrich, 2014; Helmus & Klein, 2019; Speckhard et al., 2018). Ces études ont fait état de résultats majoritairement positifs : Aldrich (2014) a déterminé que si des individus étaient exposés à des émissions de radio portant sur la paix et la tolérance, ils étaient plus susceptibles de s'engager civiquement; Helmus et Klein (2019) ont constaté que le programme Redirect Method incitait les internautes en quête de contenus extrémistes sur Google à cliquer sur des vidéos publicitaires de contre-discours à une fréquence similaire aux internautes exposés aux publicités habituelles de Google; finalement, Speckhard et al. (2018) ont observé qu'une vidéo visant à combattre la propagande d'ISIS sur Facebook était parvenue à atteindre ses objectifs auprès de la plupart de ses spectateurs, soit de susciter du mépris pour ISIS,

de générer un élan de solidarité pour le combat du peuple irakien contre ISIS et d'accroître les connaissances sur la prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent. Cependant, aucune de ces études n'a mesuré l'impact que pouvait avoir l'exposition à des campagnes de contre-discours sur les attitudes et les comportements radicaux violents, ce qui réduit la portée des conclusions positives auxquelles les auteurs sont parvenus.

Il est probable que la faible quantité d'études sur les contre-discours retenues dans notre revue systématique soit due à notre stratégie de recherche, qui n'était pas directement adaptée à l'identification de campagnes de contre-discours. Pour les lecteurs particulièrement intéressés par ce type de campagnes, nous vous invitons à consulter une revue systématique récemment publiée et consacrée exclusivement à ce sujet par Carthy et al. (2020).

6) Les données concernant les retombées des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire de la radicalisation violente d'extrême droite, d'extrême gauche et à cause unique sont pratiquement inexistantes

Parmi les 33 études examinées, aucune ne portait sur des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire ciblant la radicalisation violente à cause unique ou d'extrême gauche, et une seule visait l'extrême droite. En revanche, 24 études concernaient des programmes visant la radicalisation violente islamiste et neuf autres la radicalisation violente en général. Soulignons au passage que le nombre d'actes terroristes motivés par une idéologie

d'extrême droite a plus que quadruplé aux États-Unis entre 2016 et 2017 (Jones, 2018) et que durant la même période, les attaques liées à l'extrême droite ont augmenté de 43 % en Europe (Jones, 2018). Malgré cette hausse, il n'existe pratiquement aucune évaluation empirique de programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire axés sur la radicalisation d'extrême droite. Un tel manque de données donne à penser que certains types de

radicalisation largement répandus ne sont pas suffisamment pris en compte par les chercheurs, les bailleurs de fonds et les concepteurs de programmes. Alternativement,

il est possible que des évaluations ayant été effectuées n'aient pas encore été rendues publiques.

7) Il n'y a pas suffisamment de données en ce qui concerne les aspects financiers et l'implantation des programmes de prévention

Les études ont mis en évidence une multitude de problèmes liés à l'implantation des programmes, particulièrement les initiatives sous la stratégie Prevent (Bowie & Revell, 2018; Hirschfield et al., 2012; HM Government, 2011a-d; Joyce, 2018; Sheikh et al., 2012). Ces études ont fait état d'une gestion et d'une coordination médiocres de la part des décideurs, de formations inadéquates pour les membres du personnel, de calendriers irréalistes, de difficultés à établir des liens avec des partenaires potentiels en raison de la réputation de Prevent, d'une mauvaise utilisation des fonds et d'un manque de financement, ainsi que de lignes directrices peu adaptées au contexte. En conséquence, le personnel a parfois hésité à mettre en œuvre Prevent. Des difficultés liées à l'implantation ont également été rapportées pour d'autres programmes, notamment BOUNCEUp, un programme de formation de formateurs. Dans ce cas-ci, même si les participants appréciaient le programme, moins de 20 % d'entre eux l'ont fait connaître et/ou implanté dans leur milieu (Christiaens et al., 2018). Finalement, Madriaza et al. (2018) ont mentionné que la collecte de données de la première cohorte de Vivre-Ensemble a été dépréciée, car le personnel n'avait pas divulgué les objectifs du programme aux participants et lorsque ceux-ci s'en sont rendu compte, ils se sont montrés réticents à divulguer des informations plus controversées aux intervenants et évaluateurs.

Finalement, au-delà de Prevent, les données relatives aux défis posés par l'implantation des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire sont rares à l'heure actuelle. Cette situation rend difficile l'identification des moyens susceptibles d'améliorer ces programmes à l'avenir. Les études mentionnent très rarement les facilitateurs, les succès d'implantation, les problèmes de gestion budgétaire, ou la pérennité et le transfert du savoir-faire après l'achèvement du projet. De plus, aucune des études examinées n'a fait état des coûts monétaires liés aux programmes ou à leurs évaluations, ce qui complique la tâche d'améliorer l'allocation des ressources en fonction des résultats escomptés. Or, il s'agit là de préoccupations essentielles en ce qui concerne le financement, la diffusion et la réplication. Par exemple, un programme de prévention efficace, mais coûteux en ressources pourrait ne pas convenir à un environnement où les fonds sont limités.

Nous sommes cependant conscients que le manque d'informations concernant l'implantation des programmes pourrait être attribuable aux exigences de la publication scientifique, notamment en termes de longueur des articles, qui ne permettent pas de consacrer plusieurs pages au traitement de ces aspects. À cet égard, la littérature grise – notamment les rapports d'organisations – pourrait être plus utile que la littérature officielle.

Limites des études

Au regard des enjeux abordés dans la section précédente, nous partageons l'avis de nos collègues (Christmann, 2012; Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Lum et al., 2006) que les données empiriques fiables à propos des programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente sont pour l'instant plutôt rares. En 2015, Feddes et Gallucci ont effectué une revue systématique des méthodes utilisées dans les études d'évaluation de programmes de prévention ou de déradicalisation. Ils ont constaté que seulement 12 % des 135 échantillons figurant dans ces études⁵ étaient basés sur des données primaires. Notre revue systématique arrive à des conclusions similaires, mettant en évidence le manque de preuves empiriques solides concernant l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire de la radicalisation violente. Il convient de souligner que l'objectif de notre Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études n'était pas de critiquer les designs de recherche corrélacionnels ou les études sans groupe témoin, mais plutôt de s'assurer de la présence minimale de détails méthodologiques fondamentaux (objectifs, taille de l'échantillon, analyses, limites, etc.). En dépit de cette clémence, 41 % ($k = 23/56$) des études examinées ont obtenu un score inférieur à 3 sur notre échelle de 10 points, ce qui est inquiétant compte tenu de la façon dont elle a été conçue. Ceci suggère que de nombreux programmes ont été présentés comme efficaces sans avoir fait l'objet d'une évaluation adéquate, ou sans avoir publié un rapport d'évaluation en bonne et due forme qui nous aurait permis de faire suffisamment confiance à leurs résultats.

En général, les études quantitatives analysées présentaient des faiblesses au niveau de leur design expérimental (p. ex., pas de mesures pré-/post-test, aucune variable contrôle, pas de groupe témoin, pas d'assignation aléatoire),

avec des échantillons de petite taille ou biaisés, ainsi qu'une grande variabilité quant aux définitions, aux types de mesures et aux retombées considérées. Les études qualitatives omettaient souvent de mentionner de quelle façon leurs données avaient été analysées, se contentant de décrire le processus de collecte de données et de présenter des citations dans la section des résultats qui appuyaient le narratif des auteurs. La plupart des études s'appuyaient sur des mesures autorévéloées de caractéristiques perçues comme étant des facteurs de risque et de protection, sans que la littérature ne supporte nécessairement cette association. Ces limites peuvent être dues à la nouveauté des programmes de prévention, laissant de ce fait peu de temps pour mener des évaluations substantielles et approfondies. Par conséquent, l'intégration des données est pour le moment difficile, d'autant plus qu'il y avait plusieurs sections manquantes dans un bon nombre de manuscrits (p. ex., caractéristiques de l'échantillon, objectifs de l'étude, méthodologie). Cela étant dit, ce ne sont pas toutes les études qui ont produit des données empiriques douteuses. Boyd-MacMillan (2016), Feddes et al. (2015), Liht et Savage (2013), Madriaza et al. (2018), Manby (2009c) et Savage et al. (2014) ont collecté des données avant et après intervention. Feddes et al. (2015) et SAFIRE (2013) ont utilisé des designs de recherche longitudinaux. Aldrich (2014), Mercy Corps (2015, 2016), Swedberg et Reisman (2013) et Williams et al. (2016) ont eu recours à un groupe témoin. Il est encourageant de constater que la majorité de ces études ont obtenu des résultats positifs pour des mesures allant au-delà du niveau de satisfaction des utilisateurs.

Outre les problèmes méthodologiques, la question des conflits d'intérêts était également omniprésente dans les études d'évaluation de

⁵ Données provenant de 55 études (certaines études étaient composées de plus d'un échantillon).

programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire, en particulier dans les études qualitatives. Pour sept des 33 études examinées, les données reposaient essentiellement sur l'opinion des prestataires de programmes, des décideurs, des parties prenantes, des partenaires communautaires ou du personnel policier/carcéral, à qui l'on demandait d'évaluer l'efficacité des programmes dans lesquels ils étaient impliqués (Bala, 2017; Bowie & Revell, 2018; Hirschfield et al., 2012; HM Government, 2011a-d; Joyce, 2018; Kundnani, 2009; Younis & Jadhav, 2019). Dans six études, les données primaires reposaient sur la façon dont les membres de la communauté percevaient un programme et non sur l'opinion des personnes ayant participé au programme (Campbell III, 2011; Castillo, 2015; HM Government, 2011a-d; Kundnani, 2009; Lakhani, 2012; McDonald & Mir, 2011). Par conséquent, ces évaluations étaient potentiellement biaisées, trop positives (ou négatives dans le cas de Prevent) et, surtout, elles ne tenaient pas compte des impacts réels de ces programmes sur la population ciblée. Enfin, dans six études, les auteurs étaient également les responsables de l'implantation du programme (Liht & Savage, 2013; Madriaza et al., 2018; Mercy Corps, 2015, 2016; Savage et al., 2014; Speckhard et al., 2018). Même si on pourrait s'attendre à ce que des responsables de programmes publient des évaluations positivement biaisées de leurs propres initiatives, la plupart de ces études étaient nuancées et robustes sur le plan méthodologique, tout en évaluant les retombées intermédiaires, négatives et ultimes à l'aide de procédures adéquates de collecte et d'analyse de données. Ainsi, bien que la prudence soit de mise dans l'interprétation de résultats d'évaluations effectuées par des responsables de programmes, le fait de combiner les rôles d'évaluateur et de responsable de l'implantation semble avoir des effets bénéfiques potentiels – notamment en ce qui concerne la mobilisation du personnel, en s'assurant qu'ils comprennent la complexité et les enjeux de l'évaluation, et en soutenant leur motivation tout au long du processus. Néanmoins, afin de prévenir les conflits d'intérêts potentiels, il pourrait être

pertinent de former des équipes évaluatives mixtes comprenant à la fois des évaluateurs à l'interne et à l'externe (indépendants).

Un des principaux défis à relever pour les études évaluatives est de réussir à identifier à quoi ressemble le succès et comment ce succès est lié théoriquement et empiriquement à la radicalisation violente. Au lieu d'opérationnaliser le succès comme étant, par exemple, une réduction de la présence de facteurs de risque de radicalisation violente reconnus empiriquement, certaines études ont préféré utiliser des mesures telles que le niveau de satisfaction des utilisateurs ou des prestataires du programme. Ce type d'opérationnalisation ne permet pas de tirer des conclusions significatives quant à la capacité réelle de ces programmes à prévenir et à combattre l'extrémisme violent. Pour certains auteurs, une amélioration des facteurs de protection et une diminution des facteurs de risque de radicalisation violente ne constituent même pas de véritables mesures du succès, car ces résultats sont tout au plus des mesures indirectes de la « véritable » radicalisation violente. Toutefois, il faut garder à l'esprit qu'il n'est pas possible de mesurer l'impact des programmes sur un non-événement. Autrement dit, il n'est pas possible de conclure qu'une attaque n'a pas eu lieu grâce à un programme de prévention. De la même manière, on ne peut pas affirmer qu'une attaque a eu lieu parce qu'un programme n'a pas été mis en place ou qu'il n'a pas obtenu de résultats positifs. En recadrant les programmes de prévention dans une perspective de santé publique, il apparaît clairement qu'ils ne sont pas conçus pour empêcher la radicalisation violente ou un attentat de se produire. Ils sont plutôt conçus pour réduire le risque, à moyen ou long terme, qu'une personne vulnérable s'engage sur la voie de la radicalisation violente. Par conséquent, les études futures qui feront appel à l'amélioration des facteurs de protection ou à la réduction des facteurs de risque en tant que mesures indirectes du succès s'aligneront sur les meilleures pratiques dans le domaine de la prévention de la violence générale. Des études

supplémentaires à propos des retombées intermédiaires sont toutefois nécessaires pour déterminer comment ces mesures indirectes sont liées aux véritables événements.

Une autre limite importante est que plusieurs études n'ont pas fait d'évaluation des effets négatifs ou iatrogènes, ce qui peut avoir pour effet de biaiser l'interprétation de leur efficacité positivement et de rendre la comparaison difficile avec des programmes qui ont procédé à de telles évaluations. Il se peut que cela ait nui aux programmes qui ont été plus fréquemment évalués et qui ont mesuré les effets négatifs/iatrogènes, comme les programmes menés dans le cadre de la stratégie Prevent du Royaume-Uni ou les initiatives INVEST de Mercy Corps. Même si l'évaluation des résultats négatifs/iatrogènes peut exposer les programmes, leurs parties prenantes et leur personnel clinique à la critique, cette démarche doit être encouragée, car elle est synonyme de courage et de rigueur méthodologique et scientifique. Cela signifie également qu'il faut aider les décideurs, les parties prenantes et les organismes de financement à bien comprendre les résultats des programmes ayant été évalués exhaustivement avant de porter un jugement de valeur quant à leur efficacité.

Enfin, très peu d'études ont décrit ou formulé une théorie du changement et un modèle logique permettant de comprendre les processus de changement qui sous-tendent les retombées positives et négatives d'un programme. En conséquence, il demeure

impossible d'expliquer comment certaines activités de prévention sont parvenues à obtenir des résultats positifs et de savoir si ces résultats ont vraiment permis d'accroître la résilience à l'égard de la radicalisation violente.

En conclusion, le manque d'évaluations empiriques solides sur les plans théoriques et méthodologiques limite notre capacité à identifier les meilleures pratiques en matière de prévention de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme violent en se basant sur les données probantes. Qui plus est, bien que les trajectoires menant à la radicalisation violente soient parfois communes à différents groupes/individus, généraliser les conclusions du présent rapport à l'ensemble des contextes est impossible compte tenu de l'état limité des connaissances dans le domaine, de la diversité des populations étudiées, des différents moteurs de l'extrémisme violent selon l'État/la société, ainsi que du caractère hétérogène des programmes de prévention (Bjørgero, 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2014). Étant donné l'absence d'études évaluatives des programmes de prévention d'extrême droite, d'extrême gauche ou à cause unique, les conclusions de ce rapport ne s'appliquent qu'aux programmes de type général ou à ceux visant la radicalisation violente islamiste. Finalement, en raison du manque de clarté sur les caractéristiques des échantillons et sur leur niveau de risque, nous ne savons toujours pas quels programmes de prévention de niveau primaire ou secondaire étaient efficaces pour quelles populations.

Limites de l'étude actuelle

Quatre limites potentielles doivent être prises en compte dans l'interprétation des résultats de cette revue systématique. Premièrement, il est possible que certaines études potentiellement pertinentes n'aient pas été incluses, car elles ont été rédigées dans une langue que les membres de l'équipe de recherche ne maîtrisaient pas. Pour remédier à cette lacune, toutes les études recensées qui semblaient répondre à nos critères d'inclusion (souvent en

fonction du titre/résumé) ont été confiées à des collaborateurs du RPC-PREV qui s'expriment couramment dans ces langues. En fin de compte, toutes les études ainsi identifiées se sont avérées comporter des données peu fiables selon l'Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études. Puisque nous étions déjà confrontés à de nombreuses autres publications problématiques, ces études n'ont pas été incluses.

Deuxièmement, plusieurs programmes gouvernementaux ont peut-être été évalués à l'intérieur dans des rapports n'ayant pas été mis à la disposition du public. Il est donc possible que nous disposions seulement d'une image tronquée des retombées des programmes gouvernementaux en matière de prévention primaire et secondaire de la radicalisation violente. En ne publiant pas les résultats et la méthodologie de ces évaluations, les gouvernements risquent d'accorder trop d'importance à des résultats potentiellement douteux, contribuant ainsi à alimenter les soupçons et la méfiance du public à l'égard du gouvernement, de ses programmes, de son mandat et de ses normes éthiques. Pourtant, ces conséquences négatives pourraient être évitées en soumettant les rapports gouvernementaux à une évaluation par les pairs. À l'avenir, un accès aux données ou aux rapports gouvernementaux permettrait de confirmer, de contredire ou, du moins, d'éclairer davantage les résultats obtenus dans le cadre de cette revue systématique.

Une autre limite possible est la variabilité que peut introduire chacun des assistants de

recherche chargés de la sélection et de l'analyse des articles. Nous avons tenté d'y remédier en mesurant le coefficient d'accord interjuge ainsi qu'en organisant des rencontres de formation et de résolution des avis divergents (lorsque pertinent). Cependant, l'accord interjuge est demeurée relativement faible, indiquant ainsi que la formation des assistants de recherche sur les critères d'inclusion et d'exclusion aurait pu être améliorée.

Enfin, puisque notre stratégie de recherche a été conçue pour être suffisamment large pour couvrir un important éventail de programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente, il est possible qu'elle n'ait pas été adaptée à l'étude de certains programmes spécifiques, tels que les campagnes de contre-discours. Pour les lecteurs soucieux de se faire une idée précise des retombées de types de programmes spécifiques, nous recommandons de consulter les revues systématiques disponibles ou bien d'attendre qu'elles soient publiées par d'autres consortiums de recherche. Naturellement, il s'agit là de pistes de recherches futures.

Recommandations

Les meilleures pratiques dans le domaine de l'intervention sont issues de techniques qui se sont avérées efficaces et qui peuvent être implantées ou généralisées d'un contexte à un autre (White & McEvoy, 2012). En raison du manque de données solides à propos des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire, nous sommes d'avis que les conditions nécessaires à l'élaboration de lignes directrices de bonnes pratiques basées sur des données probantes sont actuellement absentes. L'existence de nombreux documents, trousseaux (*toolkits*) et guides qui proposent des « meilleures pratiques » est donc surprenante, et on peut s'interroger sur la validité de leurs recommandations. Dans le but d'optimiser le

processus visant à identifier les meilleures pratiques basées sur des données probantes en matière de prévention de la radicalisation violente, le RPC-PREV a mis sur pied deux comités de consensus, l'un canadien et l'autre international, qui élaboreront des lignes directrices basées sur les données scientifiques à l'intention des praticiens, des chercheurs et des décideurs. Ces lignes directrices seront élaborées par le biais d'une méthode Delphi rigoureuse réunissant des praticiens et des chercheurs issus de différents secteurs et pays, permettant ainsi d'obtenir une multitude de points de vue à travers la recherche d'un consensus. Cette revue systématique est la première étape de ce processus Delphi.

Recommandations pour le design, l'implantation et l'exécution de programmes

À la lumière des données recueillies dans le cadre de cette revue, nous fournissons les recommandations préliminaires suivantes à l'intention des professionnels travaillant dans le domaine de la prévention de la radicalisation violente :

1) Les programmes de prévention ne devraient pas cibler un groupe culturel, religieux ou ethnique en l'absence d'autres facteurs de risque (prévention primaire ciblée), puisque cela pourrait contribuer à la stigmatisation des communautés ciblées. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'ils ne devraient pas être adaptés à leurs destinataires. En fait, lorsqu'ils sont basés sur des données concrètes et que les communautés concernées y adhèrent, la personnalisation des programmes de prévention est recommandée;

2) Les liens de confiance avec les participants et de collaboration avec les communautés risquent d'être compromis si les programmes conçus pour la prévention primaire ou secondaire confondent la surveillance/la collecte d'informations avec des services de soutien psychosocial ou de santé mentale. Si votre programme comporte des éléments pouvant être utilisés à des fins de surveillance/de collecte d'informations, soyez transparent avec vos participants et expliquez clairement les limites de vos engagements de confidentialité, conformément à votre code de conduite professionnel;

3) Il ne faut pas s'attendre à ce que les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire préviennent une attaque, mais

plutôt à ce qu'ils réduisent le risque – à moyen ou long terme – qu'une personne s'engage dans un processus de radicalisation violente. En général, les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire bien conçus, ciblant des facteurs de risque et de protection appropriés, semblent être efficaces et devraient être encouragés;

4) Des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire spécifiques sont nécessaires afin de s'attaquer à la radicalisation violente d'extrême gauche, d'extrême droite et à cause unique. Les praticiens, les chercheurs et les décideurs devraient favoriser l'implantation et l'évaluation de programmes de prévention axés sur ces types d'extrémisme, en particulier dans les régions où ils sont les plus répandus;

5) Les résultats concernant l'efficacité des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire ne semblent pas encore généralisables. Ainsi, les praticiens devraient s'abstenir d'importer un programme tel quel d'un contexte à un autre. Ils ont la responsabilité d'adapter et de personnaliser les programmes en fonction des contextes locaux;

6) Dans la mesure où le financement le permet, il est recommandé qu'un modèle d'évaluation méthodologiquement robuste soit élaboré avant même l'implantation d'un programme. Il y a encore un besoin urgent de données plus complètes et robustes concernant les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire.

Recommandations pour l'évaluation de programmes

Les résultats de cette revue systématique ont souligné le besoin urgent de mieux évaluer les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire dans le domaine de la radicalisation violente. Compte tenu des observations présentées dans les sections « Conclusions principales » et « Limites des études », nous fournissons les recommandations suivantes pour les recherches futures :

1) Dans le cadre d'une évaluation de programme de prévention, les conflits d'intérêts et les biais potentiels devraient être réduits au minimum ou être explicitement divulgués s'ils sont inévitables. Les évaluateurs devraient être autorisés à publier et diffuser leurs résultats de manière indépendante;

2) Les évaluateurs devraient tenter de constituer des échantillons représentatifs, en

privilégiant la collecte de données auprès des participants du programme plutôt qu'auprès du personnel, des parties prenantes ou des membres de la communauté ne participant pas directement au programme. Toutefois, combiner les bénéficiaires du programme avec d'autres types de participants (par exemple, le personnel) peut mener à des évaluations plus exhaustives;

3) Les concepteurs et les évaluateurs de programmes ont intérêt à tenir compte des retombées intermédiaires (p. ex., une meilleure capacité à considérer plusieurs points de vue) et des retombées ultimes (p. ex., la réduction des attitudes ou des comportements radicaux violents) qui vont au-delà du simple degré de satisfaction des participants. Recueillir des données sur les retombées ultimes permet de s'assurer qu'un programme est réellement efficace et fournit des données sur le lien entre les facteurs de risque/protection et la radicalisation violente;

4) Les concepteurs et évaluateurs de programmes sont encouragés à mesurer la portée des effets négatifs/iatrogènes de leur programme. Les résultats obtenus dans le cadre de cette revue systématique semblent indiquer que les évaluations de programme plus rigoureuses rapportent souvent plus de résultats négatifs que les évaluations où ces effets n'ont pas été mesurés. Cela ne veut pas dire que ces programmes sont moins efficaces. Par conséquent, il est essentiel d'aider les décideurs, les parties prenantes et les organismes de financement à bien comprendre les résultats des évaluations de programmes avant de porter un jugement de valeur sur leur efficacité;

5) Parallèlement aux effets positifs/négatifs et aux défis liés à l'implantation, les concepteurs et évaluateurs de programmes sont encouragés à recueillir des données sur la dimension financière des projets, les facteurs facilitant leur mise en œuvre et leur pérennité;

6) Les recherches quantitatives sur les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire ont intérêt à recourir à des modèles expérimentaux plus robustes. Pour cela, il est recommandé de colliger des données sur les variables contrôles, d'utiliser des mesures pré-/post-test, de recourir à des groupes témoins et/ou d'assigner aléatoirement les participants aux différents groupes si la procédure respecte les normes éthiques (si ce n'est pas possible, des modèles quasi expérimentaux devraient être envisagés);

7) Pour ce qui est des recherches qualitatives, la rigueur au niveau des analyses est essentielle afin de minimiser les biais de confirmation potentiels des chercheurs. Plutôt que de se contenter de citer des propos qui confirment la thèse de l'auteur, il est préférable de présenter clairement la méthode employée pour effectuer l'analyse de discours;

8) Peu importe le type de recherche, qualitative ou quantitative, réfléchissez et formulez une théorie du changement susceptible d'expliquer les effets escomptés de votre programme, puis élaborez et présentez un modèle logique en conséquence. Tel que mentionné précédemment, intégrez les retombées intermédiaires et ultimes dans le modèle. Au fil du temps, révissez et complexifiez votre modèle si nécessaire.

An abstract graphic composed of several overlapping triangles. A large dark blue triangle is on the left, pointing right. It overlaps a medium purple triangle below it. The purple triangle overlaps a light purple triangle to its right. The light purple triangle overlaps a teal triangle on the far right. The word "Conclusion" is written in white, bold, sans-serif font on the dark blue triangle.

Conclusion

L'objectif de cette revue systématique était de faire une synthèse critique des retombées des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire dans le domaine de la radicalisation violente. La réalisation de cette revue systématique a mis en évidence les limites significatives présentes dans le domaine, et celles-ci ont rendu l'intégration des résultats complexe. À l'heure actuelle, les données probantes concernant les résultats des programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire se caractérisent par des divergences et des contradictions en ce qui concerne les éléments suivants : 1) la compréhension du phénomène de la radicalisation, ainsi que ses facteurs de risque et de protection; 2) les types de programmes, leurs caractéristiques et leur design; 3) la formation et l'expérience des praticiens; 4) les enjeux politiques; et 5) la diversité des milieux où sont déployés les programmes (p. ex., les considérations culturelles, la nature du problème à l'échelle locale, la capacité et les ressources disponibles sur le terrain). Malheureusement, une telle hétérogénéité peut contribuer à alimenter la méfiance envers la légitimité des initiatives de prévention et leur financement, en plus d'embrouiller les leçons susceptibles d'être apprises.

Néanmoins, sur une note plus positive, l'état actuel des connaissances en matière de

programmes de prévention de la radicalisation violente démontre que les programmes de prévention primaire et secondaire sont efficaces lorsqu'il s'agit d'améliorer les caractéristiques personnelles, interpersonnelles ou psychosociales qui ont été signalées comme des facteurs de protection contre la radicalisation violente.

Toutefois, compte tenu du manque de données solides, nous sommes d'avis que les conditions nécessaires à l'élaboration de lignes directrices de bonnes pratiques basées sur les données probantes sont actuellement absentes. L'une des façons de remédier à cette situation est de développer des lignes directrices en se basant sur des évaluations d'experts de recommandations issues de revues systématiques ou de méta-analyses. Le RPC-PREV a pour objectif d'élaborer de telles lignes directrices dans les années à venir par le biais de son processus Delphi, qui regroupe des experts de plusieurs pays et de différents secteurs. Le comité Delphi du RPC-PREV évalue présentement les lignes directrices issues des revues systématiques sur la radicalisation en ligne et les programmes de prévention primaire/secondaire de la radicalisation violente. Le comité se penchera sur les lignes directrices concernant les programmes de prévention tertiaire au moment où la revue systématique sera disponible.



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An abstract graphic design featuring a large orange triangle on the left that tapers to the right. This triangle is partially overlaid by a white triangle that also tapers to the right. The white triangle is further divided into a light orange section and a blue section. The word "Annexes" is written in white, bold, sans-serif font on the orange background.

Annexes

1) Outil d'évaluation de la qualité des études

Quality of Study Assessment Tool	
Prevention systematic review	Rating (0 = no, 1 = yes)
<p>1) ARE THE KEY CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES CLEARLY DEFINED? <i>Examples of key concepts/variables : violent radicalization, self-esteem, program completion, etc.</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>2) ARE THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESES CLEARLY STATED? <i>Example : Did completion of program X reduce radicalized behaviors and/or attitudes among sample Y?</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>3) IS THE CHOICE OF METHODS IN LINE WITH OBJECTIVES? <i>Example : If the program provider wants to assess if program X had an effect on attitudes, are there pre/post measures, or at least a control group?</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>4) IS THE SAMPLE ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED? <i>Examples : N , ethnicity, gender, age, civil status, employment, ...</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>5) ARE THERE ENOUGH METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS? <i>Examples : quantitative/qualitative design, allocation to groups, description of variables/scales, statistical analyses, interview procedures, content/discourse analyses, ...</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>6) ARE THE DATA ANALYSIS METHODS APPROPRIATE? <i>Example : If variables are dichotomous, were statistical analyses adapted to such variables (e.g., using tetrachoric correlations, logistic rather than regular regression, etc.)?</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>7) IS THE EVIDENCE ROBUST? <i>Examples : Is it minimally representative? What is the strength of the research design? Were control variables/ alternative explanations considered?</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>8) WERE MAJOR LIMITATIONS INCLUDED IN THE PAPER? <i>Examples : biases in the chosen sample, suboptimal research design, weak quantitative/qualitative analyses, ...</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>9) WERE MAJOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST DECLARED IN THE PAPER? <i>Examples : interviews conducted by program staff, financial ties, authors of the paper not mentioning that they are also authors of the tool they assessed, ...</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>10) ARE FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS OR IMPLICATIONS MENTIONED? <i>Examples : how to improve the program, how to better reach the targeted populations, how to improve policies, etc.</i></p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
TOTAL (/10)	<input type="checkbox"/>

2) Stratégie de recherche bibliographique

Plusieurs bases de données furent consultées pour la recherche bibliographique, autant les bases unidisciplinaires (science politique, sociologie, religion, éducation, etc.) que les bases multidisciplinaires (Academic Search Complete, Web of Knowledge). Les recherches initiales se sont déroulées au cours de l'été 2016, puis ont été mises à jour à la fin de 2017 et en juin 2019. La liste des bases de données consultées est la suivante : ABI/Inform Global (ProQuest), Academic Search Complete (EBSCO), ATLA Religion Database (EBSCO), CBCA

Complete (ProQuest), Communication Abstracts (ProQuest), Canadian Public Policy Collection, Canadian Research Index (ProQuest), Education Source (EBSCO), ERIC (EBSCO), Érudit/Persée, Francis (EBSCO), International Political Science Abstracts (ProQuest), Medline, PAIS International (ProQuest), Political Science Complete (EBSCO), Dissertations & Theses Global (ProQuest), PsycINFO (EBSCO), Repère, Sociological Abstracts (ProQuest), SocINDEX (EBSCO) et Web of Knowledge.

Exemple de mots-clés utilisés dans les recherches bibliographiques

L'exemple suivant illustre les mots-clés utilisés pour la recherche effectuée dans la base de données PsycINFO (EBSCO) :

("Radical Islam*" OR "Islamic Extrem*" OR Radicali* OR "Homegrown Terror*" OR "Homegrown Threat*" OR "Violent Extrem*" OR Jihad* OR Indoctrinat* OR Terrori* OR "White Supremacis*" OR "Neo-Nazi" OR "Right-wing Extrem*" OR "Left-wing Extrem*" OR "Religious Extrem*" OR Fundamentalis* OR Anti-Semitis* OR Nativis* OR Islamophob* OR "Eco-terror*" OR "Al Qaida-inspired" OR "ISIS-inspired" OR "Anti-Capitalis*")

AND

(Prevent* OR interven* OR respon* OR screen* OR assess* OR procedur* OR instrument* OR program* OR reduc* OR treatment* OR counterterror* OR "counter-terror*" OR "de-radicali*" OR detect* OR "countering violent extrem*" OR CVE)

AND

(AB youth OR adult* OR adolescen* OR student* OR teenag* OR "young people" OR colleg* OR universit*)

Toutes les recherches ont été effectuées par un expert en bibliothéconomie, en utilisant les fonctionnalités propres à chacune des bases de données et un vocabulaire adapté lorsqu'approprié. Plusieurs bases de données francophones ont également été consultées une fois les mots-clés traduits par un expert en traduction. Les résultats des recherches ont été transférés dans une base de données Endnote à des fins de gestion et les titres/résumés ont ensuite été examinés afin de juger de leur pertinence.


Des recherches supplémentaires ont été effectuées à l'aide du moteur de recherche Google pour repérer la littérature grise. Puisque

l'objectif était de trouver des publications non indexées, Google fut utilisé plutôt que Google Scholar, qui aurait surtout trouvé des articles de revues évaluées par les pairs. Puisqu'il n'est pas possible d'effectuer une recherche unique qui soit suffisamment exhaustive avec Google, nous avons effectué une série de recherches en variant les mots-clés utilisés. Les cinq premières pages de résultats étaient examinées, puis les documents pertinents étaient manuellement ajoutés à la base de données Endnote. La base de données OpenGrey.eu a également été vérifiée afin de déterminer si elle contenait du matériel potentiellement pertinent.

3) Liste des études thématiquement éligibles, mais exclues en raison de leur qualité méthodologique insuffisante

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**Tableaux
synthèses
(en anglais)**

Africa

Positive Outcomes

Table 2.1—Summary of Evidence

Study	Savage et al. (2014) Secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM), Kenya.
Objectives of the Program	<p><i>Main objective:</i> Counter violent extremism and other forms of intergroup conflict through the promotion of value and integrative complexity.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Increase participants' integrative complexity and expose them to the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody; 2) Structure group activities that allow participants to explore values on issues central to extremist discourse and relevant to events in Kenya, free from criticism or social pressure; 3) Protect from the black-and-white discourse used by radical groups; 4) Train professionals who work in the PVE field.</p> <p><i>Intervention:</i> Participants took part in a 16-hour course consisting of films and group activities that enabled them to solve problems on topics related to violent extremism, according to their personal values and priorities. The program was adapted to include relevant aspects of Kenyan culture and terrorist events. During the intervention, films representing an array of Muslim viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left were presented to the participants.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>24 participants of Kenyan and Somali ethnicities who met either of the following criteria:</i> 1) have previously been exposed to extremist discourse or 2) were PVE professionals. 22 completed all the pre- and post-test assessments, eight were identified as vulnerable to extremism, and six were former Al-Shabaab members. Mean age = 29.6; 52% men and 48% women; 96% born in Kenya, 4% born in Somalia; 92% had secondary education, 50% had technical college education, 37% had university education, and 50% had Islamic religious education; 75% had work, 29% were unemployed or looking for work; and 61% reported being Muslim, but the sample included a few Christians and individuals identifying to other groups. Participants were invited by the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) to BKBM and were selected because of recent activity or alignment with extremist groups or ideology.</p> <p><i>Four subgroups of participants went through BKBM:</i> Subgroups 1 and 4 comprised individuals who were considered to be vulnerable to extremism. Subgroup 2 included KTI staff, and subgroup 3 included co-workers, organizations, and individuals who worked in the field and were contracted by KTI.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Measures:</i> 1) Paragraph completion tests were coded for integrative complexity using a standardized protocol and an intercoder reliability criteria ($\kappa = 0.89$); 2) During the last session, participants gave a presentation about what they learned and how they would apply integrative complexity to future situations in their lives. Presentations were qualitatively analyzed for the presence/use of differentiation (ability to perceive the validity of two or more viewpoints) and integration (ability to perceive underlying common values). Then, a score of 1 was given for every piece of information that reflected differentiation or integration, and a cumulative total score was calculated. This score was correlated with participants' post-test scores. Presentations were also coded for social intelligence and the confidence to address extremist issues with integrative complexity; 3) Conflict-style questionnaire consisting of two scenarios each for the pre- and post-tests. The questions were followed by five response options capturing Kraybill's five conflict-style constructs; 4) Demographics, social identity, and power measures: five-item demographics questionnaire given at the end of the course in addition to the Social Identity & Power scale.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p>1) The intervention had a significant effect on increasing the complexity with which participants think about social issues and social groups relevant to extremism, as indicated by levels of integrative complexity; 2) 100% of the presentations reflected understanding and applied differentiation, and 50% reflected integration; 3) 77% of the participants experienced an increase in social intelligence; 4) 100% experienced an increase in confidence; 5) Conflict style shifted to direct, which is in line with the confidence and empowerment expressed by participants; 6) The program seemed effective even for former Al-Shabaab members; 7) Integrative complexity seems to highly increase traditional Islamic teachings regarding mercy and benevolence to others.</p>

Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) The intervention should last longer (weeks instead of days) in order to let participants process the material and integrate new ways of thinking; 2) Floor effects exist in measuring integrative complexity, as it is difficult to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for integrative complexity to be scorable (especially difficult in the context of written test conditions); 3) Group sizes should be smaller.
Limitations (Team)	1) The researchers assessed a program they were involved in, introducing potential conflicts of interest; 2) The protocol of the intervention should be presented more clearly, as many variables were measured. It is sometimes difficult to understand what was done during the pre- and post-tests.
Quality of Study (/10)	9

This paper empirically assessed the Being Kenyan, Being Muslim (BKBM) program, which took place in Nairobi, Kenya. The main objective of the program was to counter violent extremism and other forms of intergroup conflict by promoting value complexity and integrative complexity. More specifically, the BKBM program aims to increase integrative complexity and expose participants to the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody. The program was offered to participants who had previously been exposed to extremist discourse, as well as professionals working in the PVE field. During the program, 24 participants of Kenyan and Somali ethnicities who have previously been exposed to extremist discourse, as well as PVE professionals (mean age = 29.6), followed a 16-hour course consisting of films and group activities that enabled them to solve problems on topics related to violent extremism according to their personal values and priorities. The program was adapted to include relevant aspects of Kenyan culture and terrorist events experienced in Kenya. During the intervention, films representing various Muslim viewpoints ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left were presented to participants. The intervention was given over the course of four days and eight sessions. To assess the program, researchers asked the participants to complete two open-ended paragraphs as a pre-test (first session) and another two as a post-test (last session). The completed paragraphs were coded for integrative complexity using a standardized protocol, and intercoder reliability was assessed ($\kappa = 0.89$). Coders were blind to pre- and post-conditions. In the last session, participants gave a presentation during which they shared what they had learned in the course. They were also asked to say how they are applying or wish to apply integrative complexity to

specific situations in their lives. The presentations were recorded, and the transcripts were qualitatively analyzed in order to see if the participants had been learning about and applying differentiation (the ability to perceive the validity of two or more viewpoints) and integration (the ability to perceive underlying common values). The presentations were also coded to determine the participants' social intelligence, as well as their confidence in addressing extremist issues with integrative complexity. Finally, participants filled a conflict style questionnaire, a demographics questionnaire, and a social identity and power scale. The authors reported that the intervention had a significant effect on increasing integrative complexity. Results also showed evidence of understanding and applying differentiation in 100% of the presentations, and integration in 50% of the presentations. Moreover, 77% of the participants experienced an increase in social intelligence, and 100% experienced an increase in confidence. The intervention seemed to be effective as a prevention program among both a non-radicalized sample and former Al-Shabaab group members. However, researchers reported a few limitations. According to the authors, future interventions should be deployed over longer periods in order to allow participants to process the material and integrate new ways of thinking more fully. Participants should also be split into smaller groups. There also seem to be floor effects in measuring integrative complexity, as it is difficult to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for integrative complexity to be scorable (particularly difficult in the context of written test conditions). The authors did not mention potential conflicts of interest due to evaluating their own program. Neither did they provide details concerning the intervention protocol.

Table 2.2—Summary of Evidence

Study	Aldrich (2014) Primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)-based programs, Mali.
Objectives of the Program	Counter violent extremism using “soft security” and development programs comprising educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities.
Sample Characteristics	<i>200 participants split into two groups:</i> 1) Residents of Timbuktu who were exposed to the TSCTP programs and 2) Residents of Diré who mostly did not benefit from the programs (control). Participants were selected randomly from the broader population by knocking on people’s doors and administering the survey to those who agreed to participate. The sample included men and women from early to late adulthood of diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural backgrounds.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Quasi-experimental design aiming to understand if several years of U.S. government-funded PVE programs have achieved the following:</i> 1) increased the access to peace and tolerance programs on local radio channels; 2) increased civic participation; 3) led more residents to be critical of Al Qaeda’s use of violence in the name of Islam; and 4) motivated people to see the United States as combatting terrorism, not Islam. This was done through a 14-question survey with Likert scales. The study controlled for sex, age group, and ethnicity. <i>Data analysis:</i> After ensuring that the Timbuktu and Diré samples were comparable, the authors used bivariate analyses to see if there were any noticeable connections between exposure to the programs and outcomes of interest. Cross-tabulations with chi-squared distributions were performed, as well as regression analyses (ordered probit) to control for factors such as age, sex, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics. The authors also reordered the data through propensity-matching techniques to better resemble a twins-study structure and to ensure that the control and treatment groups were comparable.
Positive Outcomes	1) Bivariate analyses indicated a strong positive connection between exposure to the programs and listening to radio broadcasts about peace and tolerance; 2) Regressions showed that Timbuktu residents exposed to the sponsored radio programs were 40% more likely than those of Diré to listen to radio broadcasts focused on peace and tolerance, as well as to civically engage.
Negative Outcomes	1) No difference in attitudes towards Al Qaeda or the United States between the two samples; 2) The study was unable to prove a causal relationship between programming and behavioral outcomes.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Bivariate analyses cannot control for confounding factors; 2) The results were potentially affected by other unmeasured factors, such as historical legacy, self-perception, local leadership, the media, and participants’ perceptions of US foreign policies; 3) The sample size is limited and did not intend to be representative of the entire nation; 4) Some participants might have felt uncomfortable discussing their religious views and support for the Sharia law with the interviewers as it is a sensitive subject; 5) No baseline measurements were taken in the control and treatment groups.
Limitations (Team)	1) The authors did not sufficiently describe their sample; 2) Insufficient information regarding the questionnaire; 3) The selection of the participants by knocking on doors could be biased and not representative of the city as some neighborhoods could be over-represented.
Quality of Study (/10)	8

Aldrich (2014) aimed to evaluate if the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) PVE programs contributed to changes in cognitions and behaviors in Malians living in Timbuktu compared to the residents of Diré, a neighboring city that was not exposed to these programs. More specifically, the study examined if the PVE programs have achieved the following: 1) increased the access to peace and

tolerance programs on local radio channels; 2) increased civic participation; 3) led more residents to be critical of Al Qaeda’s use of violence in the name of Islam; and 4) motivated people to see the United States as combatting terrorism, not Islam. To do so, 200 randomly selected participants living either in Timbuktu or Diré filled a 14-question survey. Therefore, the study had two groups: residents of the

city of Timbuktu who were exposed to the TSCTP programs and residents of the city of Diré who mostly did not benefit from the programs (control group). The data was then analyzed using bivariate and multivariate statistics to see if there were any connections between exposure to the programs and outcomes of interest. Cross-tabulations with chi-squared distributions between the treatment and control group were performed, as well as regression analyses (ordered probit) to control for factors such as age, sex, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics. The researchers also reordered the data through propensity-matching techniques to better resemble a twins-study structure and to ensure that the control and treatment groups were comparable. Results showed that residents from Timbuktu who were exposed to the PVE programs were more likely to listen to radio broadcasts about peace and tolerance than the residents of Diré. They were also more civically engaged than their counterparts. However, even

though the broadcasts included components aimed at discouraging violent extremist behaviors, no difference was found between the attitudes of participants from Timbuktu and Dire towards either the US foreign policy or Al Qaeda. A few limitations were noted by the authors. The sample size was small and, consequently, the results cannot be representative. Some participants were uncomfortable discussing their religious and political views with the interviewers. Also, there was no baseline data to compare any change of behavior over time. Furthermore, the study did not test the empirical link between exposure to radio broadcasts and actual radicalized behaviors. Limitations not mentioned by authors include not adequately describing their sample nor giving enough information regarding their questionnaires. Finally, the selection of the participants by knocking on doors could be biased and not representative of the city, as some neighborhoods could be over-represented.

Table 2.3—Summary of Evidence	
Study	Bala (2017) Primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Search for Common Ground: Bottom-Up Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Tunisia.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Increase the ability of vulnerable communities to prevent and counter violent extremism in Tunisia. <i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Increase the engagement of diverse stakeholders (including civil society, youth, women, religious leaders, schools and universities, local governments, and the police and the army) in a community-level dialogue to identify push and pull factors for supporting violent extremism or joining as foreign fighters in Tunisia; 2) Strengthen the capacity of diverse stakeholders to implement initiatives within their communities to counter violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	10 participants (one or two stakeholder representatives in each of the six localities where the program was implemented).
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Interviews and focus groups about the following:</i> 1) motivation to join the program; 2) effectiveness and relevance of the program; 3) aspects of the program which worked best; 4) prior knowledge of PVE issues; 5) experience with community engagement activities; 6) the most significant change through the program; 7) whether the program improved the understanding of driving forces behind violent extremism; and 8) whether the program improved the relationship between institutions and civil society.
Positive Outcomes	1) The program contributed to raising communities' awareness of what drives someone to violent extremism; 2) It contributed to promoting a culture of dialogue, particularly within schools, as well as with youth and religious leaders; 3) The program also seemed to have succeeded in creating a stimulating environment for debate and helped ease strained relations between citizens and police forces; 4) The dialogue sessions emphasized the importance for youth to be granted access to cultural and educational activities as a deterrent to violent extremism; 5) Stakeholders declared increased motivation and a stronger involvement in partner NGOs activities; 6) The originality of the program, its positive role in instilling a culture of dialogue, and easing of relationships between stakeholders and NGOs was appreciated; 7) The program contributed to enhance the visibility of partner NGOs within their communities by helping them develop community-led activities and increasing public awareness through workshops, school clubs, mass media, or cultural productions; 8) The program succeeded in showing how school dropouts

	or other less-suspected factors, such as the absence of alternative narratives, may act as recruitment drivers for violent extremism.
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Key concepts and variables should have been more clearly operationalized; 2) Lack of information about the sample (age, nationality, religion, etc.); 3) As only stakeholders were questioned, it is impossible to know if the program had any effect on its targeted population.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Bala (2017) proposed an evaluation of the program Search for Common Ground: Bottom-up Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, implemented in six localities in Tunisia (Bizerte, Sidi Hassine, Ben Guardane, Sahline, Kasserine, and Siliana). The objective of the program was to increase the ability of vulnerable communities to prevent and counter violent extremism. More specifically, it aimed to increase the engagement of diverse stakeholders (including civil society, youth, women, religious leaders, schools and universities, local governments, and the police and the army) in a community-level dialogue to identify push and pull factors for Tunisians who support violent extremist or who join as foreign fighters. Another specific objective was to strengthen the capacity of diverse stakeholders to implement initiatives within their communities to counter violent extremism. To evaluate the effectiveness of the program, the author analyzed focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews conducted with one or two of the most involved stakeholder representatives in each of the 6 localities where the program was implemented. The results of this qualitative assessment showed that, according to participants, the program succeeded in raising communities' awareness of what drives someone to violent extremism. It also contributed to promoting a culture of dialogue, particularly within schools, as well as with youth and religious leaders. The program also seemed to have succeeded in creating a stimulating environment for debate and

helped ease strained relations between citizens and police forces. Furthermore, the dialogue sessions emphasized the importance for youth to be granted access to cultural and educational activities as a deterrent to violent extremism. Throughout the interviews and the focus group discussions, participants acknowledged that greater motivation was expressed by stakeholders along with a stronger involvement in partner NGO activities. Participants appreciated the originality of the program, its positive role in instilling a culture of dialogue, and easing of relationships between stakeholders and NGOs. The program also contributed to enhancing the visibility of partner NGOs within their communities by helping them develop community-led activities and increasing public awareness through workshops, school clubs, mass media, or cultural productions. More specifically, the program succeeded in showing how school dropouts or other less-suspected factors such as the absence of alternative narratives may act as recruitment drivers for violent extremism. While it provided promising results, the study suffers from several limitations not identified by the author. Indeed, key concepts and variables should have been more clearly operationalized, and more information about the sample should have been given (age, nationality, religion, etc.). Furthermore, only stakeholders were questioned, making it impossible to know if the program had any effect on its targeted population.

Table 2.4—Summary of Evidence

Study	Swedberg & Reisman (2013) Primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP), Somalia; Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth), Kenya; and Kenya Transition Initiative Eastleigh Program (KTI-E), Kenya.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Common objective:</i> Foster and promote a positive identity for youth vulnerable to recruitment by extremist elements in regions with a substantial Al-Shabab presence and a history of Al-Qaeda actions. SYLP emphasizes positive messaging, dialogue, and information-sharing, along with support for job and skill training opportunities. Unique to SYLP was a firm emphasis on placement following the training.

	<p>G-Youth focuses on enhancing the role of youth in the community, providing messages about positive behavior and personal choice, and livelihood. G-Youth has four primary pillars of intervention: youth action, education, work, and civics.</p> <p>KTI-E emphasizes moderation and peace, as well as the role of youth in the community (primary goal) and youth livelihood (secondary goal). Its objective was to reduce the risk of engagement with extremist groups by providing youth with positive opportunities.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>1,446 Somali youths in five communities in East Africa</i> (Eastleigh/Nairobi, Garissa, Hargeisa, Bosaso, and Mogadishu). The sample comprised full beneficiaries (individuals who completed the training program), partial beneficiaries (individuals who engaged to a lesser extent or dropped out), and individuals who did not participate in the programs (control group). Equal-shares, choice-based stratified sampling in the communities of interest was used to ensure the collection of high-quality data. 90 to 110 respondents per group, per program, in each location.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Likert-scale questionnaires measuring the following</i>: 1) civic engagement; 2) perception of the effectiveness of civic engagement; 3) support and belief in the power of youth associations; 4) perception of one's employability and optimism in the future; and 5) support for the use of violence in the name of Islam. It was reinforced by focus groups and key-informant interviews (face-to-face, by telephone, or by Skype).</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p>Compared to the two other groups, the full beneficiary group had both of the following: 1) much higher levels of civic engagement and 2) higher levels of perception of the effectiveness of civic engagement, support and belief in the power of youth associations, and perception of their employability and optimism in the future.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p>1) No substantial decrease in rejection of violence in the name of Islam (the difference was often not statistically significant, except in the aggregate sample); 2) Differences between full and partial beneficiaries were not, for the most part, statistically significant (although full beneficiaries usually scored higher than partial ones); 3) Implementation issues (given the important non-response rate, the entire list of partial beneficiaries had to be used instead of a randomized selection).</p>
Overall Outcome of the Program	<p>Positive.</p>
Limitations (Authors)	<p>1) Potential selection bias (people who signed up were potentially more motivated than those who did not); 2) Translation of tools, questions, and responses from Somali and/or Kiswahili to English and vice-versa might have affected the quality of the gathered information; 3) Difficulties in establishing a baseline: Because programs were already underway, collecting baseline data on participating residents and affected communities was not possible.</p>
Limitations (Team)	<p>Not enough information about the sample. Even though demographic information was said to be collected, no data is presented.</p>
Quality of Study (/10)	<p>8</p>

United States Agency International Development (USAID) evaluated the outcomes of three PVE projects they funded. The first project to launch was the Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP) in Somalia. The program focused almost exclusively on technical skill training, ranging from traditional vocational and technical training areas (e.g., plumbing) to non-traditional market niches (e.g., water filter production). The second project was the Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth). It was a localized intervention that focused on a combination of livelihood/skill training as well as the establishment of strong community relationships in the Garissa Municipality of Kenya's North Eastern province. Lastly, the Kenya Transition Initiative Eastleigh Program (KTI-E) aimed to foster moderation, identity, and self-confidence in at-risk youth in Eastleigh to

help them reject extremism. KTI-E's three primary lines of action were building capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence, empowering the local youth, and youth livelihood support. In order to assess the comparative results of the three projects on youth resistance to extremist recruitment, surveys were administered in five communities in East Africa (Eastleigh/Nairobi, Garissa, Hargeisa, Bosaso, and Mogadishu). In each community, the survey sampled three segments of the population: full beneficiaries (individuals who completed the program), partial beneficiaries (individuals who engaged to a lesser extent or dropped out), and the comparison group (individuals who did not participate in the program). Face-to-face interviews were prioritized to administer the surveys; however, telephone and Skype-based

interviews were occasionally conducted. Focus group discussions were held with key informants involved in the project. Data was organized into five categories: 1) civic engagement; 2) perception of the effectiveness of civic engagement; 3) support and belief in the power of youth associations; 4) perception of one's employability and optimism in the future; and 5) support for the use of violence in the name of Islam. Quantitative results were triangulated with focus groups that explored these issues with youth in the surveyed communities. Results indicated that full and partial beneficiaries of the evaluated programs in East Africa were highly engaged in their communities, especially through youth associations, which project beneficiaries joined in large numbers. However, this high level of engagement was not always matched by a

corresponding sense of efficacy (a feeling that this engagement was productive). In the area of identity, beneficiaries were very optimistic about their job prospects and the future, particularly in Somalia and Garissa. As for attitudes, both beneficiaries and the comparison group condemned violence in the name of Islam. Limitations mentioned by the authors included a lack of sufficient demographic information, impossibility to collect baseline data on participants, potential loss of information by translating questionnaires, and possible selection bias. In fact, because a high non-response rate made it impossible to randomly select participants for the full-beneficiaries group, all participants from the list were contacted. Nevertheless, because there were a lot of positive outcomes, the authors described the programs as successful overall.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.5—Summary of Evidence

Study	Mercy Corps (2016) Primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI), Somalia.
Objectives of the Program	Foster good governance, economic recovery, and reducing the appeal of extremism through targeted interventions that increase education and civic participation opportunities for Somali youth.
Sample Characteristics	<i>802 participants for quantitative analyses:</i> 504 in-school youth (treatment group) and 298 out-of-school youth (control group). <i>25 participants for qualitative analyses:</i> 15 in- and out-of-school youth from the above samples and 10 teachers/Ministry of Education officials/members of community education committees.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Mixed-method impact evaluation. <i>Quantitative:</i> Quasi-experimental matched design, relying on survey data about attitudes and behaviors towards political violence. <i>Qualitative:</i> Key-informant interviews measuring change in participation and support for political violence and violent extremism.
Positive Outcomes	1) Decreased likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 16%; 2) Increased perceptions of government doing a good job in providing services such as water, electricity, and healthcare; 3) Reduced sense of marginalization (youth are 15% less likely to feel isolated and excluded in communities); 4) Civic engagement activities reduced the likelihood of youth participating in political violence (by 14%) and thinking that political violence is "sometimes necessary" (by 20%).
Negative Outcomes	1) Increased likelihood of youth supporting the use of violence for a political cause by 11%; 2) Decreases of over 30% in the likelihood of being satisfied with the government's provision of education; 3) Caused a nearly 16% decrease in likelihood of feeling optimistic about future employment opportunities, and expressing fear and concern when describing the future.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	Possible conflict of interest arising from Mercy Corps evaluating an initiative in which it had a role.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

In 2016, Mercy Corps evaluated the Somali Youth Leaders Initiative, whose goal was to foster good governance, economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism through targeted interventions that increase education and civic participation opportunities for Somali youth. The research employed a mixed-methods impact evaluation approach. The research team used a quasi-experimental matched design relying on survey data from youth in Somaliland and key-informant interviews with in- and out-of-school youth, teachers, Ministry of Education officials, and members of community education committees. The quantitative survey—divided between 504 in-school (treatment) and 298 out-of-school (control) youth—was stabilized using inverse probability of treatment weighting, which matched treatment and control group participants using age, poverty, exposure to violence, marital status, number of children, experience of displacement, household characteristics, and baseline levels of political engagement. The qualitative interviews were analyzed using thematic coding through an inductive approach to understand the on-the-ground realities, social barriers, and structural challenges hampering access to education and undermining the stability in the region. These analyses produced mostly positive results. The program decreased the likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 16% but increased the likelihood of them supporting the use of violence for a political cause by 11%. Youth in the program showed increases in the

perception that the government was doing a good job in providing services such as water, electricity, and healthcare, but decreases (of over 30%) in the likelihood of being satisfied with the government's provision of education. Also, compared to the control group, those in the program were nearly 16% less likely to feel optimistic about future employment opportunities. These findings were echoed in qualitative interviews with many youths expressing fear and concern when describing the future, and frustrations at unmet expectations from their government. However, the program had a positive impact on reducing the sense of marginalization experienced by the participating youth, who were 15% less likely to feel isolated and excluded in their communities compared to similar youth who were not in school. The frustrations over the government's inability to fulfill the youth's expectations could help explain the increase in support for political violence. Nevertheless, the program appeared to deter youth from actually acting on these frustrations by making them feel less isolated and vulnerable to recruitment. In addition to access to school, the effects of adding civic engagement activities to formal education showed that student-led community actions reduced the likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 14%, and that youth think political violence is "sometimes necessary" (20%). While interesting, the results of this project may be limited by a possible conflict interest, as Mercy Corps is part of the Somali Youth Leaders Initiative.

Asia

Positive Outcomes

Table 2.6—Summary of Evidence

Study	Speckhard et al. (2018) Primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist Radicalization
Program and Country	Break the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project, Iraq.
Objectives of the Program	Raise awareness through a counter-narrative Facebook ad campaign designed to highlight the futility of ISIS's promises of bringing about the desired utopian caliphate and its failure to deliver any of its promises. The program showcases the realities of belonging to ISIS and offers opportunities for those considering joining to reconsider their decisions. The ultimate goal is to protect and prevent action in the fight against ISIS and violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	<i>1,287,557 online participants residing in 10 Governorates across Iraq</i> . 82% male and 18% female; 18–50 years old (78% between 18 and 34 years old); of Shia and Sunni Muslim religious background.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Data collection:</i> Using data on a counter-narrative video ad which ran for 24 days on Facebook, the level of reach and video retention, number of impressions, clicks, likes, shares, and comments were collected in order to measure engagement with the video and to identify possible causality between exposure to the video and change in extremist behavior. <i>Data analysis:</i> Descriptive statistics on the variables mentioned above.
Positive Outcomes	1) Comments to the video evoked negative impressions and emotions of disdain for ISIS; 2) The comments sometimes led to discussions about why terrorism happens and how to prevent/stop it; 3) The comments expressed solidarity for the Iraqi people in their fight against ISIS; 4) There were multiple positive indicators about the video, such as the number of views, likes, and shares by the audience; 5) 126,400 out of the 1,287,557 individuals in the target audience were likely to remember the ad content within two days of viewing it. This illustrates the strength of the video and its positive impact on viewers.
Negative Outcomes	1) There were a few anti-Islamic/Semitic/American/European/Turkish comments; 2) Some viewers who openly support and sympathize with ISIS expressed anger in their comments by calling the researchers unbelievers, government stooges, etc.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) The videos, which were intentionally given ambiguous titles, could be considered pro-ISIS at the initial exposure; 2) Insufficient resources.
Limitations (Team)	1) Methodological limitations (i.e., lack of pre- and post-measurements to evaluate behavioral/cognitive changes following exposure to the counter-narrative video, lack of control group); 2) Lack of pilot project to test certain aspects of the video (e.g., tone of the message, identity of the messenger); 3) Potential conflict of interest as the authors work at the center responsible for the creation of the program.
Quality of Study (/10)	6

Speckhard et al. (2018) reported on the International Center for Study of Violent Extremism's (ICSVE) Facebook ad campaign—Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project—aimed at raising awareness of the realities of living under ISIS and protecting vulnerable potential recruits. The campaign ran on Facebook for 24 days across 10 Governorates in Iraq and featured the video testimony of a Belgian female ISIS defector who had taken her young son to live in ISIS territory. The video generated a total reach of 1,287,557 individuals (82% male, 18% female; 18–50 years old; Shia/Sunni Muslims), while also leading to 2,339,453 impressions (i.e., the number of times the video

content was displayed, regardless of whether the user clicked on it or not), and close to 1.7 million views. Consideration was given to individuals who might be engaged with, or simply exposed to extremist narratives online for the first time, and who might continue down the path of sustained engagement and exposure to violent narratives propagated by terrorist groups like ISIS. Awareness metrics (i.e., reach, impressions, frequency, video views, and video retention), engagement metrics (i.e., clicks, likes, shares, and comments), and impact metrics (i.e., indicators of behavioral changes, supportive comments, and negative comments) were used as quantitative measures to analyze the data.

Comments written by the audience were analyzed qualitatively to assess the impact of the awareness campaign. Overall, the data revealed positive outcomes. Comments evoked emotions and impressions that showed disdain for ISIS and expressed solidarity for the Iraqi people in their fight against ISIS. Comments also inspired discussion about why terrorism happens and how to prevent it. In terms of quantitative analysis, there were multiple positive indicators about the video, such as the number of views, likes, and shares by the audience. Furthermore, around 126,400 of the 1,287,557 individuals in the target audience were likely to remember the content of the ad within two days of viewing it, which illustrates the strength of the video and its positive impact on viewers. However, at the same time, a few individuals made anti-Islamic/Semitic/American/European/Turkish

comments, which indicated signs of hate discourse. Some viewers, who openly supported and sympathized with ISIS, also expressed anger in their comments by calling the researchers “unbelievers” and “government stooges.” Despite its promising results, the study suffers from several limitations not mentioned by the authors, including lack of pre- and post-measurements to evaluate potential behavioral/cognitive changes following exposure to the counter-narrative video, lack of a control group, lack of a pilot project to test certain aspects of the counter-narrative video (e.g., tone of the message, identity of the messenger), and potential conflicts of interest (the authors worked, in various positions, for the ICSVE). The authors nevertheless mentioned the ambiguous title of the video (which may be considered pro-ISIS at the initial exposure) and insufficient resources as additional limitations.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.7—Summary of Evidence

Study	Mercy Corps (2015) Primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country Objectives of the Program	Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST), Afghanistan. The primary goal of INVEST is to increase youth employment in Helmand by offering three- and six-month vocational and technical training sessions in nine centers. These centers link students to various career choices through private sector actors and business leader mentorship. The broader goal is to improve stability in the region by targeting a population that is traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban.
Sample Characteristics	729 students from the INVEST program (between February and April 2014). Propensity score matching was used to create treatment and comparison groups that were similar along observable characteristics. The treatment group consisted of 465 recent graduates from the INVEST program, while the comparison group comprised 264 students who had enrolled in the program but did not start their classes.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Quasi-experimental, mixed-method impact evaluation design.</i> Its objectives were to examine the mechanisms through which the program was hypothesized to have influenced young Afghans’ propensity towards violence and support for the Taliban insurgency. The mechanisms were as follows: 1) direct effects on participants’ propensity towards political violence; 2) improvements in employment status and economic conditions; 3) social status and connections; and 4) perceptions of government performance. <i>Data collection:</i> Data was collected through face-to-face surveys and individual- and group-based interviews of former and future INVEST students. The survey included questions specifically aimed at measuring economic outcomes (employment, economic optimism, and economic conditions), social outcomes (confidence and abilities, social status, and social connections), and political outcomes (confidence in government institutions and perceptions of government effectiveness). Questions capturing propensities and attitudes towards political violence were also collected.
Positive Outcomes	1) The greatest impacts of the INVEST program were on economic outcomes: decreased unemployment, increased income, and greater economic optimism among participants. Economic optimism was significantly associated with a decrease in willingness to engage in and support for political violence; 2) Social outcomes: increased social connectedness, increased identification as an Afghan, and decreased perceived discrimination; 3) Political outcomes: significant positive impact on perceptions of local government performance.
Negative Outcomes	1) No direct program effects on attitudes towards political violence; 2) Economic outcomes: Results from the survey showed that employment status had no effect on support for

	political violence; 3) Social outcomes: No effects on participants' personal confidence, locus of control, perceived position in society, or their feelings of being respected in their community were recorded. There was little evidence that social outcomes can decrease propensity towards political violence; 4) Political outcomes: Participation in INVEST did not appear to improve youths' perceptions of the performance of the Afghan government or confidence in institutions; 5) A significant link between violence and the INVEST program was only recorded for three outcomes across the entire analysis: economic optimism, social connections, and identifying as an Afghan.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Response bias: Suspicion and social desirability could have influenced answers; 2) Data for economic factors (income, expenditures, etc.) was unavailable. This demographic information could have influenced the likelihood of program participation, outcome variables, or both; 3) Generalizability: Participants in the INVEST program had to meet certain criteria in order to enter the training. Both the treatment and comparison groups may, therefore, have different characteristics than the general population, such as having more influence in their communities.
Limitations (Team)	Potential conflict of interest (Mercy Corps carried out the study and helped to identify eligible participants for the program).
Quality of Study (/10)	6

Young Afghans—potentially vulnerable youth (limited income/unemployment, widows, female heads of households)—are traditionally considered to be sympathetic to the Taliban. With the aim of increasing youth employment in Helmand, the Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST) program trains young men and women in a range of vocational skills. Nine technical vocational education and training (TVET) centers across the province are offering a range of vocational and technical training courses that develop practical skills and link participants to various career choices, including tailoring, embroidery, mobile phone repair, information technology, occupations requiring English, automobile repair, carpentry, and other employment ventures. Using a quasi-experimental, mixed methodology impact evaluation design, Mercy Corps examined the impact of INVEST on broader economic, social, and political stabilization outcomes. Mercy Corps' wider goal was to explore the causal relationship between participation in youth employment programs and propensity towards political violence. Therefore, to generate findings applicable to other programs and contexts, the study examined three specific mechanisms through which the program was hypothesized to have an indirect effect on young Afghans' propensity toward political violence and support for the Taliban insurgency: H1) Participation in a TVET program will improve young people's employment status and economic conditions, thereby decreasing the financial incentive to support or engage in political violence; H2) Participation in a TVET program will improve young people's connection to and status within their community, thereby decreasing the social incentive

to support or engage in political violence; H3) Participation in a TVET program will improve young people's confidence in and perceptions of the government's performance in fulfilling basic functions, thereby decreasing the likelihood they will use violence to address grievances towards the government. The analysis was conducted on a treatment group (465 recent graduates from the INVEST program) and a comparison group (264 incoming students), matched according to propensity scores (baseline covariates that affect the outcomes and are associated with INVEST eligibility, including age, gender, education, literacy, religion, location, household poverty, and household size). Data was collected in face-to-face surveys and individual- and group-based interviews with both the treatment and comparison groups. Findings were mixed and produced little evidence to support the three hypotheses tested. A significant link between the INVEST program and violence was only found for three outcomes: economic optimism, social connections, and identifying as an Afghan. Social connections and identifying as an Afghan were both positively correlated with a propensity towards violence, which constitutes an iatrogenic effect. Also, there was a weak association between better economic conditions and decreased political violence outcomes. Thus, the analysis rejects the first hypothesis that links economic outcomes to violence. Due to the relatively weak connection between the INVEST program and social outcomes, and between social conditions and a decrease in propensities towards political violence, the analysis also rejects the second hypothesis. Concerning the third hypothesis, INVEST did have a slight impact on

participants' perception of local governments' performance. However, this outcome was not significantly associated with a willingness to engage in or support political violence, thus making the link from INVEST to violence through political outcomes inconclusive. Overall, results suggested that the INVEST program did not contribute substantially to stabilization through decreasing support for political violence and the Taliban. These results suggest that the lack of impact was not due to a design failure of

the INVEST program, but a failure of the theory that links these outcomes to employment. Finally, regarding the study's limitations, Mercy Corps identified response bias, limited information about baseline economic characteristics, and generalizability. Also, a potential conflict of interest could have influenced the selection of participants, since Mercy Corps were involved in the identification of eligible students for the program *and* were the ones conducting the research.

Australia

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.8—Summary of Evidence

Study	Johns et al. (2014) Targeted primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	More Than a Game, Australia.
Objectives of the Program	<p><i>Main objective:</i> Engage young Muslim men through a team-based sport (e.g., football) to deliver a range of activities intended to develop personal wellbeing and pro-social skills, and to facilitate a greater sense of social inclusion and community belonging.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Develop young role models and leaders in the community; 2) Enhance greater understanding of the Muslim community by the broader Australian community; 3) Foster greater intercultural contact and understanding between participants and other cultural groups.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>Three target groups:</i> 1) 21 program participants (young men, aged 15–25, predominantly of Lebanese cultural background, recruited from the Newport Islamic Society of Melbourne); 2) eight program facilitators; and 3) 10 college students who also participated in the Peace Team dialogue and Unity Cup.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Mixed method, post-evaluation approach:</i> Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were combined with quantitative data collection (exit surveys) as the primary method to explore participants' personal development through the program. Researcher participant-observation was also conducted during the second half of the program.</p> <p><i>Data analysis:</i> Thematic analysis was used to code qualitative responses and identify patterns in the way participants and stakeholders described their experiences of the program.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p>1) Sport as a level-playing field where people of all cultural backgrounds were bound by the same rules and expectations allowed participants to feel free to engage in forms of knowledge sharing and social and physical interactions with participants from difficult cultures—even with groups with which they shared a historically conflict-ridden relationship; 2) The experiences of playing together with participants from different racial, cultural, and religious groups provided new forms of awareness and knowledge to participants, demonstrating that social functions and roles can, under certain circumstances, become more important than social identities, transcending other kinds of group boundaries and divisions. For example, out of the 21 participants who took part in the evaluation, following participation in the program most indicated a more positive attitude towards a range of cultural groups (particularly towards Jewish youth); 3) Team-based sports that emphasize cooperation, sense of responsibility to others, and trusting teammates can reduce participants' sense of vulnerability or solitude. Participants identified this type of social bonding as providing a safe space where other cultural groups can be safely encountered, stereotypes can be challenged, and friendships formed; 4) Discipline learned through sports encouraged participants to develop self-control in situations where conflict could arise; 5) Using team-based sport countered feelings of alienation and strengthened feelings of belonging to the broader community and society by promoting an understanding that there is a role for everyone in the team.</p>
Negative Outcomes	Participants felt strong bonds to their ethnic and religious community, and thus felt torn between a sense of loyalty to their community and openness to the program.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) No pre- and post-evaluation data was collected; 2) Possible social desirability effect of participants potentially skewing recollections of their experiences; 3) Small sample size leading to limitations for representativity; 4) Methodological problem of trying to establish a link between sport-based mentoring programs and the prevention of violent extremism given the difficulty of measuring the processes that take place while engaging in sports activities.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Johns et al. (2014) evaluated the More than a Game sport-focused youth mentoring program in Melbourne, aimed at developing a community-based resilience model using team-based sports to address issues of identity, belonging, and cultural isolation amongst young Muslim to counter forms of violent extremism. The research used semi-structured interviews and focus groups, combined with exit surveys, to assess the benefits of participating in team sports, namely in terms of 1) developing a sense of belonging; 2) interacting with people from different cultural backgrounds; and 3) using other means than violence to resolve problems. The sample was divided into three groups: 21 program participants (young men, aged 15–25, predominantly of Lebanese cultural background, recruited from the Newport Islamic Society of Melbourne); eight program facilitators; and 10 college students who also participated in the Peace Team dialogue and Unity Cup. Thematic analysis of the participants' experiences of the program revealed a number of positive outcomes: 1) Participants reported perceiving sport as a level-playing field where people of all cultural backgrounds were bound by the same rules and expectations, allowing them to feel free to engage in forms of knowledge-sharing and social and physical interactions with participants from different cultures, even with groups that they shared a historically conflict-ridden relationship with. Such experiences afforded them practical and powerful experiences of lived justice; 2) The experiences of playing together with participants from different racial, cultural, and religious groups provided new forms of awareness and knowledge to participants, demonstrating that social functions and roles can, under certain circumstances, become more important than social identities, transcending other kinds of group boundaries and divisions. For example, out of the 21 participants who took part in

the evaluation, most indicated a more positive attitude towards a range of cultural groups (particularly towards Jewish youth) following participation in the program; 3) Team-based sports that emphasize cooperation, sense of responsibility to others, and trusting teammates can decrease participants' sense of vulnerability or solitude. Participants identified this type of social bonding as providing a safe space where other cultural groups can be safely encountered, stereotypes challenged, and friendships formed; 4) Discipline learned through sports encouraged participants to develop self-control in situations where conflict could arise; and 5) Using team-based sport countered feelings of alienation and strengthened feelings of belonging to the broader community and society by promoting an understanding that there is a role for everyone in the team. Some participants, however, also expressed negative effects arising from the program: They felt torn between loyalty to their religious/ethnic groups and the program, which in turn generated tension. Despite the strong positive impact participants related, the authors identified several limitations in their research: 1) The evaluation was commissioned mid-way through the program, making it impossible for researchers to collect pre- and post-evaluation data from participants, which significantly limited the measurement of the precise impact of the program; 2) Researchers feared that possible social desirability effects could potentially skew participants' recollections; 3) The small sample size further limited the study's representativity; and 4) The methodological problem of trying to establish a link between sport-based mentoring programs and the prevention of violent extremism proved problematic given the difficulty of measuring the processes that take place while engaging in sports activities.

Europe

Positive Outcomes

Table 2.9—Summary of Evidence	
Study	Liht & Savage (2013) Secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Being Muslim Being British (BMBB), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Prevent violent extremism in young UK Muslims who have been exposed to extremist discourse with a course designed to allow participants to see the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody and to explore all positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse. The program also aimed to decrease the affinity towards the “us versus them” discourse by increasing the participants’ integrative complexity. A higher integrative complexity favors reflection, conflict resolution, and the ability to perceive multiple points of view. The program was also offered to people who are interested in issues that affect young Muslims.
Sample Characteristics	<i>81 youths, mostly Muslims, who have been exposed to extremist discourse or are interested in the issues raised by it.</i> Only 49 out of the 81 participants filled a sociodemographic questionnaire. Mean age = 19.48; 60% men, 40% women; 88% Sunni Muslims, 5% Church of England, 2% Protestant, 5% other; 29% Pakistani, 8% Bangladeshi, 42% Afro-American, 21% Indian. The participants were divided into seven pilot groups: one in a university setting, one in a technical community college, one in a community group for newly arrived Somali immigrants, two in Prevent local initiatives, and two in existing initiatives for young Muslim men and women.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Participants took a 16-hour, eight-session course consisting of film and group activities that enabled them to solve problems according to a broad array of personal values. Participants could explore all positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse, free from criticism or social pressure. Activities included group discussions that were coded to assess the evolution of integrative complexity over the course of the program. Pre- and post-test data was gathered. <i>Measures:</i> 1) Recorded group discussions from the first (pre) and last (post) session of the course, scanned for integrative complexity and the presence of values using a standardized coding framework and protocol; 2) Moral dilemmas: Six vignettes with dilemmas relevant to Muslims living in Britain were presented to the participants (three pre- and three post-). Integrative complexity and the presence of Schwartz’s 10 basic values were evaluated with responses to the dilemmas (number of times each value was present in the conversation), as well as Kraybill conflict styles. Inter-rater reliability was assessed between two trained coders blind to the pre/post conditions ($\kappa = 0.54$).
Positive Outcomes	1) Improved integrative complexity compared to the pretest levels; 2) Significant increase in the values of universalism (equal worth of human beings), benevolence, and stimulation (valuing new information and being open to new viewpoints); 3) Better conflict resolution strategies in group discussions and in written responses to moral dilemmas relevant to Muslims living in the UK; 4) Participants shifted towards collaboration and compromise and away from the “us vs. them” discourse commonly used by extremist groups; 5) At the beginning, the views of a pilot group were aligned with those of Hizb ut Tahrir (Islamist group), but at the end of the course, all of them had significantly changed their position; 6) Improved resilience against the dichotomous discourse from extremist groups; 7) Participants were better equipped to choose prosocial ways to resolve conflicts.
Negative Outcomes	1) Integrative complexity did not improve based on the written moral dilemmas; 2) No significant improvement in value spread when analyzing the pre- and post-written answers to moral dilemmas; 3) Age was moderately and negatively correlated with integrative complexity gains.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Integrative complexity scores (pre- and post-intervention) could not be compared as paired-type data because of the anonymity of participants; 2) No control group; 3) The cognitive load of the moral dilemmas was too heavy, making it difficult to elicit written evidence from the participants.

Limitations (Team)	1) Potential conflicts of interest as the authors evaluate a program they seem to be involved in; 2) Inter-rater reliability for integrative complexity was low; 3) The sample description is incomplete as only 49 out of the 81 participants filled a sociodemographic questionnaire.
Quality of Study (/10)	9

This paper assessed the Being Muslim, Being British (BMBB) program in the UK. The program aimed to prevent violent extremism in young UK Muslims who had been exposed to extremist discourse or were interested in the issues raised by it. It was also offered to people interested in issues that affect young Muslims. The BMBB course was designed to expose participants to the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody and propose group activities that allow participants to explore all positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse. Over the course of the program, 81 youths (mean age = 19.48) from seven pilot groups took a 16-hour course consisting of film viewing sessions and activities such as group discussions and written moral dilemmas aimed at preventing violent extremism by increasing the group's integrative complexity and enabling the participants to solve problems in an environment free from criticism and social pressure. The first and the last group discussions were recorded and then coded to assess the evolution of the participants' integrative complexity over the course of the program. The discussions were also coded for the presence of Schwartz's values and Kraybill's conflict styles. Participants' written answers to six moral dilemmas were analyzed (three from the first session and three from the last) and coded in terms of integrative complexity and values. Higher levels of integrative complexity are believed to protect against radical discourse used by recruiters from extremist groups as it gives individuals the ability to perceive and

understand multiple viewpoints and find linkages between them. The results of the study showed an increased integrative complexity in group discussions at the end of the program. The BMBB program also encouraged better conflict resolution strategies in group discussions, seen through a shift towards collaboration and compromise rather than an "us vs. them" rhetoric. Regarding values, an increase in the values of universalism, benevolence, and stimulation was observed in group discussions. Moreover, at the beginning of the program, one group was agreeing with the views of the Islamist group Hizb ut Tahrir, but by the end, participants had significantly changed their views. However, no significant changes in terms of values and integrative complexity were noted in the written answers to moral dilemmas. Overall, the authors felt that their program succeeded in building resilience against the black-and-white discourse from extremist groups, and helped prevent violent extremism by improving integrative complexity and increasing the participants' values. Limitations mentioned by the authors included incapacity to compare pre- and post-scores as paired-type data in order to maintain the anonymity of participants, the absence of a control group, and the complexity of the moral dilemma activities. Limitations not mentioned by the authors included missing sociodemographic data, relatively weak inter-rater reliability, and potential conflicts of interest stemming from the fact that the authors evaluating the program were also involved in it.

Table 2.10—Summary of Evidence

Study	Boyd-MacMillan (2016) Targeted primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Being Muslim Being Scottish (BMBS), Scotland.
Objectives of the Program	Increase integrative complexity and collaboration across communities.
Sample Characteristics	<i>21 participants divided into two groups: the Muslim group (n = 10; educators, housewives, students, and other professionals) and the practitioner group (n = 11; educators, social workers, and Prevent police officers). Mean age = 42.05; most participants (n = 19) had university scholarship; 13 men, eight women.</i>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Mixed methods. <i>Quantitative:</i> Pre- and post-paragraph completion tests, as well as social identity and power questionnaires. <i>Qualitative:</i> Presentations of self-perception and integrative complexity regarding the ingroup/outgroup.
Positive Outcomes	1) Increased cognitive capacities in conflict resolution (wider array of responses when facing difference and disagreement); 2) Decreased "othering," a mindset that can be

	exploited by violent extremist groups; 3) Increased capacity to respect difference and see validity in other views despite disagreement; 4) Learned about how to communicate between communities, how to support people vulnerable to radicalization, better awareness of risk factors involved in radicalization, and increased confidence to speak about controversial topics.
Negative Outcomes	Possibility of participants growing fatigued over the two days of training, which may have curtailed their reflections and discussions.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	Lack of formal follow-up measures that evaluate if benefits of the program on integrative complexity last over time.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of Study (/10)	8

Boyd-MacMillan (2016) examined the impact of Being Muslim Being Scottish (BMBS), a program designed to increase integrative complexity, and therefore, shift from closed, black and white thinking that sees no validity in others' viewpoints toward more deliberate, flexible, and open thinking without sacrificing one's core values. The research consisted of 21 participants (13 men and eight women) with a mean age of 42.05. Participants were divided into two groups; 11 in the Muslim group (educators, housewives, students, and other professionals) and 10 in the practitioner group (educators, social workers, and Prevent police officers). Of the participants, 19 had one or more years of university education; specifically, three received Islamic, and two received a Christian university education. Six participants were born outside the UK (Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and Pakistan), and 15 were born in either Scotland, the UK, Great Britain, or the European Union. BMBS intervention was delivered over two days. Before and after the intervention, participants were tasked with paragraph completion tests, where they had to complete sentences about their relationship with their community and that of a community they oppose. Next, participants were asked to write as much as they could, without self-censorship or concern for grammar, in response to prompts such as "when I think about my community" and "when I think about the other group." Once this was over, participants responded to a five-item Social Identity & Power Questionnaire, which focused on agreement with statements such as "groups that are more powerful often treat my

group unfairly" or "members of my group are easily accepted into influential or powerful groups." Finally, during the last session, all participants made an oral presentation on what they learned from the intervention. Paragraph completion test responses, scored and coded in SPSS by three experienced integrative complexity coders using cross-culturally validated frameworks, revealed that participants experienced increased cognitive capacities in conflict resolution (wider array of responses when facing difference and disagreement). This increase represented a crucial step away from "othering," a mindset that can be exploited by violent extremist groups. Participants' responses to the Social Identity & Power Questionnaire showed evidence of increased capacities to respect differences and see validity in other views despite disagreement. Finally, all presentations, which were qualitatively assessed and correlated with quantitative integrative complexity scores, showed that participants learned the following: how to communicate between communities, how to be aware of the risk factors involved in radicalization, how to support people vulnerable to radicalization, and how to speak about controversial topics with increased confidence. However, as acknowledged by the authors, the results of this research are limited by the lack of formal follow-up measures that could evaluate the possible after-glow effect on the intervention's participants. Furthermore, the participants may have grown fatigued over the two days. This may have resulted in their reflections and discussions having been curtailed.

Table 2.11—Summary of Evidence

Study	Christiaens et al. (2018) Secondary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	BOUNCEUp program, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden.
Objectives of the Program	1) The BOUNCE program aims to strengthen youngsters' resilience through group-based interventions in order to prevent violent radicalization. Personal resilience is seen here as a factor that can reduce susceptibility to violent extremism; 2) The BOUNCEUp program aims to train future BOUNCE trainers about the three BOUNCE tools (understand these tools, use them, implement them in one's own domains and cities, and inspire other services and colleagues to use and promote them).
Sample Characteristics	<i>Study 1:</i> User satisfaction of trainers who received the BOUNCEUp program (101 participants). <i>Study 2:</i> Short-term outcome evaluation of the BOUNCEUp tool by trainers (50 participants). Gender and age were not provided.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Data collection:</i> 1) User surveys (reactions during participatory observations, a quantitative questionnaire about participants' experience, and follow-up interviews with half of the participants to assess their knowledge and application of the BOUNCE program); 2) Trainers' experience of the program (semi-structured interviews); 3) Program evaluation (focus groups and follow-up interviews with trainers about the project); 4) User satisfaction (observation during training, quantitative surveys, and telephone interviews). <i>Data analysis:</i> Descriptive statistics of user satisfaction and perception of the program (quantitative) and content analysis (qualitative).
Positive Outcomes	<i>Study 1:</i> 1) Both during the training observations and in the post-training surveys, participants expressed that they were satisfied (average between 7.29 and 8.39/10) with the BOUNCEUp training (clarity of content, satisfaction with content, satisfaction with trainers, and satisfaction with exercises); 2) Participants largely perceived that the training clarified the concepts and methods of BOUNCE, with 53.5% agreeing that trainers used clear explanations; 3) The logical sequence of the ten sessions—each following the same structure (opening circle, energizer, exercises, reflection)—was also appreciated by participants, as well as the holistic approach and combination of BOUNCEYoung and BOUNCEAlong; 4) Participants also agreed that the trainers' attitude was adequate and enjoyable; 5) The training content was generally well understood and supported by participants. <i>Study 2:</i> 1) Participants said that the training taught them new working methods with younger populations; 2) Participants also mentioned that they already knew some of the performed exercises but learned to use them for a "broader cause"; 3) Other participants said that the BOUNCE training experience was an opportunity for self-reflection, while others mentioned that exercises were not innovative (but the structure of the BOUNCE program was); 4) All participants agreed or strongly agreed that the training clarified the conceptualization of resilience; 5) A majority of participants (39/50) were thinking, during the follow-up interviews, of organizing BOUNCE actions in the future. Six weeks after the program, participants were enthusiastic but uncertain about how to implement BOUNCE in their city; 6) At the end of the follow-up, most participants had told colleagues about the program, and half of them mentioned that their colleagues were eager to learn more.
Negative Outcomes	<i>Study 1:</i> BOUNCE trainers cannot explain, with a logic model, why the program is able to prevent radicalization. The process analysis also showed that several training elements were still unclear for participants, most notably the link between BOUNCE and preventing radicalization. <i>Study 2:</i> 1) Few participants mentioned that they gained knowledge on theoretical models, the importance of group dynamics, and resilience training; 2) The theory behind BOUNCE is not immediately understood by everyone; 3) During the follow-up interviews, only 10 out of 50 participants had organized BOUNCE-related activities; 4) Even though many participants reported interest from their colleagues in BOUNCE, only five respondents said that concrete actions for implementation were taken.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) High dropout rate (1/4 of the sample), size of the groups (should ideally be between eight to 12 while they were from six to 14); 2) Timing of the training: All sessions took place in the spring of 2017, but the last three were near the summer holidays, thus lowering possibilities

	for immediate action; 3) Not all colleagues understood the added value or logic of the program.
Limitations (Team)	The multitude of measures and results concerning different aspects of the program makes this report difficult to follow. The writing also lacked organization.
Quality of Study (/10)	8

In their report, Christiaens et al. (2018) proposed an evaluation of BOUNCEUp, a train-the-trainers program implemented in five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden) during a year-long study between February 2017 and February 2018. The BOUNCE program aimed to strengthen youngsters' resilience through group-based interventions to prevent future violent radicalization. As for the assessed BOUNCEUp program, the objectives were to train future BOUNCE trainers about the content of the three BOUNCE tools, so that trainers go on to implement and use them in their own domains and cities. The authors of the report tried to provide a detailed description of the BOUNCEUp intervention and theoretical evaluation of its scientific basis. To do so, they proceeded in two different ways. One study was about the user satisfaction of trainers who received the BOUNCEUp program (101 participants); the other was about the short-term outcome evaluation of the BOUNCEUp tool by trainers (50 participants). The authors assessed user satisfaction and perception of the program through quantitative questionnaires and qualitative investigation (interviews, focus groups, observation, and content analysis). The results of the study about user satisfaction suggest that participants were satisfied with train-the-trainer program exercises and content, as well as with the

mentors themselves. They understood the concepts and methods and appreciated the holistic approach of the program. The short-term outcome evaluation of the tools revealed that the training either taught participants new methods to work with youngsters or showed them how to use exercises that they already knew for a broader cause. In almost all cases, it clarified the conceptualization of resilience. The possibility of using the training sessions as a place for self-reflection was also mentioned. However, the results demonstrated that several training elements were still unclear for participants, most notably the link between BOUNCE and preventing radicalization. Furthermore, even if participants seemed convinced by the BOUNCE program, they were not able to convince their colleagues of its interest, nor could they implement it by themselves in their communities or workplaces. Even though the general outcome is positive, many limitations were mentioned by the authors: the high dropout rate, the size of the groups, the timing of the training sessions, and the fact that not all colleagues understood the added value or logic of the program. Furthermore, the multitude of measures and results concerning different aspects of the program makes this report difficult to follow, especially because of the lack of organization in the writing style.

Table 2.12—Summary of Evidence

Study	Feddes et al. (2015) Targeted primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Diamond, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	Strengthen participants' self-esteem and increase their agency, perspective-taking skills (cognitive ability to anticipate the behavior and reactions of other people), and empathy in order to reduce their relative deprivation and disconnectedness from society, which in turn is expected to result in more resilience against violent radicalization.
Sample Characteristics	<i>A total of 46 adolescents and young adults: aged 14 to 23 (M = 16.9, SD = 2.8); 85% Moroccan, 11% Turkish, 1% Surinamese, and 1% Pakistani; all participants indicated they were Muslim. Participants were divided into three groups: Group 1 (n = 12; 67% men, 33% women; 45% first-generation immigrants, 58% second generation) and group 2 (n = 16, 63% men, 37% women; 12% first-generation immigrant, 88% second generation) included youngsters who followed the training in a community center, while group 3 (n = 18; all men; 6% first-generation immigrant, 94% second generation) included high-school students. Participants were recruited via the municipality (e.g., unemployment office), trainers or peers (groups 1 and 2), or via the school board (group 3).</i>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Longitudinal research design with five measurements: T1 (pre-measurement), turning point (after the end of the first module), T2 (between-measurements), T3 (post-training), and T4 (follow-up, only with group 1).</i>

	<p><i>Questionnaire to measure outcomes of interest on scales comprising two to four 5-point Likert variables:</i> 1) individual relative deprivation; 2) collective relative deprivation; 3) social disconnectedness; 4) self-esteem; 5) agency; 6) narcissism; 7) empathy; 8) perspective taking; 9) attitudes toward ideology-based violence by others; and 10) own violent intentions. Internal consistency of scales was overall “good” to “very good.” Where necessary, questions were adapted to the ethnic and religious backgrounds of participants.</p> <p><i>Data analysis:</i> Paired sample t-tests.</p>
Positive Outcomes	1) A marginal increase of reported self-esteem, empathy, and perspective-taking when comparing T1 and T3; 2) A significant increase in reported agency was found; 3) Attitudes toward ideology-based violence and reported own violent intentions decreased significantly when comparing T1 and T3.
Negative Outcomes	1) Data showed a marginally significant increase of reported narcissism, which was strongly associated with ideology-based violence; 2) Higher reports of perspective-taking were positively associated with attitudes toward ideology-based violence.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Participants were not members of extremist groups nor showed signs of violent radicalization. Therefore, it is unknown whether Diamond is effective with actual violent extremists; 2) The study did not include a control group. Potential positive or negative effects may therefore have been undetected; 3) There is a possibility that participants’ characteristics influenced the results of the training as they knew the objectives of the program beforehand, which might have had a confounding impact on their behavior; 4) Small sample size limiting the examination of age or context effects in the study.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of Study (/10)	9

Feddes et al. (2015) did a longitudinal evaluation of Diamond, a training program in the Netherlands whose aim is to build participants’ resilience against violent radicalization by reducing their relative deprivation and disconnectedness from society and strengthening their self-esteem, agency, perspective-taking skills, and empathy. The sample, recruited through the unemployment office, trainers, and school boards, consisted of 46 young Muslims (aged 14 to 23, $M = 16.93$, $SD = 2.76$) of first- and second-generation immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, Suriname, and Pakistan. They were divided into three groups. The program offered three modules over a period of three months. In the first module, to increase self-esteem and agency, participants worked on their social and professional competencies while strengthening their identity by discussing their family history and how they experience their dual identity. In the second and third module, participants reflected on their own opinions about what is “good” and “bad” behavior in comparison to what is acceptable behavior in society as a whole, so as to think critically about their own and other’s behavior and how to best deal with potential conflicts. A longitudinal research design applied at T1 (pre-measurement), turning point (after the end of the first module), T2 (between-measurements), T3 (post-training), and T4 (follow-up, only with group 1) measured the impact of the modules. At each point, a questionnaire measuring outcomes of interest on scales comprising two to four 5-point Likert variables was administered to participants.

It included data about the following: 1) individual relative deprivation; 2) collective relative deprivation; 3) social disconnectedness; 4) self-esteem; 5) agency; 6) narcissism; 7) empathy; 8) perspective taking; 9) attitudes toward ideology-based violence by others; and 10) own violent intentions. Internal consistency of scales was overall “good” to “very good.” Paired sample t-tests revealed a marginal increase of reported self-esteem and perspective-taking when comparing T1 and T3, a significant increase in reported agency, and a significant decrease in attitudes towards ideology-based violence and reported own violent intentions when comparing T1 and T3. However, the data also revealed a marginally significant increase in reported narcissism and perspective-taking, both of which were positively associated with ideology-based violence. Even though their methodological design was sophisticated, the authors recognized multiple limitations in their research: 1) Participants were not members of extremist groups nor showed signs of violent radicalization. It is, therefore, unknown whether Diamond is effective with actual violent extremists; 2) The study did not include a control group. Potential positive or negative effects may, therefore, have been undetected; 3) There is a possibility that participants’ characteristics influenced the results of the training, as they knew the objectives of the program beforehand. This might have had a confounding impact on their behavior; 4) Finally, the small sample size limited the examination of age or context effects in the study.

Table 2.13—Summary of Evidence

Study	SAFIRE (2013) Targeted primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Diamond, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	Increase resilience against radicalization among vulnerable youth and reduce susceptibility to violent extremism of non-radical Muslim adolescents. The Diamond program is based on two kinds of interventions: the system and the resilience approaches. The program involves parents, schools, and municipal organizations such as welfare agencies and frontline workers. It aims, among other things, to increase the participants' self-esteem and sense of agency, as well as decrease social isolation.
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>46 non-radicalized Muslim teenagers:</i> between 14 and 24 years old ($M = 16.93$), mostly with bicultural identities. Most participants were referred by government agencies such as organizations for the unemployed, social workers, or secondary schools. 85% were of Moroccan background, 11% of Turkish background, 2% of Surinam background, and 2% of Pakistani background. 78% were males and 22% females. 83% were born in the Netherlands (i.e., second-generation immigrants).</p> <p><i>Participants were divided into three groups:</i> Groups 1 ($n = 12$) and 2 ($n = 16$) included participants who were referred to the Diamond training via social workers and municipal organizations. Group 3 ($n = 18$) consisted of pupils at a secondary school. Participants of groups 2 and 3 participated voluntarily in the program; however, most of the group 1 participants did not participate voluntarily. Moreover, only group 1 had completed the four follow-up measurements at the publication of the report. Group 2 had completed three follow-ups and group 3, only two.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p>This research aimed to investigate the long-term effectiveness of resilience training in preventing radicalization among vulnerable youth. It is a longitudinal study using a mixed-method design. Both qualitative and quantitative measures were taken at four different times: before the training, in the middle of the training, after the training, and three months after the training. The study consisted of interviews and surveys.</p> <p><i>Quantitative measures:</i> Participants filled a Likert-type questionnaire measuring the following factors: 1) identification with Islam; 2) identification with Dutch society; 3) identification with one's ethnic background; 4) perceived distance to non-Muslims; 5) perceived superiority of the Muslim ingroup; 6) disconnectedness from Dutch society; 7) agency; 8) uncertainty; 9) self-esteem; 10) symbolic threats to the Muslim ingroup; 11) realistic threats to the Muslim ingroup; 12) illegitimacy of authorities; 13) collective relative deprivation (feeling of receiving less than one deserves) of the ethnic ingroup; 14) perceived humiliation of the ethnic ingroup; 15) perspective-taking skills with regard to non-Muslims; 16) empathy towards non-Muslims; 17) attitudes towards ideology-based violence; and 18) own violent intentions.</p> <p><i>Qualitative measures:</i> semi-structured interviews examining the variables of interest. They were then coded independently by two researchers using a coding scheme and analyzed.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p><i>Quantitative:</i> 1) Reduced sense of social marginalization and isolation (social disconnectedness) as more participants were enrolled in school, had an internship, or worked; 2) Better perspective-taking abilities; 3) Steady increase in empathy over time.</p> <p><i>Qualitative:</i> 1) Increase in self-esteem, perspective-taking, and empathy after the training; 2) Participants had more insight about their personal abilities and showed personal responsibility; 3) Participants learned to set concrete goals and deal with conflicts and negative feelings; 4) Decrease in social disconnectedness and feelings of relative deprivation; 5) The fact that the training was given in groups had a positive effect on participants; 6) Participants made friends during the training; 7) Participants made a positive evaluation of the training.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p><i>Quantitative:</i> 1) The decrease over time in attitudes toward ideology-based violence was non-significant, as was the increase in agency; 2) No significant results were found regarding the participants' own violent intentions; 3) No significant increases in agency and self-esteem.</p> <p><i>Qualitative:</i> None reported.</p>
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.

Limitations (Authors)	1) It was not possible to find a comparable control group that did not follow the Diamond training; 2) Each experimental group suffered drop-out of participants; 3) Measures could not be taken at the four different time points for most groups.
Limitations (Team)	1) The program defined “vulnerability to violent extremism” as being Muslim and having multiple cultural identities; 2) We do not know if the program was effective with radicalized youth.
Quality of Study (/10)	9

The authors assessed the Diamond PVE program, which took place in the Netherlands. The program’s main objective was to increase resilience against radicalization among vulnerable non-radical Muslim youth and reduce their susceptibility to violent extremism. During the program, 46 non-radicalized Muslim teenagers between the ages of 14 and 24 learned to think about their different identities, deal with important events in their lives, and set goals. They were also taught how to deal with different opinions, aggression, and conflicts. Finally, they were coached by certified trainers who helped them find work or access education. The Diamond program was evaluated using a longitudinal design. The authors used both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to assess the program. Measures were taken at four different times across the study: before the training, in the middle of the training, after the training, and three months after the training. Participants were divided into three groups: groups 1 ($n=12$) and 2 ($n=16$) included participants who were referred to Diamond via social workers and municipal organizations. Group 3 ($n=18$) consisted of pupils at a secondary school. The authors used Likert-type questionnaires to gather quantitative data. The questionnaires measured factors such as identification with Islam, identification with Dutch society, perceived distance to non-Muslims, perceived superiority of the Muslim ingroup, disconnectedness to Dutch society, agency, uncertainty, self-esteem, violent intentions, and empathy towards non-Muslims. Qualitative data was gathered using semi-structured interviews,

which examined these variables more in greater depth. Overall, the outcomes of the program were positive. Quantitative results indicated that the participants had a reduced sense of social disconnectedness, better perspective-taking abilities, and a steady increase in empathy over time. However, there were no significant results regarding the attitudes towards ideology-based violence and the participants’ own violent intentions. No significant increases in agency and self-esteem were observed. On the other hand, qualitative results seemed to show an increase in self-esteem over time. Moreover, they indicated that participants had more insight in their personal competencies, learned to set concrete goals, deal with conflicts and their negative feelings, felt more connected socially, and even made friends during the training. In addition, participants made a positive evaluation of the program. According to the authors, the Diamond program succeeded in preventing radicalization by promoting resilience among vulnerable youth. A major limitation of this study was the lack of a control group, as the authors reported being unable to find a comparable group that did not participate in the Diamond program. Some limitations were not acknowledged by the authors, namely that they defined “vulnerability to violent extremism” as being Muslim and having multiple cultural identities, which could be stigmatizing. Furthermore, we do not know if the program was effective with radicalized youth, as the sample exclusively comprised non-radical Muslims.

Tables 2.14 and 2.15—Summary of Evidence

Study	Manby (2010a) Secondary prevention General violent radicalization	Manby (2010b) Secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (Citizenship Programme), UK.	Prevent (Pathways into Adulthood), UK.
Objectives of the Program	1) Provide young people with a broad grounding in citizenship, principles of democracy, terrorism, and dictatorship; 2) Undertake library assignments exploring these issues.	1) Provide an opportunity to focus on issues of identity experienced by young people in the British communities (including issues related to radicalization); 2) Create a film on the theme of identity.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Nine young men</i> : age = 14–18; ethnicity = two British Pakistani, seven White British.	<i>Five young men</i> : age = 17–18; ethnicity = British South Asian; religion = Islam.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	1) Observation of one session; 2) Live and telephone interviews with participants; 3) Telephone interviews with parents of the participants; 4) Questionnaires and interviews for the staff.	1) Observation of two group sessions; 2) Semi-structured interviews with participants; 3) Telephone interviews with parents of the participants; 4) Questionnaires for the staff; 5) Interviews with program managers.
Positive Outcomes	1) Acquisition of knowledge on citizenship and cultural diversity; 2) Better self-confidence; 3) Parents and staff members confirmed the clear positive impact of the program.	1) Exploring identity issues related to ethnocultural belonging; 2) Maturation and better self-confidence; 3) Staff had a very positive view of the program's execution and benefits.
Negative Outcomes	Some participants were too young to fully understand the notions presented.	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	Participants were not at risk of radicalization (and should have been since it is a condition of this Prevent program).	The program was only accessible to young Asian people; it should be made available to a wider demographic.
Limitations (Team)	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.
Quality of Study (/10)	5	4

Manby (2009a–b; 2010a–b) conducted five small-scale evaluation studies on different projects under the Prevent initiative. Manby (2010a) found that participating in the Citizenship Programme of Prevent enabled nine young men (age = 14–18, ethnicity = British Pakistani and White British) to acquire knowledge on citizenship and cultural diversity, as well as improve self-confidence. Even though parents and staff members confirmed the clear positive impact of the program, some participants were too young to understand the program content fully. Furthermore, participants in the Citizenship Programme were not at risk of radicalization but should have been as it is a condition for participating in this Prevent program.

Manby (2010b) found that participating in the Pathways into Adulthood program of Prevent enabled five young Islamic British South Asian men (age = 17–18) to explore identity issues related to ethnocultural belongingness, which led to increased maturation and self-esteem in participants.

Manby (2009a) found that participating in the Pilot Parenting Project of Prevent enabled seven British and South Asian mothers to develop stronger parenting skills and increase their capacity to safeguard their children from online recruitment into radical groups. This led to a decrease in child problem behaviors as observed by the mothers. Even though the feedback of participants was very positive, three of the seven parents had to drop out of the program because of language communication problems, whereas the provision of translators may have reduced attrition.

Tables 2.16 and 2.17—Summary of Evidence		
Study	Manby (2009a) Primary prevention General violent radicalization	Manby (2009b) Secondary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (Pilot Parenting Project), UK.	Prevent (Theatre Project), UK.
Objectives of the Program	<p><i>Main objective:</i> Increase the knowledge, skills, and confidence of local parents so that they are better able to support their children/young people, should they be targeted or recruited by extremist groups.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Improve general parenting skills; 2) Build more resilient communities.</p>	Create a short drama production on the theme of preventing violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	Seven mothers of mixed ethnicity (British, South Asian).	<i>Six young people:</i> age = 13–17; gender = four men and two women; ethnicity = three British Asian, two White British, one of dual heritage. All had experienced racism before, either as victims or perpetrators.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	1) Parents' views of problem behaviors in their children (Eyberg Child Behaviour Inventory); 2) Interview of participants about the impact of the program; 3) Questionnaire about the experiences of participants in the program; 4) Questionnaire for the staff about the easiness of implementation and progress achieved by participants.	1) Observation of a training session and a video of the theatrical production; 2) Interviews with participants about their experience in the project, understanding of violent extremism, and self-esteem improvements during the project; 3) Questionnaires and interviews for the staff.
Positive Outcomes	1) Feeling of having developed better parenting skills (knowledge about child protection/safeguarding and against the potential for recruitment via radical websites); 2) Decrease in problem behaviors as observed by mothers; 3) Very good overall feedback by participants.	1) Knowledge acquisition and skill development related to theatrical productions, teamwork, and conflict management; 2) Better self-confidence; 3) Cost-effective; 4) Staff commended the commitment and progress of participants.
Negative Outcomes	Three parents dropped out because of communication problems (language barrier).	The stressful context for participants (tight schedule, performance anxiety) sometimes led to conflicts.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Interpreters for non-native English speakers could have prevented dropouts; 2) The program should have covered a wider range of interests and concerns.	Unclear how well the aims and potential benefits of the Prevent project were understood by the Theatre Project program staff.
Limitations (Team)	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.
Quality of Study (/10)	6	4

Manby (2009b) found that participating in the Theatre Project of Prevent enabled six young people (four males, two females, age = 13–17, ethnicity = White British and Asian British) who were either victims or perpetrators of racism to acquire knowledge about theatre production, teamwork, and conflict management. Study participants reported that this led to an increase in self-confidence. Although the program was deemed successful and cost-effective by the staff and researchers, they also noted that the stressful context of building a theatre play sometimes led to conflicts among participants.

Even though Manby (2009a–b, 2010a–b) found mostly positive outcomes for these Prevent projects, the evidence is potentially anecdotal. The low number of participants and weak methodology preclude generalization to larger audiences.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.18—Summary of Evidence	
Study	Sheikh et al. (2012) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women and Imams' Active Development (ADFYWIAD), UK.
Objectives of the Program	<p><i>Main objective:</i> Increase community resilience to violent extremism.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives of ADFYWIAD projects:</i> 1) iLead program (13–16 years and 16+ years): Build the confidence and skills of Muslim youth so that they are able to act as leaders in the community; 2) "Keep fit": Involve young Muslim women in various activities that can make them less vulnerable to extremist messages; 3) Radical Middle Way training sessions: Educate Muslim leaders and community representatives about identifying and deconstructing extremist messages, so that they can cascade messages to the grassroots communities they work in; 4) Governance and child protection training for mosques, madrassahs and Muslim organizations: build the resilience of mosques, Madrassahs, and Muslim organizations across Wales; 5) Meetings between police officers and Imams: partnership work between Imams and the police.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>A total of 82 individuals participated in this evaluation:</i> 1) Program participants: Of the 48 individuals in this category, the majority had participated in the iLead youth leadership program ($n = 15$ in the 13–16 years old group; $n = 9$ in the 16+ group). 10 persons were participants of the Radical Middle Way project, 10 of the "Keep fit" project, and the four left participated in the governance and child protection training for mosques, madrassahs, and Muslim organizations; 2) Institutions: A link to an online survey was emailed to 64 government's own networks. 29 respondents from Welsh Muslim institutions answered (response rate of 45.3%). Most of them were females ($n = 16$), and the majority were from Cardiff ($n = 17$) or Newport ($n = 6$). Roughly half worked with a Muslim voluntary group ($n = 14$), and one third worked in a mosque ($n = 9$); 3) Police officers: Two police officers that attended meetings with Imams were interviewed; and 4) Project coordinators: Three project coordinators were from the Muslim Council of Wales.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Data collection:</i> Measures focused on the awareness of ADFYWIAD programs and participants' perceived impacts. These were assessed using the following: 1) an online questionnaire designed by the Office for Public Management; this tool aimed to assess the awareness of Muslim institutions on four key elements of the program—governance training, child protection training, iLead youth leadership projects, and "Keep Fit" monthly social activities; 2) interviews: 14 structured interviews were administered to two police officers, nine program participants, and three project coordinators about their understanding of the program, its perceived strengths and weaknesses, and its potential impacts; and 3) focus groups: a total of five focus groups (from seven to 15 participants each) were conducted by Office for Public Management facilitators, who followed preestablished guides created by the authors.</p> <p><i>Data analysis:</i> Data collected over the course of the evaluation was subjected to thematic analysis to assess both extent and type of impact. The theory of change model was used as a broad framework for analysis. Having data from different points in the evaluation allowed triangulation of the data to produce more robust findings.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p><i>Awareness of Muslim institutions in the iLead and child protection projects:</i> More than half the respondents had heard of them.</p> <p><i>Perceived impacts:</i> 1) Improvement of practices within Muslim institutions (better organizational structure, knowledge, and skills needed to better support the Muslim communities they serve); 2) Progress in the partnership between Muslim institutions and statutory agencies such as the police; and 3) Development of leadership skills among Muslim youth participants such as confidence, public speaking, conflict management, etc.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p>1) Awareness of the Muslim institutions of the governance training and "Keep Fit": Slightly less than a third of respondents had heard of them; 2) Difficulties reaching the targeted audiences: Recruiting mosque committee members and Imams to participate in the training sessions was challenging and time-consuming as they tended to be apprehensive in the beginning; 3) Implementation issues included poor management and coordination, and two elements of the original program for Imams were not delivered due to a lack of interest; 4) No reported impacts of the "Keep Fit" project (no decreased vulnerability to recruitment by</p>

	extremist groups); 5) Inadequate training sessions mostly comprised lectures with little room for practical exercises.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Limited generalizability of findings (due to the small number of participants interviewed or taking part in focus groups); 2) Problematic sampling methods: involvement of Welsh government and the Muslim Council of Wales in the choice of participants; 3) Two other projects under ADFYWIAD could not be implemented.
Limitations (Team)	1) Not enough information on participants, including the total sample size; 2) Insufficient methodological details; 3) No detailed descriptions of the projects' content; 4) Relevant findings are based on subjective perceptions from participants; 5) Limited insight on real-life prevention of radicalization.
Quality of Study (/10)	4

The Office for Public Management (OPM) was commissioned by the Welsh government to evaluate the Muslim Council of Wales's "Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women and Imams' Active Development" (ADFYWIAD) program. The main goal of ADFYWIAD is to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism via several projects, each of which has different specific objectives. The iLead youth leadership program for 13–16 years old, and a similar project for those over 16, were developmental projects lasting a year that focused on personal development, engaging with the wider community, and leadership development. Its aim was to build the confidence and skills of Muslim youth so that they are able to act as leaders in the community. The "Keep Fit" project consists primarily of enjoyable monthly sports activities with some time dedicated to discussions about theology, citizenship, and civic responsibility, which are often led by scholars. These activities were destined to involve young Muslim women in diverse activities that can make them less vulnerable to extremist messages. Radical Middle Way training consists of a series of training sessions delivered to Muslim leaders, who, it is hoped, will, in turn, cascade the messages to grassroots communities they work in. Governance and child protection training for mosques, madrassahs, and Muslim organizations hopes to build the resilience of mosques, madrassahs, and Muslim organizations across Wales by ensuring that 1) they operate within the context of good governance, child protection, and safeguarding policies/procedures and 2) help them appreciate the importance of diverse representations of governance structures. Meetings between police officers and Imams cover partnership work between Imams and the police. This evaluation used the theory of change model as a broad framework for analysis. Qualitative data was collected from 82 individuals (48 program participants, 29 workers from Welsh Muslim institutions, two police officers, and three project coordinators) through several

instruments. OPM designed a short online survey whose purpose was to test the awareness of the Muslim community of the program of work being delivered in their local area. It was sent to 64 institutions across Wales, and 45.3% responded (29 individuals). A total of 14 interviews were also conducted, following predetermined interview guides. Whether it was for the two police officers or the nine program participants, the themes discussed were the same: their understanding of the program, its perceived strengths and weaknesses, and the perceived impacts of participating in it. For the three project coordinators' interviews, two other themes were added: 1) project recruitment, management and delivery and 2) learning and recommendations. In addition, a total of five focus groups containing seven to 15 participants each were conducted by OPM facilitators, who followed preestablished guides created by the authors. The data collected throughout the evaluation was subjected to thematic analysis to assess both extent and type of impact. Having data from different points in the evaluation allowed the triangulation of the data to produce more robust findings. Regarding the awareness of Muslim institutions of ADFYWIAD projects, findings showed that more than half the online survey respondents ($n = 15$) were aware of the child protection training and the iLead project. On the other hand, approximately one third or less were aware of the governance training ($n = 10$) and the "Keep Fit" monthly social activities ($n = 8$). As for the perceived impacts ADFYWIAD, several were highlighted by participants: 1) There was some evidence indicating that governance training, child protection training, and Radical Middle Way motivated participants to improve the working practices and responsiveness of Muslim institutions; 2) Both interviewed police officers felt that the meetings with Imams had been the start of a more formal relationship with them and helped build trust and confidence amongst those present (this view was also echoed by the project

coordinator); and 3) Participants of iLead felt that these projects helped them develop confidence and public speaking skills. Many reported having learned a number of other skills (conflict management, teamwork, and time and stress management skills) that would be valuable to take up leadership roles in the community. Negative outcomes were as follows: 1) Very few Muslim institutions were aware of the governance training and “Keep Fit” program; 2) The recruitment of mosque committee members and Imams to participate in the training sessions was challenging and time-consuming as they tended to be apprehensive in the beginning; 3) Concerning implementation issues, poor management and coordination were mentioned, and two elements of the original program for Imams were not delivered due to a lack of interest; 4) Concerning impacts, the “Keep Fit” project could not decrease at-risk women’s vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups; and 5) Training sessions were described as inadequate because they mostly comprised lectures with little room for practical exercises. As for limitations, the

authors mentioned that the small number of questioned participants significantly weakens the generalizability of findings. Furthermore, the sampling methods used were questionable; indeed, due to difficulties recruiting participants, individuals were not randomly selected but rather approached by the Muslim Council of Wales. Also, the online survey was distributed to only a subsample of Muslim institutions chosen by the Welsh government. Additional limitations were raised by our team, including that relevant findings are based on subjective perceptions with limited methodological details surrounding their collection or analysis. This evaluation was particularly unclear, with much important information missing (barely any details on the interviewees or focus group members, including the total sample size). Methodological details were also lacking, for example, regarding data analyses, interview lengths and who conducted them, how participants were recruited, or why a follow-up focus group had more participants than the original one.

Table 2.19—Summary of Evidence

Study	Hirschfield et al. (2012) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	48 programs under Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	50 locations in the UK were identified as being at higher risk of violent extremism. The Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) of these regions were then encouraged to apply for PVE funding. 48 of these 50 locations had developed programs under the Prevent strategy at the time the evaluation took place. <i>The main objectives of these programs were the following:</i> 1) preventing violent extremism among young people (eight to 18 years old) by delivering programs across YOTs; 2) reaching out to children and young people who are most at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism; 3) expanding existing programs for vulnerable young people in communities where extreme views are prevalent; and 4) providing training and support for selected youth justice staff to counter violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	In order to frame a national picture of the PVE programs under Prevent, practitioners and stakeholders across 48 locations were interviewed (<i>n</i> = not provided). Practitioners were defined as those who were directly involved in the design and/or delivery of the project. Stakeholders were those who were not directly involved but who had a direct interest in the project or were otherwise aligned to it (e.g., police officers, community engagement officers, leaders from community organizations). No further data on their profession, sex, mean age, or sociodemographic information was provided. 71 stakeholders and practitioners from 12 locations were interviewed, as well as 33 young people who participated in nine out of the 12 programs. Among the 33 young participants, 21 were men, and 12 were women. Their age ranged between 14 and 21 years old, and all but three were Muslim. In all, 18 were Asian, six Somali, five Caucasian, one Moroccan, one Algerian, one Afghan, and one was Albanian.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	The evaluation of the programs had three stages. <i>Stage 1:</i> Systematic review on PVE in order to scope the evidence. <i>Stage 2:</i> Framing a national picture of the PVE programs. This stage consisted in the identification and assessment of existing PVE programs. During this stage, the research team visited 48 sites and conducted in-depth interviews with project staff and representatives from each of the YOTs carrying PVE programs, and analyzed project documentation and data provided by the Youth Justice Board (YJB).

Stage 3: Case studies of 12 project sites were selected on the basis of geographical spread and the delivery of different sets of interventions. Semi-structured interviews with practitioners and stakeholders were conducted ($n = 71$). The interviews aimed to learn more about their perceptions and experiences of the program, as well as about the interventions being delivered. They also aimed to examine the benefits and challenges of delivering the programs. The research team also conducted interviews with young people who were enrolled in the programs ($n = 33$) in order to understand their views, attitudes, and beliefs, and to elicit their perceptions of the interventions' effectiveness.

Project diary sheets: The authors additionally made non-participant observations of project interventions ($n = 36$) and proceeded to further documentary analysis, such as of the original project bids, evaluation reports, curricula outlines, and recording sheets. This provided information about the characteristics of young people participating in the project, the range of interventions delivered (objectives, methods of delivery, nature of targeting), and an indication of project activity and change over time. Project diary sheets were filled during stages 1, 2, and 3 of the evaluation process.

Positive Outcomes

Interviews with staff members and practitioners and program documentation analysis: 1) Some practitioners welcomed the investment of Prevent for communities, which were often deprived and overlooked; 2) Most interviewees considered they had received enough funding to carry their program; 3) Overall, responses to the training were positive among the staff; 4) Most respondents thought their program had positive effects on tackling the causes of violent extremism; 5) Respondents felt that young people had become increasingly involved in group sessions, had received a lot of support and information, and made progress. They also reported that youth had positive reactions towards the interventions and noticed positive attitude changes towards the government and the police; 6) There was increased awareness and understanding of prejudices experienced by the participants; 7) Practitioners believed they had provided young people with the necessary skills to enable them to communicate, debate, reach their own decisions, and resist extremist views; 8) Projects involving peer mentors and youth leaders were considered to be successful and have greater longevity; 9) Some practitioners believed that their work with families led to greater resilience within the wider community; 10) Partnerships with other organizations led to better awareness of PVE among partner agencies and increased the chances of identifying youth at risk of violent radicalization.

Interviews with participants: 1) Participants enjoyed the programs and activities, especially sport, leisure, and outward-bound activities; 2) Some participants said they developed new skills, such as music production; 3) There was an increase in self-esteem, empathy, and open-mindedness; 4) Some reported an increased awareness of similarities with those who were previously perceived to be different; 5) Some enjoyed meeting participants who shared the same religion or ethnic background as them as it was an opportunity to discuss and learn; 6) A few participants enjoyed discussing conflicts between their faith and Western values and reported feeling more comfortable with themselves afterwards; 7) The staff was described as respectful, non-judgmental, and empathetic; 8) Some reported they were less likely to offend or re-offend because of improved critical thinking and greater awareness of alternatives to offending; 9) The young people felt they understand Islam better and were more equipped to rebut advances from radical groups; 10) Most young people were confident they would be able to put what they had learned into practice.

Negative Outcomes

Interviews with staff members and practitioners and program documentation analysis: 1) The title of the initiative (Preventing Violent Extremism) was seen as unhelpful and stigmatizing by some practitioners. Many felt uncomfortable with this label; 2) Most projects targeted young Muslim men and only focused on Islamist terrorism, which could be perceived as stigmatizing and discriminating, as well as potentially counter-productive; 3) There seems to be a lack of communication between the government and Prevent programs regarding the national agenda and perception of PVE, which was initially focusing on Islamist extremism but then shifted to include more types of extremism without informing the projects. Consequently, many programs could not adjust; 4) There was a lack of clarity and understanding of the term "violent extremism" among practitioners, which led to several projects implementing activities with minimal PVE content; 5) Over half of the practitioners stated they had insufficient time to develop and implement their program. They also stated the timetable was unrealistic, with most projects being at least five months behind schedule; 6) It was difficult to recruit and retain staff because of the short length of the contracts and the negative views towards Prevent; 7) It was sometimes difficult to

establish partnerships as some organizations, such as local mosques and schools, viewed Prevent as discriminatory. Some mosques started their own programs to keep young people away from Prevent; 8) Some Imams feared deportation; 9) Most of the practitioners did not think their intervention was effective in reaching those most at risk of becoming involved with violent extremism (they only had access to low-risk individuals, the higher-risk ones being more secretive, harder to reach, or untrusting of Prevent); 10) Only three out of the 12 case study programs had external evaluations and only two used pre- and post-intervention measures; 11) Three participants displayed lower prosocial attitudes at the end of the program than at the beginning; 12) Eleven out of 12 projects struggled to assess outcomes in a robust fashion; 13) There seems to be a need for a wider and more holistic approach to counter the risk of violent extremism, involving other agencies and the wider community; 14) In a few situations, the staff seemed to lack the skills required to ensure input and discussion from participants; 15) A program had a high turnover of participants due to their legal status and the logistics involved in moving inmates; 16) Fewer than 30% of the participants were involved over two or three seasons and just over 3% for more than three seasons; 17) Practitioners expressed concerns about confidentiality and about what would happen to the data collected during their project (namely, if it could be used against the participants).

Interviews with participants: 1) Branding a project as PVE scared some people/families (double agenda of surveillance and intervention); 2) Trust issues between the community and Prevent programs; 3) Some participants felt coerced into activities.

Overall Outcome

Mixed.

Limitations (Authors)

1) It was not possible to determine the number of young people involved in interventions; 2) Interviews with young participants were not always conducted in ideal situations (e.g., private spaces); 3) No baseline data to measure progress and the impacts of PVE programs; 4) Substantial missing data; 5) The views presented do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the majority of the staff and participants of Prevent initiatives; 6) Very few negative comments were made among the participants, especially for those who were attending the program under conditions.

Limitations (Team)

1) Little to no information about methods, qualitative data, statistics, and the robustness of results; 2) The evaluation was mostly based on user satisfaction; 3) The practitioner and stakeholder samples are poorly described, and the sample size is not provided; 4) The report should have been divided into two or three reports to make it easier to follow; 5) Practitioners and stakeholders may be biased as they want the program they are involved in to succeed.

Quality of Study (/10)

8

The authors assessed 48 programs under Prevent in the UK. The study was divided into three stages. The first two involved 1) a systematic review on preventing religious radicalization and violent extremism and 2) identifying and evaluating the outcomes and implementation of PVE programs. This was done by interviewing project staff and stakeholders and gathering data in project documentation such as the characteristics of participants, information about the interventions that were delivered (methods of delivery, objectives covered, nature of targeting), and indications of project activity and change over time (n = not provided). The study's third stage involved case studies of 12 project sites during which the researchers interviewed practitioners and stakeholders (n = 71) about their perceptions and experiences of the program and the interventions delivered. They also interviewed young people (n = 33) participating in the programs in order to

understand their views, attitudes, and beliefs, as well as their perception of the program's effectiveness. Observations, documentation analysis, and diary analysis were also conducted throughout the study (n = 36). Key findings showed an increase in self-esteem, empathy, and open-mindedness, as well as a better understanding of Islam, better communication skills, and a better perception of similarities with those who were previously perceived to be very different by participants of the program. Participants felt they were better equipped to refute advances from radical groups. Practitioners perceived that the young people who participated in their program had progressed and become increasingly involved, which made them think their interventions were directly preventing violent extremism. On the negative side, most practitioners did not think that their intervention was effective in reaching those who were really at risk of radicalization. Also, the fact that the programs were targeting young Muslim men and

were branded as PVE had a stigmatizing effect and scared some of the participants. Practitioners expressed concern about the confidentiality of the information they were collecting and what would happen to the data afterwards. Moreover, three participants displayed lower prosocial attitudes at the end of the program than at the beginning. Limitations of the research were noted. According to the authors, there was substantial missing data in the internal evaluations of some programs, and there was no baseline data to measure progress in most programs. Also, it was not possible to determine the number of young people engaged across interventions, and the interviews with young

participants were not always conducted in ideal situations (e.g., private spaces). Very few negative comments were made among the participants, especially for those who were attending the program under particular conditions. Limitations not mentioned by authors include the potential biases of interviewed practitioners and stakeholders, who want the program they are involved in to be successful, the prevalence of user satisfaction measures over other outcomes, and the lack of information regarding the sample and qualitative/quantitative analyses. The report could have been divided into two or three reports to make it easier to follow.

Table 2.20—Summary of Evidence

Study	Manby (2009c) Secondary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (Film Project), UK.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Produce a film focused on supporting and challenging young people's views. <i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Support vulnerable individuals who could be recruited in extremist groups; 2) Challenge violent/extremist ideologies and support mainstream views; 3) Open up dialogue with young people.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Inclusion criteria:</i> Young people that had been victims of extremism or were disengaged from mainstream activities or were living in polarized communities. <i>Nine participants:</i> Six boys, three girls; age = 14–17; they all had experienced violence in their lives; four had committed offenses.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Questionnaires and interviews on the following:</i> 1) self-esteem (Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale); 2) skills learned during the project (including awareness about violent extremism); and 3) general performance. <i>Data analysis:</i> Pre- and post- measures were taken and parents were asked to fill questionnaires.
Positive Outcomes	1) Acquisition of knowledge on violent extremism, film production, and teamwork; 2) Greater self-esteem.
Negative Outcomes	1) Establishing a link between violence and extremism was cognitively hard for participants; 2) Unsure if the program will have an effect on future concrete behaviors; 3) One participant committed an offense during the program; 4) Some were suspected of using drugs; 5) The project was time-consuming and expensive.
Overall Outcome	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Manby (2009c) found that participating in the Film Project of Prevent enabled nine teenagers (six boys, three girls, age = 14–17) who all experienced violence in their lives to acquire knowledge about extremism, film production, and teamwork. The program also strengthened their self-esteem. However, participants found it hard to cognitively link extremism and violence; one committed an offense during the program, and multiple participants were suspected of using drugs. Finally, it was unclear if the

program had effects on future behaviors, and was described as time-consuming and expensive. Even though the authors clearly described the negative outcomes of the program, its effects were positive for most participants, leading to a “mixed” overall outcome. Like the other studies from Manby, this one suffers from potentially anecdotal evidence; the low number of participants and weak methodology preclude generalization.

Table 2.21—Summary of Evidence

Study	Madriaza et al. (2018) Secondary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	Vivre-Ensemble, France.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Prevent the risk of violent radicalization by promoting cultural and religious pluralism. <i>Intermediate objectives:</i> 1) Develop participants' critical thinking about dogmatic thoughts; 2) Develop autonomy in regard to external influences; 3) Develop the recognition of multiple identities.
Sample Characteristics	The Vivre-Ensemble intervention was implemented on two cohorts from the Isère reinsertion and probation penitentiary services (<i>services pénitentiaires d'insertion et de probation</i> ; SPIP); <i>n</i> = 10 (five per cohort). All participants were identified by the internal multidisciplinary commission of the establishment as being receptive to violent radicalization. Due to inconsistencies in the answers to demographic questions, all data collected from the first cycle had to be rejected. The second cohort comprised four men and one woman (mean age = 20.4 years old). All participants had French citizenship, but one was born in Algeria. Two individuals were employed, three were unemployed; one was in a relationship, the others were single; one had not finished college, two had graduated, one had not finished high school, and one had.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>A pre- and post-test design was used to evaluate the outcomes of the program.</i> The same online questionnaire was administered before and after the intervention, with items measuring seven domains of interest: 1) sympathy towards radicalization (SyfoR); 2) integrative complexity (Moral Dilemmas Test); 3) self-uncertainty (Scale of Self-Uncertainty); 4) self-esteem (Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale); 5) empathy (Basic Empathy Scale); 6) social isolation (Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults); and 7) anxiety and depression (Symptom Scale Hopkins-25). The post-test questionnaire added 10 items to measure user satisfaction.
Positive Outcomes	1) A statistically significant decrease in self-instability was observed; 2) All participants were very satisfied with the activities included in the program; 3) All users agreed that they would recommend participating in Vivre-Ensemble.
Negative Outcomes	1) Some participants distrusted correctional services and therefore gave fake answers; 2) Many results were not statistically significant (no change in mental health and sympathy towards radicalization and a slight decrease in self-esteem, empathy, and social isolation) or could not be evaluated (integrative complexity) because of the poor quality of answers written by participants; 3) The majority of participants did not consider that Vivre-Ensemble's activities met their goals or helped them with the issues that led them to incarceration.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size: 10 individuals participated in the programs, and of these, only the data of five could be analyzed. Indeed, because the real purpose of the intervention was not disclosed the first time Vivre-Ensemble was implemented, some participants changed their answers to certain factual questions (e.g., age) in the post-test, invalidating their data; 2) Participants were selected according to very strict criteria, which limits generalizability; 3) Many of the assessed indicators require considerable time to change, but the follow-up was limited.
Limitations (Team)	1) Textual inconsistencies: change in the number of participants from one page to another; 2) Psychometric instruments were translated by the researchers, which limits content validity (though translations were reviewed by stakeholders); 3) Potential bias: The authors were responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the program.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Madriaza et al. (2018) implemented an 18-month research-action project on three sites in France. This project aimed to develop an intervention model for offenders released in the community that are radicalized or at risk of becoming radicalized. These individuals were under the jurisdiction of the

reinsertion and probation penitentiary services (*services pénitentiaires d'insertion et de probation*; SPIP). The report presents in detail the implementation of the project, as well as an assessment of its outcomes. In order to assess the impacts of the program, a pre- and post-test design

was used. The same online questionnaire was administered before and after the intervention in order to measure seven dimensions of interest: sympathy towards radicalization, integrative complexity, self-uncertainty, self-esteem, empathy, social isolation, and mental health (anxiety and depression). The 99 items measuring these dimensions were taken from empirically validated instruments (translated by the authors and reviewed by stakeholders when necessary). In the post-test questionnaire, 10 items were added to assess user satisfaction. The Vivre-Ensemble program was implemented twice. Participants were recruited in the Isère SPIP and had committed property damage and exhibited antisocial behaviors. The first time, participants ($n = 5$) were not told the real purpose of the intervention, and it was found that, when responding to the post-test, participants changed their answers to certain factual questions (e.g., age). The data collected was, therefore, invalidated. The second time, participants ($n = 5$) were notified of the

aim of the intervention, and data collected in the pre- and post-test were consistent. Results revealed that following the program led to a decrease in self-uncertainty, and overall user satisfaction was good. However, most users believed that activities did not meet their expectations and did not help solve the problems that led them to incarceration. Limitations acknowledged by the authors include the small sample size, an issue amplified by having to discard data of the first wave—limited generalizability, and limited follow-up time to detect lasting changes. Other limitations include using psychometric tests with a “homemade” translation in the absence of an official version (of note, efforts were made to ensure the validity of translations, which were reviewed by stakeholders), slight inconsistencies in the writing of the report (change in the number of participants from one page to another), and a potential conflict of interest (authors were responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the program).

Negative Outcomes

Table 2.22—Summary of Evidence

Study	Bowie & Revell (2018) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (in universities), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Detect and report extremist behavior among students and colleagues in UK universities to counter radicalization on campuses.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Eight participants from two English universities with Anglican foundations:</i> These included two students with senior experience in student union work (both in their 20s) and six staff members who held multiple roles in universities (all in their 40s and 50s). These roles comprised operating Prevent, operating the chaplaincy, and being responsible for diversity and equality in universities. The sample included Christians, Muslims, and those of no expressed faith or belief, all from a range of genders and sexual orientations.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Semi-structured, in-depth interviews:</i> Conducted in private, these lasted one to 1.5 hours. They explored how academics, students, and professional officers that are engaged in the implementation of Prevent in Anglican universities understood, interpreted, and applied its controversial policies. <i>Data analysis:</i> Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed qualitatively to draw out thematic patterns.
Positive Outcomes	None reported.
Negative Outcomes	1) Risk of controversy and poor implementation of the Prevent policy (concerns that staff responsible for Prevent, mostly teachers, might misinterpret religiosity for radicalization); 2) Students experienced fear and self-censorship due to concern that their teachers are spying on them; 3) General concern about the focus on Muslim populations and lack thereof on far-right extremist groups (highlighting the idea that Prevent is mainly an Islamophobic and racist policy—the inclusion of far-right groups in Prevent documentation being tokenistic); 4) Staff members feeling a tension between their duty as university staff and the obligations of Prevent.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	Small sample size.

Limitations (Team)	1) Potential conflict of interest in the choice of participants, specifically those from student unions, who were known to hold existing opposition to Prevent strategy; 2) Lack of information on methodology and data analysis.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Bowie and Revell (2018) examined the impact of the UK’s Prevent program to counter radicalization on the campuses of two English universities with Anglican foundations. The researchers, through a qualitative approach, conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with two students in their 20s (representatives of student unions) and six staff members in their 40s and 50s (key individuals responsible for responding to the Prevent’s proposal in university management). The participants included Christians (of differing denominations), Muslims, and those of no expressed faith or belief, and were from a range of genders and sexual orientations. The interviews consisted of questions relating to the following: 1) the participants’ involvement in the development of the Prevent/Fundamental British Values university policy; 2) the values and Christian foundations of the university; 3) feelings about the government’s motivations for the policy; and 4) any training programs used by the university concerning Prevent. Five key themes emerged from the interviews: 1) the need to be able to speak and make decisions in a religiously-informed way when it comes to judgments around Prevent, as well as the controversy of the Prevent policy and risk of poor implementation; 2) the existence of issues of

radicalization with Christian and non-religious societies and groups, highlighting the narrow perspective of Prevent, mainly focusing on Muslim members; 3) concerns about free speech, fear of surveillance, active profiling, and concerns that the inclusion of far-right radicalization groups in Prevent was tokenistic; 4) tension arising from the balance between critical independence and legal compliance, namely worries that universities might not be doing enough to protect students/staff from terrorism and that they were being unethical in engaging with the Prevent strategy; and 5) the significance of having staff members who understand religious development in young people and have good knowledge and engagement with religious students. While the small scale of the research presents a significant limitation, the authors believe that the in-depth interviews revealed important challenges universities face in responding to Prevent policies. However, other limitations not mentioned by authors also characterize this study, namely potential conflicts of interest in the choice of participants, specifically those from student unions who are known to hold existing opposition to Prevent. Finally, the lack of information on methodology and data analysis limits the evaluation of the empirical strength of the study.

Table 2.23—Summary of Evidence

Study	HM Government (2011a–d) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism in the UK and overseas. <i>Five specific objectives:</i> 1) Challenge and rebut terrorist ideology; 2) Disrupt the activities of propagandists for terrorism; 3) Support those vulnerable to their messages; 4) Increase community resilience towards violent extremism; 5) Address grievances exploited by ideologues.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Besides an unknown number of MPs and councilors, a total of 1,158 individuals or organizations participated in the consultation process:</i> 1) 325 individuals answered the online consultation questionnaire. The majority of respondents identified themselves as from police and local authorities. The others worked in specific sectors of Prevent or were members of the public interested in Prevent. In addition, 78 respondents (individuals or organizations) sent their answers via email and post. Most of them were from local authorities; 2) 586 delegates attended the consultation events. Among these, participants were from local authorities (38%), police (22%), community organizations and faith groups (11%), the National Offender Management Service and Probation (4%), and “other” (19%). Two additional consultation events were held: one for MPs and Peers in the House of Commons, and one for local councilors at the Local Government House in London under the auspices of the Improvement and Development Agency. No information was provided on the number of

	<p>participants; 3) 124 individuals (37 Muslims, 87 non-Muslims) never involved with Prevent were selected to participate in several focus groups. Respondents were selected using a mix of on-street and snowballing techniques designed to capture a wide range of backgrounds (e.g., working status, socioeconomic group, age, gender). For the Muslim subsample, most individuals were from Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Bangladesh, and North Africa, and were between the ages of 18 and 44.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Online questionnaire:</i> respondents were invited to answer 13 questions, with Question 14 providing respondents with an opportunity to make general comments. Questions covered key aspects of the previous Prevent strategy (CONTEST) and sought the views of respondents concerning a proposed new Prevent strategy. In addition, specific equality impact assessment questions were included to ensure that the project did not discriminate against any of the following characteristics: race, religion or belief, disability, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, age, pregnancy and maternity, and marriage and civil partnership.</p> <p><i>Consultation events:</i> 11 regional consultation events were held in which participants were divided into subgroups of five to 10 persons. As they answered the five questions, one individual per subgroup noted their answers, and these discussion records formed the content for analysis.</p> <p><i>Focus groups:</i> A total of 24 in-depth focus groups were organized. Of these, 11 focused on the views of the general public in a variety of regional settings. 13 smaller sessions sought the views of Muslim members specifically. Participants had eight themes/questions to answer and discuss: 1) aims and objectives of the Prevent strategy; 2) broadening of Prevent to include other threats; 3) resilience and resilient community; 4) funding for Prevent-related interventions; 5) important institutions for the Prevent strategy; 6) collaboration of central and local governments along with community organizations to challenge terrorist propaganda; 7) risk-based approach; and 8) resisting apologists for violence.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p>1) Channel, one of Prevent's key components, was seen quite positively; 2) Broad support of the aims and objectives of Prevent; 3) Some respondents felt that Prevent had had a positive impact on women and young people; 4) It was perceived that the new strategy could help to mitigate the negative impact of CONTEST on religion/race by expanding the scope of violent radicalizations targeted by the program; 5) The proposed strategy could promote active engagement and raise awareness of risks.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p><i>Implementation issues:</i> 1) Absence of clear guidelines; 2) Poor use/management of funding; 3) Lack of transparency; 4) Lack of consideration of local contexts; 5) Need for more accountability for professionals; 6) Need for more balance between central and local governments; 7) Difficult to evaluate the Prevent activity.</p> <p><i>Iatrogenic effects:</i> Climate of distrust between program providers and the community.</p> <p><i>Negative impacts:</i> Prevent was perceived to have a disproportionate focus on specific religions, beliefs, and races. Men and young people were particularly likely to be negatively impacted.</p>
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Evaluation based on the perceptions of participants who did not go through the program; 2) Absence of limitations and discussion sections; 3) Lack of demographic information on the sample; 4) Vague terms (e.g., "many") in the descriptive statistics.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Prevent is part of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy in the UK. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. A three-month consultation process was held to review the Prevent strategy and to gauge the public's perceptions of a proposed new strategy. In order to do so, multiple data collection methods were used. First, a 14-item questionnaire covered key aspects of the previous strategy and sought the respondents' views on suggestions to improve the existing strategy. In

addition, specific equality impact assessment questions were included in relation to the following protected characteristics: race, religion or belief, disability, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, age, pregnancy and maternity, and marriage and civil partnership. This allowed the authors to consider whether any aspect of the proposed strategy would have a disproportionate impact on any of the aforementioned characteristics. Members of the public were able to answer these

questionnaires online, via email, or by post. Three hundred and twenty-five individuals completed the full online questionnaire, and of that, 52% ($n = 169$) responded to equality impact assessment questions. Seventy-eight responses were received via post or email from individuals or organizations. Second, 11 regional consultation events were attended by a total of 586 delegates from a wide range of statutory and non-statutory partners. Local authorities, police-community organizations, and faith groups were the largest identifiable groups represented at these events. Approximately one hour was allocated for the completion of five questions on key areas of Prevent. Delegates sat in groups of between five and ten people, with participants mixed by sector and occupation. The discussion record forms provided the content for the analysis of responses. Finally, in order to gauge public opinion on Prevent, 24 in-depth focus groups were held across England, Scotland, and Wales. Eighty-seven respondents were selected using a mix of on-street and snowballing techniques. A separate Muslim-only sample (37 individuals) was also selected, given the perceived negative impact of the previous strategy on this group. None of these 124 respondents had been involved in Prevent consultations, were working in Prevent, or had a political interest in Prevent. No information on how data was analyzed was provided. Regarding positive outcomes, findings from the equality impact assessment showed that some respondents felt that Prevent had a positive impact on women by removing the constraints that block their participation in the program, empowering them to tackle intolerance and play a more active role in society. Young people were also believed to have been more affected by Prevent, which was considered helpful since they are being targeted by radicalizers and would suffer the most if Prevent did not focus on them. In addition, a key component of Prevent—Channel—received largely supportive comments from respondents. Channel is a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction

panels. Comments were largely supportive, quoting its successes and supporting its continuation. The majority of responses to the consultation events were broadly supportive of the aims and objectives of the previous Prevent strategy. Findings reveal that concerns and criticisms were mostly aimed at the implementation rather than the overall strategy. In fact, key concerns raised were that the strategy had not been clear enough and that the objectives were overly ambitious and had been open to misinterpretation. Better communication of the strategy was the other prominent issue raised in responses, as the Prevent brand was tarnished and unpopular within communities. Many respondents felt that the strategy was too Islam-focused and stigmatized individuals of the Muslim faith. Results from the equality impact assessment supported this since the strategy was perceived to have had a disproportionate impact with regards to religion, belief, and to some extent, race, namely on Muslims of South-Asian, Middle-Eastern, or African heritage. Over 80% of consultation respondents believed that Prevent should address a wider range of threats, including not only Al Qaeda, but also violence from extreme right-wing or other ethnic or religious radical organizations. Furthermore, young individuals, especially men, were perceived to have been particularly negatively impacted by Prevent, as they were targeted on the presumption that they were at greater risk of radicalization. Ultimately, the review points out the difficulty of evaluating the strategy and offers recommendations to update it, taking into consideration the outcomes of their reviewing process. However, no limitation and discussion sections were presented in the manuscript by the authors, which is a major limitation according to our team. In addition, the evidence was based on perceptions of participants who did not go through the program, and there was no information on the how the data was analyzed. The sample was not detailed enough, and the findings lacked precision, with the constant use of subjective terms such as “some,” “the majority of,” “several,” etc.

Table 2.24—Summary of Evidence

Study	Joyce (2018) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (in schools), UK.
Objectives of the Program	1) Identify children who may be vulnerable to radicalization; 2) Know what to do when they are identified; 3) Build resilience to radicalization through promoting British values and enable them to challenge extremist views; 4) Manage concerns via setting-based safeguarding policies.

Sample Characteristics	The author identified 38 teachers through termly planning meetings and by talking to them individually. The sample consisted of 27 female and 11 male teachers working in two high schools and 10 elementary schools. Seven held undergraduate degrees, 21 had postgraduate certificates, and 10 had master's degrees. 33 participants were White British, two were British Asian, and three were Black British. The level of experience that teachers had in implementing Prevent in schools varied greatly: 15.8% had no experience, 31.6% had less than one year of experience, 50% had between two to five years of experience, and 2.6% had more than five years of experience.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Pragmatic, sequential, mixed-method design. <i>Quantitative:</i> Cross-sectional data collected via paper-based surveys. <i>Qualitative:</i> Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to expand on quantitative results. The 38 surveys included information on teachers' sociodemographic and professional characteristics, as well as their attitudes towards the implementation of Prevent. 10 teachers were then interviewed on their general awareness of radicalization and extremism, the fidelity of Prevent, their attitudes towards Prevent, dosage and adaptations made to the program, the quality of the training received, how their pupils reacted to discussions around Prevent, and any other factors that might have affected the implementation of Prevent in schools. Thematic analysis using NVivo12 was applied to analyze the interviews.
Positive Outcomes	Most teachers identified anti-radicalization training as highly important.
Negative Outcomes	1) A large proportion of the teachers expressed that Prevent had not been easy to deliver in their schools, that they had not received enough training, and that they did not feel particularly comfortable putting it into practice; 2) Teachers defined and understood radicalization and extremism in different ways, affecting their perception of what their duty under Prevent legislation should be; 3) Most teachers felt that they were not given enough time to deliver the content, with few opportunities to generalize the training; 4) Teachers' general perception of Prevent is that it has a greater emphasis on policing, as opposed to educating, leading to uncomfortable tensions for some participants; 5) There was a widespread view that there were not enough resources to deliver the program effectively, with teachers having to make up many of their own PowerPoints, documents, and other resources; 6) Almost all teachers had to make adaptations to the program for it to be fit for purpose; 7) The training of the program was deemed inconsistent, with some receiving the training online only.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size; 2) The data collection took place in schools where the author worked as a trainee educational psychologist, and as such, it is possible that teachers may have been more likely to get involved in the project, having had contact with the author in the past; 3) It is also possible that teachers who were willing to talk about radicalization and extremism already had strong views about the topic; 4) Limitations inherent to cross-sectional research (e.g., giving only a snapshot) and semi-structured interviews (e.g., possible lack of objectivity).
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of Study (/10)	9

Joyce (2018) studied teachers' beliefs and values toward radicalization and extremism, and their perceptions and attitudes towards the implementation of Prevent strategies in primary and secondary UK schools. The study comprised 38 teachers (27 women and 11 men) from different ethnicities: 33 White British, three Black British, and two British Asian. Seven participants held undergraduate degrees, 21 had a postgraduate certificate, and 10 had completed a master's degree. A pragmatic, sequential, mixed-method design was adopted for the research. Quantitative data was

collected via 38 paper-based surveys where participants were asked about their sociodemographic and professional characteristics, as well as their attitudes towards the implementation of Prevent. Ten participants were then purposively selected to conduct semi-structured interviews. Open-ended questions on teachers' general awareness of radicalization/extremism and their evaluation of Prevent's implementation produced the qualitative data. The surveys were analyzed through descriptive statistics, and the interviews were examined by

thematic analysis. The results revealed that most teachers highly valued anti-radicalization training. However, they expressed that Prevent had not been easy to deliver in their schools, that not enough training was provided, and that they did not feel particularly comfortable putting Prevent into practice. Teachers defined and understood radicalization and extremism in different ways, affecting their understanding of their duty under the Prevent legislation. Almost all teachers had to make adaptations to the program for it to be “fit for purpose” and had to address the issue of radicalization on their own time. There was a widespread view that there were not enough resources to deliver the program

effectively. Teachers’ general perception of Prevent was that it has a greater emphasis on policing, as opposed to educating, leading to uncomfortable tensions in classrooms. Finally, the training of the program was deemed to be inconsistent with those receiving training only through online resources. Overall, the research disclosed negative outcomes as pertaining to Prevent duty for teachers in primary and secondary schools. The author noted multiple limitations to their study: the research’s small-scale, possible selection biases among participants, and limitations inherent to cross-sectional research and semi-structured interviews.

Table 2.25—Summary of Evidence

Study	Kundnani (2009) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	1) Challenge violent extremist ideology and disrupt its promoters; 2) Support institutions in activity fields related to prevention; 3) Support individuals who are being targeted and potentially recruited in violent extremist causes and support mainstream voices; 4) Increase resilience of communities and address grievances.
Sample Characteristics	<i>32 participants:</i> Six Prevent program workers and managers in local authorities, 10 members of local Prevent boards, 10 voluntary sector workers engaged in Prevent, and 6 community workers familiar with local Prevent work. All but 5 participants were Muslim and half were women. Interviewees were selected based upon their experience and knowledge of Prevent projects, rather than being established community leaders; they had a range of prior perspectives on Prevent, ranging from refusing to work on Prevent, to neutral ones, to viewing it positively. Participants were located across England.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	32 interviews (half face-to-face, half by telephone) followed by a roundtable event with 24 participants to explore in more detail the issues that were raised in the interviews. <i>Questions in the interviews and roundtable were about the following:</i> 1) the general impact of Prevent funding at the community level; 2) the definition of extremism in Prevent-funded projects; 3) whether Prevent efforts foster social cohesion or exacerbate inter-communal conflicts and divisions; 4) how Prevent programs interact with the local democracy; 5) how Prevent programs depict Muslim communities; and 6) whether Prevent programs involve non-police agencies in intelligence gathering.
Positive Outcomes	None reported.
Negative Outcomes	1) Prevent programs construct the Muslim population as a “suspect community”; 2) Fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and others; 3) Encourages tokenism; 4) Facilitates violations of privacy and professional norms of confidentiality; 5) Is counter-productive in reducing the risk of political violence; 6) Has been used to establish one of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Evaluation based on participants who did not go through the program; 2) Potentially biased sample as to their prior opinions of Prevent.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Kundnani (2009) evaluated the general impact of Prevent funding and projects at the community level and examined its effects on social cohesion. The study focused on local authorities in England that

have received Prevent funding and voluntary sector organizations in those areas to find out the following: 1) the general impact of Prevent funding at the community level; 2) the definition of extremism in

Prevent-funded projects; 3) whether Prevent funding foster cohesion across communities or exacerbate inter-communal conflicts and divisions; 4) how Prevent programs interact with local democracy; 5) how Prevent views Muslim communities; and 6) whether Prevent involves non-police agencies in intelligence gathering. The research took place over a six-month period. During the first part of the study, 32 interviews were conducted (half of these were face-to-face, the rest over the phone) with six Prevent workers and managers in local authorities; 10 members of local Prevent boards; 10 voluntary sector workers engaged in Prevent work; and six community workers familiar with local Prevent work. All but five participants were Muslim, and half were women. In selecting interviewees, the researchers were interested in speaking to people with experience and knowledge of Prevent projects rather than with established community leaders. Among those interviewed, there was a range of perspectives on Prevent, from those refusing to work on Prevent, to those who were engaged in Prevent projects but with significant concerns, or to those who were reasonably positive about the way Prevent had been designed and implemented. As a follow up to the interviews, a roundtable event with 24 participants explored in more detail the issues raised in the interviews. Overall, the participants voiced

several negative outcomes arising from Prevent. Participants argued the following about the program: 1) It constructs the Muslim population as a “suspect community” due to its focus on Muslims; 2) It fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and others (for example, many participants reported that arbitrarily favoring “moderate” [e.g., Sufis] versus “extremist” [e.g., Salafis] worldviews has generated a climate of distrust and suspicion); 3) It encourages tokenism; 4) It facilitates violations of privacy and professional norms of confidentiality; 5) It is counter-productive in reducing the risk of political violence, due to its the promotion of a depoliticizing approach that undermines and discourages democratic deliberation and radical discussions on political issues; and 6) It has been used to establish one of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain. In short, participants identified Prevent as a strategy that alienates the very people it wants to serve. Although Kundnani (2009) did not discuss them in his paper, the research suffers from two limitations: The evaluation was based on participants who did not go through the program (staff rather than individuals potentially at risk of violent radicalization), and the selection of participants could have been biased (participants with a mostly negative opinion of the program).

Table 2.26—Summary of Evidence

Study	Kyriacou et al. (2017) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (in universities), UK.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Obstruct university students' exposure to radical and extremist narratives and thereby derail the path to violent extremism. <i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Stop campus speakers from inciting terrorism; 2) Block access to websites inciting terrorism on campus computers; 3) Offer pastoral support to radicalized individuals or those becoming radicalized (students and staff members).
Sample Characteristics	<i>Nine British Muslim undergraduate students.</i> Invitations to participants were sent to contacts at several universities in the UK, who were asked to forward the invitations to members of the Islamic Society in their respective institutions.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	The aim of the study was to explore participants' perceptions concerning Prevent and its impact on their sense of personal and national identity. Data was collected over an eight-week period via an online questionnaire. The questionnaire comprised five-point Likert scale questions to measure agreement with a number of statements and 12 open-ended questions which required the students to report their views on the following: 1) To what extent are the students aware of the government's Prevent strategy?; 2) How do the students think the Prevent strategy will impact their experience of higher education?; 3) What do these students think about the Prevent strategy and its effectiveness in combating terrorism?; and 4) Has the Prevent strategy had any influence on their sense of personal and national identity?
Positive Outcomes	1) Participants had a general understanding of Prevent; 2) One student felt Prevent enhanced his/her identity as a British Muslim.

Negative Outcomes	1) None of the participants believed Prevent was effective or would ensure that students are not radicalized; 2) The majority of participants believed that Prevent failed to understand the root causes of terrorism and could use more effective strategies; 3) Most felt that Prevent encourages Islamophobia and suspicion of young Muslims, that it is clearly focused on Muslims, and not—as stated by the government—on a broad range of groups that might be involved in terrorism; 4) Several were worried about possible negative repercussions on Muslim students’ university experience (such as feeling isolated, becoming extra vigilant about what they say, and discourage them from going to university); 5) Three participants said that Prevent made them feel like they did not belong in Britain and made Muslims feel that they are an isolated and monitored group; 6) One participant described Prevent as institutionally racist.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Low response rate; 2) Small, unrepresentative sample; 3) Researchers had no way of knowing which universities the participants attended.
Limitations (Team)	Lack of details about the sample.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Kyriacou et al. (2017) explored the views of a small sample of British Muslim students regarding Prevent and its impact on their sense of personal and national identities. The sample consisted of nine undergraduate students who were recruited through members of the Islamic Society at their respective institutions. Over an eight-week period, an online questionnaire was administered. It comprised five-point Likert scale questions to measure agreement with a number of statements and 12 open-ended questions which required the students to report their views on the following: 1) To what extent are the students aware of the government’s Prevent strategy?; 2) How do the students think the Prevent strategy will impact their experience of higher education?; 3) What do these students think about the Prevent strategy and its effectiveness in combating terrorism?; and 4) Has the Prevent strategy had any influence on their sense of personal and national identity? The responses overall revealed negative outcomes. First, none of the participants believed Prevent was effective, nor that it would ensure students did not become radicalized. Second, the majority of participants believed Prevent failed to understand the root causes of terrorism and could benefit from employing more effective strategies.

Third, most argued that Prevent encourages Islamophobia or suspicion of young Muslims, and that it is clearly focused on the Muslim community and not—as stated by the government—on a broad range of groups that might be involved in terrorism in the UK. Fourth, several participants were worried about possible negative repercussions on Muslim students’ university experiences, such as feeling isolated, becoming extra vigilant about what they say, and being discouraged from going to university. Fifth, three participants said Prevent made them feel like they did not belong in Britain and made Muslims feel that they are an isolated and monitored group. Finally, one participant described Prevent as “institutionally racist.” Alongside these negative perceptions, most participants said they had a general understanding of Prevent and its processes. Indeed, one participant felt that Prevent enhanced his/her identity as a British Muslim. Limitations in the study highlighted by the authors include the low response rate and ensuing small sample size, its potential unrepresentativeness, and the fact that researchers had no way of knowing in which universities the participants attended. In addition, the manuscript was scarce on details about participants.

Table 2.27—Summary of Evidence

Study	Lakhani (2012) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Five main objectives:</i> 1) Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; 2) Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate; 3) Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or have already been recruited by violent extremists; 4) Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; 5) Address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting.

	<p><i>Two specific objectives:</i> 1) Develop supporting intelligence, analysis, and information; 2) Improve strategic communication.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>56 male participants recruited through snowball sampling.</i> 12 members of the Muslim community; 31 individuals involved with this community (e.g., imams, representatives); one minister; two high-level public servants; three government employees; one police officer; two university teachers; and four researchers.</p> <p><i>Respondents were categorized into two groups:</i> 1) informed informants (individuals conducting deradicalization and counter-radicalization work at the grassroots level within particular local Muslim communities) and 2) community members (members within four distinct local Muslim communities who were not, to the author's knowledge, directly exposed to those with extremist beliefs).</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Data collection:</i> Data was gathered over a nine-month period through in-depth, semi-structured interviews across England. Several respondents were interviewed multiple times.</p> <p><i>Data analysis:</i> Transcriptions of the interviews (produced by the author using Express Scribe) were analyzed using a combination of both thematic and comparative analyses. NVivo 8 was used for qualitative analysis.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p>A very small minority of grassroots groups believed many elements of the Prevent strategy were crucial to their work to provide a stronger support structure for at-risk individuals.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p>1) <i>Funding issues:</i> Money invested through the Prevent Strategy was being wasted because many of the funded projects were far removed from the overarching aims of Prevent. Local authorities lacked knowledge and confidence on how to allocate funding for projects run by non-state actors. Local authorities were accused of funding groups with whom they already had established networks, regardless of whether these organizations had the capacity, knowledge, or experience to achieve the aims of Prevent. Local authorities were opting to fund projects which seemed to be the safest, easiest, and most risk-averse. There was a disconnect between local and central governments with a lack of specified guidance from central to local. Finally, participants felt that the government was "throwing money at the issue" in order to be seen as actively attempting to reduce the threat.</p> <p>2) <i>Community confusion:</i> Participants found it difficult to see any obvious correlations between the commissioned projects they knew and the end goal of Prevent, due to blurred lines between community cohesion projects and counter-terrorism work. Terms such as "terrorism," "radicalization," and "violent extremism" were being used under the Prevent banner when in reality, many projects had very little, if any, meaningful connections with these issues.</p> <p>3) <i>Intelligence gathering/spying:</i> Prevent was perceived as being used as an intelligence-gathering or spying tool for the State. Many feared that these methods, when coupled with other counter-terrorism legislations (e.g., detention without charge), could potentially disrupt the lives of individuals who were later released without charge. Muslim communities were looking at one another with suspicion, causing an element of distrust and apprehension. Half of the grassroots respondents admitted they either regretted receiving Prevent funding, subsequently refused it, or attempted to conceal it from their communities.</p>
Overall Outcome of the Program	<p>Negative.</p>
Limitations (Authors)	<p>1) Lack of trust towards the researcher; 2) Unwillingness to discuss sensitive issues around the topic of terrorism.</p>
Limitations (Team)	<p>1) Poor reporting of sample characteristics and research methodology; 2) Evaluation based on participants who did not go through the program; 3) Potential conflict of interest in the choice of participants (e.g., ministers and government employees); 4) Lack of female participants.</p>
Quality of Study (/10)	<p>6</p>

Lakhani (2012) assessed the perception and reception of the UK's Prevent Strategy using a sample of 54 male participants who were either 1) conducting deradicalization or counter-radicalization work at the grassroots level within local Muslim

communities or 2) Muslim community members who were not, to the author's knowledge, directly exposed to those with extremist beliefs. The research gathered data over a nine-month period through in-depth semi-structured interviews across England.

Transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed through a combination of thematic and comparative analyses using NVivo 8. The data revealed three main concerns: 1) *Funding issues*: Participants believed money invested through the Prevent Strategy was being wasted because many of the funded projects were far removed from the overarching aims of Prevent. Local authorities lacked knowledge and confidence on how to allocate funding for projects run by non-State actors. Local authorities were also accused of funding groups with whom they already had established networks, regardless of whether these organizations had the capacity, knowledge, or experience to achieve the aims of Prevent. Furthermore, local authorities were opting to fund projects which seemed to be the safest, easiest, and most risk-averse. There was a disconnect between local and central governments with a lack of specified guidance from central to local. Finally, participants felt that the government was “throwing money at the issue” in order to be seen as actively attempting to reduce the threat. 2) *Community confusion*: Participants found it difficult to see any obvious connections between the commissioned projects of which they were personally aware and the end goal of PVE due to the blurring of lines between community cohesion projects and counter-terrorism work. Terms such as

“terrorism,” “radicalization,” and “violent extremism” were being used under the Prevent banner, when, in reality, many projects had very little, if any, meaningful connections with these issues. 3) *Intelligence gathering/spying*: Participants argued that Prevent was being used as an intelligence-gathering or spying tool by the State. Many feared that these methods, when coupled with other counter-terrorism legislations (e.g., detention without charge), could potentially disrupt the lives of individuals who were later released without charge. Muslim communities were looking at one another with suspicion, causing an element of distrust and apprehension. Half of the grassroots respondents admitted they either regretted receiving Prevent funding, subsequently refused it, or attempted to conceal it from their communities. The study has several limitations; as the author recognized, lack of trust towards the researcher and an unwillingness to discuss sensitive issues around the topic of terrorism greatly limited the number of participants and reliability of the collected responses. Limitations not mentioned by the author comprise the lack of female respondents, potential conflicts of interest in the choice of participants (stakeholders who did not go through the program), and poor reporting of sample characteristics and research methodology.

Table 2.28—Summary of Evidence

Study	Younis & Jadhav (2019) Targeted primary and secondary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (in health care), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Identify and report patients who show signs of vulnerability towards radicalization.
Sample Characteristics	<i>16 National Health Service staff</i> : 10 psychiatrists, three psychologists, two general practitioners, and one manager; nine men and seven women; nine Muslim and seven non-Muslim; 10 ethnic minority and six White British.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Data collection</i> : All participants were recruited via snowballing. Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were carried out in person, as well as over the phone, and lasted between 30 minutes to two hours. A two-way dialogue was used to unpack participants’ experiences of Prevent training and its translation into practice. <i>Data analysis</i> : A thematic content analysis was used to measure the narratives, where a mind map was constructed to connect themes to particular social contexts.
Positive Outcomes	None reported.
Negative Outcomes	1) Fear and moralizing discourse intrinsic to Prevent training; 2) Self-censorship among health care staff, more prominently for Muslim participants, who experienced anxiety and fear about speaking out during training; 4) Perception of Prevent as a racist policy which first and foremost targets Muslim populations; 5) Moral distress, anger, and lack of trust arising from structural issues within the National Health Services, which were amplified by integrating Prevent training.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.

Limitations (Authors)	1) Most participants already held critical positions towards Prevent; 2) Small number of participants; 3) Lack of delineating between various health professionals participating in the study; 4) Prevent training sessions may have differed significantly during the ethnographic fieldwork.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Younis and Jadhav (2019) studied Prevent’s impact on 16 National Health Service (NSH) professionals, who participated in mandatory Prevent counter-radicalization training. Participants were recruited via snowballing and comprised nine men and seven women, of whom nine were Muslim, and seven were non-Muslim. In addition, 10 participants were from ethnic minorities, and six were White British. Already at the beginning of the research, participants expressed varying degrees of dissent to Prevent policies. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews were carried out in person, as well as over the phone. A thematic content analysis was used to qualitatively understand the participants’ experiences with Prevent training and their ability to share these experiences with others. Two overarching themes associated with the self-censorship of health care staff during Prevent training were identified. Fear and morality were underscored in the first theme: Participants identified Prevent training as morally charged and were afraid that they would be labelled as a terrorist sympathizer if they raised criticism about the program. Participants also labelled Prevent as a racist policy, which first and foremost targeted Muslim populations. Muslim participants reported difficulties navigating the moral salience of Prevent

and the moral distress it caused them through self-censorship. The second theme was related to structures in the NHS beyond Prevent, which nonetheless contributed to self-censorship. Participants were more self-conscious about censorship when they received training with staff they did not know as it made them feel distrustful towards each other. In addition, participants did not tend to raise their dissent when they perceived trainers simply as mediators/actors following institutional scripts. The “reluctant trainer” effect was exacerbated when the trainers themselves recognized that Prevent may pose ethical concerns but were compelled to follow the script they were given. Finally, participants expressed concerns about the limited time and attention they could devote to personal and ethical matters in the healthcare climate, highlighting the austerity and burn out issues in the UK context. The authors mentioned a number of limitations to their study, namely the exclusion of participants who may feel neutral or supportive towards Prevent, the small sample size, the lack of delineation between participants who come from a wide range of health professions, and ethnographic fieldwork being affected by significant changes occurring during Prevent training sessions.

Table 2.29—Summary of Evidence

Study	McDonald & Mir (2011) Targeted primary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (Pathfinder), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Improve mutual understanding on issues of policing, crime, and community safety between police, stakeholders, and select individuals from Black and minority ethnic communities residing in London. Improve policy development and service delivery for communities in the future.
Sample Characteristics	<i>1st phase:</i> 1,149 community residents from five boroughs: Newham (Tamil Sri Lankan), Tower Hamlets (Bangladeshi), Redbridge (Pakistani), Haringey (Turkish/Kurdish and Turkish/Cypriot), and Ealing (Somali). 54% men, 46% women; average age < 30 years old. <i>2nd phase:</i> 48 Muslim community members of 10 different ethnicities among participants that were recruited in the first phase.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Qualitative data collection:</i> Semi-structured questionnaires, one-on-one interviews, and expert briefings. <i>1st phase:</i> Local consultations in all five boroughs using semi-structured questionnaires to gather feedback from residents on a range of concerns about local crime, community safety, and local policing. <i>2nd phase:</i> More in-depth research (one-on-one interviews) on issues that emerged in the first phase.

Positive Outcomes	1) Decreased sense of suspicion and anxiety because of inter-group contact; 2) Better relations between Muslims (and other communities) and the police where mutual understanding and engagement had previously been low.
Negative Outcomes	<i>1st phase:</i> Participants expressed a number of issues afflicting their communities, which included: 1) a lack of trust and confidence in policing; 2) hate crimes and Islamophobia; 3) hidden crimes (such as domestic violence, forced marriage, and drug use); 4) youth crimes and gangs, and 5) vulnerability of young people to gang recruitment. <i>2nd phase:</i> Focused more precisely on the issue of Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorism, participants felt the Prevent program: 1) was excessively focused on their community; 2) led to a strong sense of discrimination; 3) decreased community trust and confidence in the police leading to under-reports to the police; 4) described the Muslim community as a single-faith group which tended to alienate this community; and 5) was discriminatory and institutionally racist. Finally, 6) police intervention was not seen as a helpful tool for prevention with discontent expressed by Muslim respondents on account of unfair and discriminatory “stop and search” incidents experienced in their communities.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	<i>Pre-held attitudes of participants:</i> 1) Lack of community trust in the police; 2) The subject of Prevent was itself already contentious, especially within Muslim communities.
Limitations (Team)	The interviews in the second phase, led by volunteers from the same communities as the participants, may have led to biases and created obstacles to the participants’ ability to freely express their opinions.
Quality of Study (/10)	6

McDonald and Mir (2011) present the results from a community-engagement program called Pathfinder, which assessed UK’s Prevent program by focusing on local issues of policing, crime (violent extremism), and community safety between the police, stakeholders, and a sample of Black and minority ethnic communities residing in London. Five community organizations facilitated peer-led engagement research in the boroughs. Approximately five volunteers from each community organizations were selected on the basis of the following: 1) their interest in participating and contributing to local policing and community safety issues; 2) access to and knowledge of their own communities; 3) lack of understanding and engagement with local services (including the police) in their community; 4) ethnic background; and 5) ability to add value to existing engagement activities. These volunteers received training and capacity-building instruction to help them undertake their local fieldwork in the community. The study, using semi-structured questionnaires, interviews, and expert briefings, collected qualitative data from 1,149 community residents in five London boroughs; 54% were men and 46% women, with an average age of below 30 years old. The first phase of the study revealed a number of issues afflicting the communities: 1) a lack of trust and confidence in policing; 2) hate crime and Islamophobia; 3) hidden

crimes (such as domestic violence, forced marriage, and drug use); 4) youth crime and gangs; and 5) vulnerability of young people to gang recruitment. The second phase of the program focused more specifically on the issue of Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorism. Interviews of 48 Muslim community members across 10 different ethnicities revealed that local Muslims felt that the Prevent program: 1) was excessively focused on their community; 2) led to a strong sense of discrimination; and 3) decreased community trust and confidence in the police, leading to under-reports to the police. Respondents also expressed concerns over how their faith was being misrepresented in the wider media. Contrary to these negative results, some participants believed that Prevent had decreased sense of suspicion and anxiety because of inter-group contact and led to better relations between Muslims and the police where mutual understanding and engagement had previously been low. The large sample size and the variety of representatives across different sections of the city display a sound research method. However, as mentioned by the authors, the results must be interpreted in light of the pre-held negative attitudes of participants towards Prevent and the police. One limitation not mentioned by the authors was the potential social desirability arising from interviews of the second phase being conducted by volunteers from their own communities.

North America

Positive Outcomes

Table 2.30—Summary of Evidence	
Study	Castillo (2015) Primary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) iWatch Anti-Terrorism Program, USA.
Objectives of the Program	Use community-oriented policing programs to foster positive relationships among community members and law enforcement as a means of creating partnerships to gather information about suspicious terrorist behavior.
Sample Characteristics	10 LAPD officers (eight men, two women; between 30 and 51 years old; seven patrol-level officers and 3 full-time supervisors) and eight community members (four men, four women; between 30 and 67 years old; education ranging from high school to graduate). All participants were purposefully recruited based on their familiarity with the iWatch program.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Qualitative explanatory single-case study.</i> 18 one-on-one semi-structured interviews comprising 31 open-ended questions, administered face-to-face or over the telephone across a period of eight weeks. Interview questions were field-tested by two anti-terrorism professionals with experience in the field of law enforcement and research. <i>Data analysis:</i> Transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed through a constant comparative method to identify emerging codes, which were then sorted into themes concerning participants’ perceptions of the iWatch program.
Positive Outcomes	1) iWatch was seen as a valuable program for anti-terrorism purposes; 2) Community policing was seen as an effective tool against terrorism; 3) Law enforcement education was perceived positively; 4) iWatch was thought to create effective guardians within the community who would be able to work with law enforcement professionals to report suspicious terrorist activities; 5) Feelings of empowerment, acknowledgement, and mutual trust were associated with iWatch.
Negative Outcomes	1) Federal government failed to provide specific guidelines for anti-terrorism in the US; 2) Lack of communication regarding anti-terror guidelines/programs between the federal government, law enforcement, and community.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Selection of a very specific population and site; 2) Findings limited in scope/participants/geographic region, therefore, not applicable to other contexts; 3) Methodology did not account for existing views and biases of participants and researchers.
Limitations (Team)	Potential conflict of interest in the choice of participants (e.g., police officers).
Quality of Study (/10)	9

Castillo (2015) explored the perceptions of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los Angeles community members concerning LAPD’s iWATCH, a partnership program aimed at countering violent extremism by building positive relationships between police departments and the communities they serve. The research employed an explanatory single-case study design within a qualitative approach and focused on iWatch’s idea of capable human guardians as an important section of community policing for reporting suspicious terrorist activities. The participants, who were purposefully selected based upon their familiarity with the iWatch program, included 10 key informant LAPD law enforcement members (eight men and two

women; between the ages of 30–51 years old; seven patrol-level officers and three full-time supervisors) and eight Los Angeles community members (four men and four women between the ages of 30–67 years old). A field test was performed with two anti-terrorism professionals with experience in the field of law enforcement and research to assess the credibility of the interview questions. Eighteen one-on-one semi-structured interviews that comprised 31 open-ended questions were administered face-to-face or over-the-telephone across a period of eight weeks. Data collection consisted of a transcript-based analysis record of the interviews. A constant comparative method was employed to identify emerging codes, which were sorted into themes

concerning participants' perceptions about iWatch. Results revealed that, overall, participants believed iWatch was valuable for anti-terrorism purposes. More specifically, participants recognized community policing as an effective tool against terrorism and considered law enforcement education on anti-terrorism as a positive engagement. Furthermore, participants indicated that the iWatch program was a valuable tool for both community and law enforcement members. Finally, feelings of empowerment, acknowledgement, and mutual trust were associated with the program. Participants also highlighted shortcomings, namely the federal government's failure to provide specific

guidelines for anti-terrorism efforts and the lack of communication regarding anti-terror guidelines/programs between the federal government, law enforcement, and community. The author recognized that the lack of control for pre-existing views of participants, the selection of a very specific population and site, and the limited scope and focus of the interviews might have limited the representativeness and applicability of results. Another limitation not mentioned by the author pertains to the potential conflicts of interest arising from interviewing police officers to assess a program run by the police department itself.

Table 2.31—Summary of Evidence

Study	Helmus & Klein (2019) Secondary prevention Islamist and far-right radicalization
Program and Country	Redirect Method, USA.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Prevent unobstructed access to extremist content. <i>Specific objective:</i> Expose individuals searching for violent extremist content on Google to an ad that redirects them to counternarrative videos.
Sample Characteristics	Google AdWord technology was used to identify Google searches in the US for violent radical content. Those who did the searches were subsequently exposed to counternarrative videos in the search results. 216,221 searches were identified during the duration of the program.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Descriptive statistics about the number of searches for violent radical content and the number of clicks on counternarrative videos.
Positive Outcomes	The campaign effectively exposed individuals searching for violent jihadist or far-right content to videos offering alternative narratives. Among those exposed, 2.39% clicked on a link leading to a counternarrative video. This result is on par with industry standards in web advertising. The campaign was more successful in placing Google ads and CVE videos in front of users who searched for violent jihadist content than in front of individuals who searched for far-right extremist content. In addition, more users looking for violent jihadist content (3.19%) clicked on counternarrative links than those looking for far-right content (2.22%).
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	Partial evaluation that did not assess the impact of the counternarrative videos on users' attitudes and behaviors.
Limitations (Team)	1) Not enough information about the methods, namely the content of counternarrative videos, and by whom they were produced; 2) No information about the keywords that were used to trigger the Redirect method.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Helmus and Klein (2019) assessed the impact of the Redirect Method, a PVE campaign implemented in 50 US states. The Redirect Method used Google Ad technologies to identify 216,221 searches looking for either violent Islamist or far-right extremist content. The campaign then exposed those individuals to an advertisement in their search results that linked to counternarrative videos. The results of this study suggest that the Redirect Method achieved its primary goals: to expose individuals searching for

violent jihadist or far-right content to counternarrative videos. However, the campaign was more successful in placing Google ads and CVE videos in front of users who searched for violent jihadist content than those looking for far-right extremist material. In addition, more users looking for violent jihadist content (3.19%) clicked on counternarrative links than those looking for far-right content (2.22%). Even though the overall outcome of the program was considered positive, the

authors mentioned that this partial evaluation did not assess the impact of the video content on users' attitudes and behaviors. In addition to limitations identified by authors, there was a lack of information about counternarrative videos: What is their content,

who produced them, and how was exposure to videos measured? Furthermore, no information was provided regarding the keywords used to trigger the Redirect method.

Table 2.32—Summary of Evidence

Study	Williams et al. (2016) Primary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	World Organization for Resource Development (WORDE), USA.
Objectives of the Program	<p><i>Main objective:</i> Create and maintain networks of civically engaged individuals who are sensitized to violent extremism and who have proactive, cooperative relationships with local social services and law enforcement agencies.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives:</i> Promote volunteerism, youth civic engagement, cross-race/cross-religion social integration, and family relationship building.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>179 youth and adults in Montgomery County, Maryland.</i> These individuals fell in one of two categories. The first was comprised of those who had participated in any of WORDE's programs ($n = 133$). To ensure data was collected across demographic categories, a stratified random sample was selected from the list of interested participants. The second category was comprised of 46 individuals who reported participation in volunteerism or multicultural events, but never with WORDE. These participants were recruited by interfaith and public-school partners in Montgomery County, as well as in electronic bulletin boards (Facebook, Craigslist, Google groups).</p> <p><i>Both groups were statistically matched with respect to nine factors:</i> 1) religiosity; 2) religious dogmatism; 3) political extremism; 4) amped political extremism; 5) emotional stability; 6) historical loss; 7) modern racism; 8) resiliency and coping; and 9) trust in police. No additional demographic information was provided on the participants.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Data collection:</i> Focus groups were held with individuals who participated in WORDE volunteer-service or multicultural programs, where the researchers asked about motivations to participate and perceived benefits. The various answers were distilled into categories that the research team considered PVE-relevant: 1) feeling welcomed; 2) feeling part of something bigger than oneself; 3) feeling a sense of teamwork; 4) making friendships beyond the project; 5) making friends with people from other races; 6) feeling useful; 7) having responsibilities; 8) having leadership responsibilities; 9) feeling a sense of purpose; 10) feeling free of peer pressure; 11) feeling accepted; 12) not feeling lonely; 13) not feeling afraid to talk to others; and 14) learning about other cultures.</p> <p><i>Data analysis:</i> Employing time-series analyses, change in attendance to PVE program events was also tested. Combined to factor analyses, this allowed the authors to predict individuals' future participation in activities and programs. Additionally, to compare those who had participated in WORDE with those who volunteered in other programs or multicultural events, propensity-score matched analyses were employed.</p>
Positive Outcomes	1) Participants felt the project had its intended effects on 12 of the 14 outcomes believed to be relevant to PVE; 2) No discernable iatrogenic effects.
Negative Outcomes	1) Two outcomes scored below the midpoint (making friends with people from other races and having leadership responsibilities); 2) None of the outcomes were significantly better in comparison to the subsample of participants who volunteered or participated in multicultural events other than WORDE.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Some secondary PVE projects under WORDE could not be implemented during data collection and thus were not included in this evaluation; 2) Social desirability bias may have affected responses and was not controlled for; 3) Findings may not be generalizable; 4) Findings rely on inferential statistics; 5) Insufficient data (i.e., events/time points) to yield any discernable patterns or trends over time regarding the size of attendance at WORDE's various programs.

Limitations (Team)	1) Lack of demographic information; 2) Compares WORDE participants' responses to those of individuals who have taken part in similar projects rather than a fully-fledged control group.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) is a US, community-based, and Muslim-led organization of committed individuals, local social services, and law enforcement officers. WORDE's approach to PVE does not consist of a single program, but an interlocking set of three types of programs: 1) community education; 2) Islamic training for Law Enforcement and cooperation between community, law enforcement, and social services; and 3) volunteerism and multi-cultural programming. Williams et al. (2016) evaluated the effects of all of WORDE's volunteer-service and multicultural programming on 14 PVE-relevant outcomes. To do so, 179 individuals were administered the same survey. 133 of them had previously participated in a WORDE program and the 46 remaining had attended similar but non-WORDE programs. The instrument, created and tested by the authors, measured the following PVE-relevant constructs: 1) feeling welcomed; 2) feeling part of something bigger than oneself; 3) feeling a sense of teamwork; 4) making friendships beyond the project; 5) making friends with people from other races; 6) feeling useful; 7) having responsibilities; 8) having leadership responsibilities; 9) feeling a sense of purpose; 10) feeling free of peer pressure; 11) feeling accepted; 12) not feeling lonely; 13) not feeling afraid to talk to others; and 14) learning about other cultures. The WORDE participants' responses to this 99-item survey revealed that the volunteering and

multicultural projects were perceived to have achieved 12 out of the 14 expected outcomes relevant to PVE. These included the feeling of working in a team, having a sense of purpose, being accepted, and collaborating in something bigger than oneself. The only two outcomes that were not achieved were making friends with people from other races and having leadership responsibilities. However, by comparing scores of the two groups on the successful outcomes, no statistically significant difference was found. In other words, WORDE programming's expected outcomes were reliably produced but not in a superior way relative to other similar types of programming. Factor analyses further revealed that participants' future participation in WORDE projects could be significantly predicted by their level of satisfaction, the quality of alternatives, and the level of personal investment, with these three factors explaining 77% of the scores for self-reported commitment to the projects. The authors mentioned several limitations to their research, including the possibility of a social desirability bias, or that the results could not be generalized outside of Montgomery County (Maryland). The team also noticed that there was no demographic information on the sample and questioned the decision to use individuals who participated in similar programs (outside of WORDE) instead of a fully-fledged control group. Notwithstanding these limitations, this study offered a clear analysis of perceived program outcomes.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.33—Summary of Evidence

Study	Campbell III (2011) Primary prevention General violent radicalization
Program and Country	See Something, Say Something, USA.
Objectives of the Program	1) Make the public more aware of tactics used by terrorists; 2) Keep the public more informed of threats; 3) Empower the public to report suspicious activities to the proper authorities; 4) Work closely with state and local authorities, as well as community groups, to fight crime and terrorism.
Sample Characteristics	A total of 25 individuals participated in this study, separated into two groups. <i>Government subsample (n = 10)</i> : Department of Defense employees were recruited using both a purposive and snowball sampling technique. Half of these participants were females, and the mean age was 48.8 years old, with participants ranging from 41 to 61 years old. All participants but one were Caucasian. <i>College students subsample (n = 15)</i> : Students were recruited through convenience sampling in communication department classes at a Mid-Atlantic university. 12 participants were

	women, and three were men. The mean age of this subsample was 22.4 years old, with individuals ranging between 18 and 33 years old. Five students were Caucasian, four were Afro-American, three were Asian, one was East-Indian, one was Persian, and one was Middle Eastern.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Data collection:</i> The author conducted 25 in-depth semi-structured interviews, using a protocol pre-tested with two graduate students in communication. The interviews asked basic demographic questions and how the participant made meaning of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and campaign messages. Detailed transcriptions of the recordings were made. <i>Data analysis:</i> Using a grounded theory approach, the author looked for patterns, concepts, themes, and ideas that emerged from the data.
Positive Outcomes	1) A sense of empowerment due to giving citizens the ability to do something; 2) Raising awareness and increasing vigilance; 3) Informing the public to recognize domestic terrorism as a threat and challenging preconceived associations of terrorism with Middle Easterners (or Islam); 4) The campaign messages had a somewhat greater impact on young adults.
Negative Outcomes	1) Participants felt that the Department of Homeland Security should do more to publicize the campaign. All were receptive to the messages, but few had ever heard of it; 2) Although they felt they should be involved in the campaign, the messages had a smaller impact on government employees.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) The author conducting the interviews can lead to biases in the data; 2) Because the government subsample was mostly unaware of the campaign, it could not be considered as the "internal public" subsample, which the author would have wanted. Therefore, the study became a comparison of two external publics: the government and young adults.
Limitations (Team)	1) Small sample size limits generalizability; 2) No detailed qualitative results were reported—only positive and convenient quotes selected by the author; 3) Lack of precision in the result section: subjective terms (e.g., "most," "a majority," "many") were used instead of clear numbers and statistics; 4) No description of the content of the campaign videos and press releases, which could have helped to understand why the campaign was unknown to most participants.
Quality of Study (/10)	6

Through a qualitative study, Campbell III (2011) aimed to evaluate the impacts of the Department of Homeland Security's See Something, Say Something counter-terrorism campaign. The goal of the campaign was to raise public awareness of terrorist tactics, keep them informed of potential sources of danger, and encourage them to report suspicious activities to the authorities. In order to examine how the campaign messages would impact various publics, interviews were conducted with two groups. The government subgroup comprised 10 Department of Defense employees recruited using a purposive and snowball sampling technique. Ages varied from 41 to 61 years old ($M = 48.8$), and women accounted for half the sample. Nine participants were Caucasian, and one was from another ethnicity. The external public subgroup (participants who did not work for a government agency) came from a Mid-Atlantic university. Fifteen students were recruited during classes from the communication department, using a convenience sampling method. All students but three were women, ages varied between 18 to 33 years old ($M = 22.4$), and this subsample was culturally diverse: Five students were Caucasian,

four were Afro-American, three were Asian, one was East-Indian, one was Persian, and one was Middle-Eastern. All 25 interviews were conducted by the author, adopting an interview protocol pre-tested with two communication graduate students. The interviews began with basic demographic questions, followed by a few questions that sought to understand how participants made meaning of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Participants then read two press releases regarding the campaign, followed by a viewing of the See Something, Say Something campaign video. Participants were then asked how they made meaning of the campaign messages. In order to conduct the analyses, detailed transcriptions were made by the author and coded in three steps: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. This permitted for patterns, concepts, themes, and ideas to emerge from the data to determine how both subsamples made meaning of the campaign messages, and if those messages were effective in getting the public to act. All in all, the messages from See Something, Say Something were well received and had several impacts. One of the campaign goals was to raise awareness and

vigilance, and it was successful for 16 participants (most of them from the student subgroup). Empowering the public to report suspicious activities to the proper authorities was another goal of the campaign, and it was met. In fact, most participants expressed a sense of empowerment following exposure to the campaign, and 19 expressed direct feelings of self-efficacy. A sense of personal responsibility for counter-terrorism efforts was also expressed by 9 participants (7 from the student subgroup and 2 government employees). Several student participants expressed a desire to be involved but felt that before being exposed to the campaign, they did not know how. After exposure, many participants knew how to take action and felt compelled to do so. Finally, the last goal of the campaign was to inform the public on terrorist threats and tactics. After being exposed to messages, most participants realized that domestic terrorism was a real threat. Some participants who previously associated terrorism with Middle-Easterners or Islam recognized that other threats exist, challenging their preconceived notions of terrorism. However, it should be noted that even though all participants were receptive to the messages, few had ever heard

of the campaign before the evaluation study. Therefore, participants felt that more efforts should be made by the Department of Homeland Security to publicize the campaign. Limitations mentioned by the author include the possibility that the interviewer (and author) biased the information and ensuing data. The author also mentioned operationalization issues, which led to the comparison of two external publics (government employees and students) rather than an internal and external public. Our team also noticed other limitations, such as the small sample size, which limits generalizability. In addition, the evidence is not particularly robust, as no detailed qualitative results were reported—only positive and convenient quotes selected by the author. Furthermore, the results lacked clarity since subjective terms like “most,” “a majority,” and “many” were used instead of precise numbers. Finally, the article did not provide much information regarding the content of the campaign videos and press releases, which could have helped to understand why the campaign was ineffective in reaching most participants prior to the evaluation study.